The Art of Dwelling

Jakob Due Lorentzen

PhD Thesis



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PhD dissertation by Jakob Due Lorentzen

Main supervisor: Dorthe Jørgensen

Dept. of Philosophy and History of Ideas

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SUMMARY

The dissertation advances a contemporary thinking of dwelling referred to as *the art of dwelling* based on a thematic reading of the concept of dwelling in Martin Heidegger's late works. The investigation is informed by Heidegger's 1962 journey to Greece and his resulting travel book, *Aufenthalte* (*Sojourns*). These serve as a structuring prism for exploring Heidegger's late reflections on place and experience, which come to a head in the encounter with the ancient Greek artifacts and landscape.

The study opens with an investigation of the concept of dwelling [*wohnen*] understood as a composite term (in chapter 1). In order to appreciate the full experiential activity of dwelling, the conventional notion of *wohnen* is expanded to incorporate Heidegger's notions of *verweilen* and *aufhalten*, so that the spatial [*wohnen*], the temporal [*weilen*], and the experiential [*aufhalten*] aspects of the term all come to the fore in a thematic reading of *Sojourns* and other late writings of Heidegger. Reflected in *Sojourns* is also an overarching discussion of homelessness and dwelling, as well as an examination of Heidegger's thinking of technology and the history of being as conditions for the inquiry (in chapter 2).

The exposition of dwelling as a composite term has implications for the notion of place. Following an examination of how dwelling presupposes a sense of place and an ontology of atmosphere in *Sojourns* and in the late Heidegger more generally (in chapter 3), the study brings these intertwining concepts into conversation with contemporary perspectives. What emerges from Heidegger's findings in *Sojourns* on the sense of place, and his thinking on sculpture (in chapter 5) in terms of spatiality and dwelling, is the key concept of receptivity in relation to dwelling. In this way, Heidegger's thinking on place is brought into conversation with contemporary modern art and literature, motivating a reappropriation of the notion of place.

Following these lines of development, the study advances a contemporary thinking of dwelling referred to as *the art of dwelling* (in chapter 6) as a mode of being in the world. The study finds renewed potential for a thinking of place, atmosphere, and embodied experience today by calling attention to the activity of the *Aufenthalt* and the concept of atmosphere reflected in dwelling as a sensitivity toward the singularity of the world.

RESUMÉ

Kunsten at dvæle

Afhandlingen præsenterer en nutidig filosofisk refleksion over begrebet ”dvælen” på baggrund af en tematisk læsning af Martin Heideggers såkaldte sene værker. Undersøgelsen bygger på Heideggers rejse til Grækenland i foråret 1962, som er skildret i rejsebogen, *Aufenhalte* (da. Ophold, eng. Sojourns). Mødet med den antikke arkitektur og det græske landskab sætter Heideggers egne tanker om dvælen på spidsen, og bogen udgør derfor et omdrejningspunkt i afhandlingen.

Afhandlingen åbner med en undersøgelse af begrebet dvælen i Heideggers sene forfatterskab. Det viser sig, at den konventionelle forståelse af dvælen som *Wohnen* må udvides til også at rumme Heideggers brug af ordene *weilen* og *aufhalten* for at kunne afspejle den erfaringsmæssige dimension af dvælen fuldt ud. Herved træder de spatiale [*wohnen*], temporale [*weilen*] og erfaringsmæssige [*aufhalten*] aspekter af dvælen alle frem. Afhandlingen rummer desuden en overordnet diskussion af Heideggers teknologikritik og værenshistoriske tænkning, som en forudsætning for at forstå spørgsmålet om dvælen og hvordan vi erfarer verden.

På baggrund af Heideggers egne stedserfaringer i *Aufenthalte* samt hans refleksioner over rum og skulpturkunst etableres et begreb om receptivitet som et centralt træk ved det at dvæle. Spørgsmålet om dvælen knytter således an til en forståelse af stedets og atmosfærens ontologi, hvilket undersøges i en læsning af Heideggers sene tænkning holdt op imod nutidige stemmer. Med udgangspunkt i eksempler fra moderne samtidskunst og litteratur føres en diskussion af Heideggers stedstænkning, hvilket leder til en gentænkning af selve stedsbegrebet.

I forlængelse af undersøgelsens forudgående kapitler præsenterer afhandlingen afslutningsvis et nutidigt filosofisk bud på ”kunsten at dvæle”. Afhandlingen finder fornyet potentiale i en tænkning af sted, atmosfære, og kropslig erfaring udmøntet i opholdet [*Aufenthalt*] som aktivitet. Herved vindes en poetisk sensitivitet overfor verden, som finder sted i mødet med verdens singularitet.

C O N T E N T S

ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS

References to the work of Heidegger are provided in footnotes to the English translation when available and to Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* (complete works), abbreviated GA and followed by the volume number and the pagination, for example: GA75, p. 215. *Sojourns*, p. 1.

A separate list in reference of the volumes in the *Gesamtausgabe* cited in this study is provided in the bibliography. English translations of Heidegger's works are listed in the bibliography.

Joan Stambaugh's translation is preferred as the English version of *Being and Time* throughout the study. I also reference the earlier translation by Macquarrie and Robinson, but only when clearly stated.

The two exceptions from the citation practice of *Gesamtausgabe* are the use of *Sein und Zeit* which I cite in the Niemeyer single edition and *Die Kunst und der Raum* which I refer to in the English translation by Neil Leach.

A separate reference list of the epigraphs in the study is provided at the end of the bibliography.

Part of the discussion in chapter 5 is an elaboration of "Sculpture and the Sense of Place", published by De Gruyter in *Open Philosophy*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 2019 as part of the topical issue "Experience in a New Key".

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for Marie & Solvej

I wonder if we are ever to find the region that we are seeking? And whether the finding will ever be given to us, if we visit the still existing land of the Greeks and greet its earth, its sky, its sea and its islands, the abandoned temples and the sacred theaters?

Martin Heidegger, *Sojourns*

> Lost things. They claw through the membranes, attempting to summon our attention through an indecipherable mayday. Words tumble in helpless disorder. The dead speak. We have forgotten how to listen.
>
> Patti Smith, *M Train*

I N T R O D U C T I O N

This study advances a reading of Heidegger's later thinking that focuses on the notion of dwelling. The study is informed by Heidegger's own journeys to Greece as a point of entry for exploring dwelling in relation to a thinking of place and experience. Heidegger's travel book, *Aufenthalte*, plays an important role throughout this study as a structuring principle and a recurring reference point to the reflections here rendered. This study proposes an account of the art of dwelling, grounded in Heidegger's analysis of dwelling as a mode of being in the world, that offers renewed potential for a thinking of place, atmosphere, and embodied experience today.

Over the course of several years, I have had the fortune of teaching a philosophy course on ancient Greece that included taking university students to Greece for first-hand encounters with the land and places that we study. These encounters also included the study of *Aufenthalte*, and the reflections and conversations that took place during these trips serve as a backdrop for this study. Travelling in the footpath of Heidegger is indeed a curious undertaking. Heidegger's reflections and visits involve more than a single plane of thought; rather, a double movement appears, which opens up more than a few avenues. At the heart of this double movement are two encounters. The first encounter is with Heidegger's thinking, his reflections on place and travel, and his thoughts on the particular visits and experiences made in Greece. The second encounter is with the places themselves. The locations were journaled by Heidegger, but to study these renderings on location also made for another layer of impressions, experience, and reflection.

Aufenthalte

In 1962, aged 72, Heidegger traveled to Greece for his first ever visit to the country. For a long time, he had put off plans of a trip to Greece, but now a present from his wife, Heidegger finally came around to making the journey.[1] During the trip, Heidegger writes his reflections on the events into the text later published as *Aufenthalte* and dedicated to his wife.

Aufenthalte,[2] or in English *Sojourns*,[3] is something as rare as a philosophical travel book. It is a short piece, just over 30 pages, and published in 2000 in volume 75 of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* (complete works) alongside his account of a later, second trip to the Aegean Islands under the title *Griechenlandreisen*. But *Aufenthalte* is a work in its own right. It was first published in 1989 as a separate publication for the occasion of Heidegger's 100th anniversary.[4] Other researchers have found an interest in Heidegger's journey book. In English scholarship, John Sallis and Andrew Mitchell both call attention to the significance of Heidegger's Greek sojourn[5]. Writing from the perspective of art, Paul Duro offers a short but insightful reading of *Aufenthalte*, while juxtaposing Goethe and Heidegger.[6] In a German context, Peter Geimer has mused over Heidegger's mundane situation and personal perspective in "*Frühjahr 1962*"[7] with the somewhat ironic yet biting subtitle: "*Ein Touristenschicksal*" – destiny of a tourist.

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[1] Petzet, H. W. (ed). *Martin Heidegger-Erhart Kästner Briefwechsel*, Frankfurt a. M. Insel Verlag, 1986, p. 43. Plans for a trip with Erhart Kästner and his wife two years earlier had been called off by Heidegger. The decision to finally travel after all is recounted by Luise Michaelsen in her remarks "*Zur dieser Ausgabe*" in the publication of *Aufenthalte* for the occasion of Heidegger's 100th anniversary in 1989.

[2] Heidegger, Martin. *Aufenthalte*. Vittorio Klostermann, 1989.

[3] Heidegger, Martin. *Sojourns*. Translated by John Panteleimon Manoussakis. SUNY Press, 2005. *Aufenthalte* is translated into English by Manoussakis as *Sojourns – The Journey to Greece*. The term "sojourn" is well-chosen. In English, a sojourn is a stop along the way, a waystation, in terms of a rest or a staying. The term therefore implies most of the same meaning as the German *Aufenthalt*. Heidegger's title also alludes to a historical stay or sojourn – the time of the Greeks – which is also possible with the English title. As explained in chapter 1, the multifaceted term *Aufenthalt* also refers to dwelling in several aspects.

[4] The 100th year anniversary publication of *Aufenthalte* is a facsimile edition of Heidegger's original manuscript and also contains several water color paintings made by his wife, Elfriede, during the trip.

[5] Apart from the brief foreword to Manoussakis' English translation, *Sojourns*, Sallis has also surveyed the history of architecture and buildings of worship informed in part by Heidegger. Mitchell reads even more into Heidegger's journeys to Greece, proposing a new direction in Heidegger's late thinking based on the travelogues of GA75, *Aufenthalte* and *Zu den Inseln der Ägäis*. Here, the Greek archipelago becomes a metaphor for the detected change from a uniform, unequivocal conception of Greece as "one Greek Island" at the end of *Aufenthalte*, to a fractured, decentralized, "archipelagic" thinking of the relational cluster of Greek Islands in the Aegean Sea.

[6] Duro, Paul. "The Return to the Origin: Heidegger's Journey to Greece." *Art Journal*, 66, no. 3, 2007, pp. 88-101.

[7] Geimer, Peter. "Fruhjarh 1962: Ein Touristenschicksal." *Verwindungen. Arbeit an Heidegger*, Edited by Wolfgang Ullrich, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003, pp. 45-62.

Throughout this study, I will cite John P. Manoussakis' English translation of *Aufenthalte*, entitled *Sojourns*, and reference the German original text in the notes below. For the same reason, I will refer to the work as *Sojourns* throughout the study, unless in reference to the specific German publication. When relevant, I will include the original German terms in brackets. Citation quotes are listed in reference to both the German complete works, *Gesamtausgave*, e.g., GA75, and the English translation of *Sojourns*.

A well-rounded work of its own, carefully crafted and composed by Heidegger, *Sojourns* is first and foremost a travel book. These are not live notes in any strict sense, but rather reflections made during and, more likely, following the visits. Heidegger's reflections of events are to some degree worked into a larger narrative. And yet the text also comes to us with the appeal of a journal and a clear sense of day-to-day events unfolding before our very eyes. Heidegger's own mood and writing changes as he visits the different locations, reflecting the changing itinerary. He at one point even shares the decision to stay on the boat, avoiding the company of his fellow travelers who disembark. *Sojourns* is not an academic book, in the sense that it has no footnotes and very rarely goes into the kind of philosophical explanations of his more formal lectures. It is not a lecture or a lecture worked into an essay, as is the case with many of Heidegger's later writings. *Sojourns* is a reflection on travelling, replete with allusions to work that has been done elsewhere. As such, the book serves as a window into Heidegger's later thinking.

Sojourns places Heidegger firmly in the Greek landscape in front of sanctuaries and temples that were once sacred places of worship and communal significance. In a series of visits or stays – *Aufenthalte* – to places in and around the Greek mainland, Heidegger comes face to face with the remains of a world that has come to take up most of his own thinking. Heidegger himself is keenly aware of this fact and the relation to his own philosophy with its appraisal of the uncorrupted Greek world. In hindsight, he would later refer to the journey of *Sojourns* as a *Prüfung*, that is, "a test as to whether the basic features of the attempted interpretation of the Greek origin of Western thinking, the question of *alethia*, was indeed to be confirmed."[8]

[8] GA75, p. 249. My translation. Heidegger incomplete text, "Zu Den Inseln der Ägäis," is the account of a later trip to Greece in which he refers to the defining role of this first journey reported in *Aufenthalte*. The German reads: *"Anderes als auf der ersten Fahrt nach Griechenland, die zur Prüfung werden sollte, ob der Grundzug der versuchten Auslegung des Anfangs des abenländischen Denkens bei den Griechen, die Frage nach der Ἀ-λήθεια, ihre bewährende Antwort fände aus dem Anblick der alten noch als Natur und Werk waltenden Welt."*

Throughout his career, Heidegger had written extensively on the significance of Greek thought, but always from afar, so to speak, always through the distance of philosophical argument. Now, at the age of 72, the perspective of an imminent actual encounter may well have unsettled the aging thinker – although Heidegger was not likely blind to the theatrics of self-postponement either. Whatever the reasons, Heidegger's hesitation would come to an end with the journey to Greece. But as in the ancient Greek notion of boundary – *peras* – the boundary of *Sojourns* implies not only an end but also a new beginning. Over the following five years, Heidegger would visit Greece four more times.

By the time of *Sojourns*, however, Heidegger had rarely sat foot outside of Germany, apart from a few trips to Italy and around the Netherlands. Travelling by cruise ship, Heidegger and his wife found themselves part of a larger company of travelers – tourists, in fact, and ironically so, given Heidegger's own reservations about the modern tourist industry and its lack of reflection. Yet over the course of two weeks, the journey chronicled in *Sojourns* introduces Heidegger to all the major sites of Ancient Greece. The book is built around these visits. In fact, the locations themselves play the central role in Heidegger's reflections. As such, *Sojourns* draws attention to the sense of place and the importance of the particular.

In the narrative presented in *Sojourns*, Heidegger examines the contrast between the world of the ancient Greek and our modern world. The central question posed in the text is how and whether it is still possible to access and experience the traces of this golden age long gone. The journey to Greece thus places Heidegger in a Greek landscape that allows him to accentuate the question of the particular place and our relation to the "shrine" of Greek spirituality. In doing so, *Sojourns* exposes the tension between the world of the Greeks and Heidegger's assessment of modern Greece in light of his thinking of a history of being.[9] In the midst of this tension, we find the places visited.

As a result of Heidegger's reflections on Greece and the particular places he visits in *Sojourns*, these places take up their own role in the present study. The reason for this is simple. Each visit is a reflecting mirror for the issues at hand. They serve as examples to illustrate aspects of Heidegger's thinking and are presented accordingly in connection with his reflections

[9] Heidegger's own term for this is *Seinsgeschichte*. It implies a particular conception of history and being that is examined in chapter 1.

and impressions. The list of particular places included in this study goes as follows: The Acropolis and the Parthenon; Cape Sounion and the Temple of Poseidon; Olympia and the Temple of Zeus; Delphi and the Temple of Apollo; The island of Aegina and the Temple of Aphaia; Mount Kynthos and the island of Delos.

Sojourns will serve as a structuring principle for this study. Heidegger's own visits will be used to reflect the concepts under discussion. Chief among these are the following:

1) A contemporary notion of dwelling – referred to later in this study as *the art of dwelling* – is informed by Heidegger's late reflections on place and experience, which come to a head in his encounter with ancient Greek artifacts and the Greek landscape.
2) The concept of dwelling [*Wohnen*] understood as a composite term. The study calls attention to an expanded notion of dwelling reflecting the full range of the concept, in which both the spatial (wohnen), the temporal (weilen), and the experiential (aufhalten) aspects of the term come to the fore in a thematic reading of *Sojourns* and other late writings of Heidegger.
3) An expanded notion of place. Following an examination of how dwelling presupposes a sense of place and an ontology of atmosphere in *Sojourns*, and in the late Heidegger more generally, the study brings these intertwining concepts into conversation with contemporary perspectives.
4) The study of Heidegger's thinking of sculpture. Informed by the journey to Greece and the visit to Olympia in particular, the study examines Heidegger's reflections on sculpture and dwelling through the lens of contemporary art and literature. As a result, the study advances a contemporary notion of dwelling referred to as *the art of dwelling*.
5) Heidegger's thinking of technology and the history of being as conditions for the inquiry.

Exposition

The study of dwelling presented here falls into six chapters. The outcome of the investigation will reveal how the concepts of dwelling and place intertwine and depend on one another, making room for a sensitivity toward the world that holds potential for a contemporary thinking of

dwelling that I refer to as *the art of dwelling*. In order to investigate these concepts, dwelling and place are first treated as separate objects of analysis, then later, together as a concept pair.

In chapter 1, *The Concept of Dwelling*, I offer a thematic reading of Heidegger through the concept of *Wohnen*, examining the full breadth of dwelling as a composite term. It emerges that in order to appreciate the full experiential activity of dwelling, we must expand on the conventional notion of *Wohnen* to incorporate Heidegger's notions of *verweilen* and *aufhalten*.

Chapter 2, *Arrivals*, begins with Heidegger's arrival to Greece. As he sets out on a long-envisioned journey, the chapter identifies the tension in *Sojourns* between two trajectories in the work – one hopeful and one discouraging – and traces the root of this tension to Heidegger's thinking of technology as a conditioning premise for *Sojourns*, as for all modern thinking. At stake here is the unveiling of our own situatedness and historical removal from the Greek sojourn in light of Heidegger's theory of the history of being.

Chapter 3, *A Sense of Place*, is an examination of the ontology of place. With Casey, the chapter argues that Heidegger's writings fall short of addressing the experiential dimension of place and embodiment. Instead, an expanded notion of place is needed to adequately account for the role of place in relation to dwelling. Borrowing from Schmitz and Böhme, the chapter explores the experiential dimension of place through a thinking of atmosphere and affectivity in order to establish a commonsensical and comprehensive notion of place that also reflects the expanded notion of dwelling as a composite term.

Chapter 4, *A Sense of Greece*, is an exploration of the concept of place in Heidegger's thinking in relation to *Sojourns* and his later thinking. The chapter argues for the relevance of the particular place, and ties the notions of home and homelessness to a discussion of receptivity and sacred places through an exploration of Heidegger's visit to Cape Sounion and the island of Delos.

Chapter 5, *A Thinking of Sculpture*, opens with an account of Heidegger's visit to Olympia. The visit sets up a discussion of Heidegger's later thinking of sculpture that establishes the central idea of receptivity for a thinking of dwelling. This receptivity is examined not only in the grounded character of Chillida's place-bound artworks, but also, and critically, in the ephemeral openness of the air encompassing Echelman's art and the poetry of Spahr. Heidegger's notion is

thus challenged by a juxtaposition with contemporary modern art posing in light of a contemporary sense of place as immersive, embodied, and dynamic.

The study concludes, in chapter 6, *The Art of Dwelling*, by reconsidering dwelling as an *art* based on the findings in the study. Through examples from Smith, Espedal and others, the contours of a contemporary thinking of dwelling emerge in attunement to the singularity of the world. This sensitivity is a way of being in the world in the receptivity and responsivity of the art of dwelling.

The Lateness of Heidegger

Heidegger scholarship generally agrees to reference a later period in Heidegger's thinking, although there is less agreement on which works fall into it. The idea of a later Heidegger presupposes one or more earlier periods in the span of his oeuvre. While it would be tempting to simply apply a "before and after" in reference to Heidegger's own assertion of a turning [*die Kehre*], some scholars subdivide the periodization of Heidegger's work into three parts, naming an early, a middle, and a later period. Following this line of thought, this study follows the periodization of Heidegger's work applied by Mitchell,[10] by which Heidegger's thinking falls into a tripartite division: the early period (1912-1932, including *Being and Time*); the middle period (1933-1944, including *The Origin of the Work of Art* and *Contributions to Philosophy*); and the late period (1945-1976) referencing the so-called "later writings." Heidegger's later thinking thus refers to the post-war period, starting with the 1949 Bremen lecture cycle, *Insight into That Which Is*. In the present study, all references to Heidegger's later writings, as well as to that of his "later thinking" and his "late thought," are used synonymously and in accordance with the aforementioned division.

Needing mention on the topic of periodization, while it makes good sense to operate with a later period in Heidegger's thinking, which develops into its own set of ideas and themes, such as rethinking the role of language and expanding the terminology at hand, it would nonetheless be wrong to regard this lateness in Heidegger's thinking in isolation, artificially separate from his earlier thinking. To the contrary, the later thinking is informed by the earlier work and, as such, it

[10] Mitchell, Andrew J. *The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger*, Northwestern University Press, 2015, p. 6.

may be seen as a continuation of many basic questions and motifs. While there are obvious ruptures and developments in both form and content, for reasons that are laid out in this study, Heidegger's concern with the question of being and the forgetting of being are in fact ongoing philosophical underpinnings throughout the authorship.

This study calls attention to Heidegger's focus on *the concrete* as one such philosophical undercurrent. Emphasis on the particular in its particularity – the nearness and concreteness of things and places - emerges in Heidegger's late thought in relation to dwelling. As such, it constitutes a leitmotif throughout Heidegger's later thinking. The art of dwelling examines the role of the particular in relation to dwelling as a mode of being in the world. This focus on the particular in its particularity holds consequences for the way we experience space and place, and the relation to things. Heidegger's own reflections on these matters most distinctively comes to the fore in his writings on *the thing* and *the fourfold*. As this study argues, however, the same attention to the particular in its particularity can be found in Heidegger's reflections on art – in particular in Heidegger's thinking of sculpture. Consequently, throughout this study, art constitutes a versatile venue for examining Heidegger's thinking of dwelling and sense of place.

Preliminary Perspectives on Dwelling

Already in *Being and Time*, Heidegger expresses an intense interest in the way humans are in the world. What is unique and characteristic of human existence is that we always already find ourselves in a world. Heidegger phases human existence in terms of *Dasein*, as literally, a "being-there." It reflects the human condition of being "there," the thrownness of being into the particularity of facticity, a "there-ness," so to speak, and it reflects the special way in which humans are in the world as *Dasein*. We are *Dasein* because of the way we exist in a world. Unlike other beings, *Dasein* is characterized by not having an essence, but rather, "the essence of *Dasein* lies in its existence,"[11] Heidegger writes. In the lines that follow, Heidegger outlines the "mineness" [*Jemeinigkeit*] of *Dasein* and introduces a fundamental distinction between two modes of being in the world:

[11] Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh, SUNY Press, 2010, p. 41.

> The kinds of being [*Seinsmodi*] as authenticity [*Eigenlichkeit*] and inauthenticity [*Uneigentlichkeit*].[12]

In other words, *Dasein* is concerned with its own being and, critically, *how* we are in the world falls into the normative divide of authentic or inauthentic being. This distinction is also a premise for Heidegger's later thinking of dwelling. One of the main insights of the analysis of fundamental ontology in *Being and Time* is that Dasein is projected toward its own existence. Dasein is characterized by its ecstatic being in that it "stands out," and Heidegger reserves the formal term *Existenz*, in English "existence," to describe this fundamental ontological condition. This way of being in the world as ecstatic being is unique to *Dasein*. Much in the same way that Heidegger's notion of existence describes *Dasein*'s special way of being-in-the-world as "standing out" in existence (in Latin *ek-sitere*), dwelling as *wohnen* is indicative of existential dimensionality. According to Heidegger, "dwelling [*Wohnen*] is the manner in which mortals are on the earth"[13] and, as such, it can be seen as the continuation of the thinking of existence in his earlier work.

Despite the apparent similarities, however, Heidegger's later emphasis on dwelling is also more than simply the latest installment of an earlier term. There are important differences between the earlier *Existenz* and Heidegger's later notion of dwelling through the use of the interrelated terms of *wohnen* and *schonen* (sparing). In the terminology of *Being and Time*, *Existenz* is a *formal* term and is as such an abstract, empty concept. *Wohnen*, in contrast, is a richer, non-formal term. To live in the sense of *wohnen* and *schonen* implies for Heidegger a fuller and more resonant and engaging sense of being in the world. This is evident, for instance, in his clear emphasis on verbs and in the performativity and activity implied in this verbalization of language. Whereas *wohnen* can be seen as a development of the formal term *Existenz*, *schonen*, for its part, echoes the fundamental ontological structure identified by Heidegger under the term *Sorge*, meaning care. It is this existential baggage that carries over from the analysis of the structures of fundamental ontology in *Being and Time* to the later writings, and that reverberates as

[12] Ibid, p. 42.
[13] GA7, p. 150. Heidegger, Martin. "Building Dwelling Thinking." *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. Harper Perennial, 2013, p. 146.

the hermeneutical background for understanding the existential weight of *Wohnen* and *Schonen* as they appear in the later writings, most noticeably perhaps in *Building Dwelling Thinking*.

Heidegger's analysis of the basic ontology structures of being-in-the-world in *Being and Time* also leads to his important insights on the attunement [*Befindlichkeit*] and mood [*Stimmung*] pertaining to our existence and the way we are in the world. The emphasis on nearness also finds a convincing form in Heidegger's reflections on *Sorge* [care] in the analysis of the fundamental structures of existence and how we as human beings are in the world. This is a focus upon which Heidegger insists throughout his career and which, as we shall see, will lead him to some of the most fruitful insights in his later thinking in relation to dwelling and sparing [*schonen*].

As an overarching trajectory in Heidegger's thinking, the focus on care and nearness reflects a strong commonality between *Being and Time* and Heidegger's later writings. It is this focus on human existence and the near-ontological impulse that reemerges in the introduction of dwelling. In the concept of dwelling, the subject of the present study, Heidegger's insistence on the depth and concreteness of the world arguably finds its most fruitful expression and form.

The Disenchantment of the World

Heidegger's reflections on dwelling may also be seen in light of another philosophical perspective. Although fostered outside the world of philosophy, Max Weber's thoughts on the disenchantment of the world offers a poignant framework for understanding Heidegger. In this view, the concept of dwelling becomes indicative of an underlying assumption that Heidegger's thinking confronts – although in a somewhat different way through the analysis of technology and, elsewhere, in his reflections on the role of the gods and our place in history – and in the history of being.

In his lecture on "Science as Vocation," presented at the University of Munich during the fall of 1919, Max Weber presents the idea that we live in a "disenchanted" world [*entzauberte Welt*]. The peril of our time, according to Weber, lies in our rational disposition. We have stripped the world of its ambiguity. In this fully transparent world of scientific calculation, "*there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather […]one can in principle,*

master all things by calculation."[14] It is this idea of domination and scientific mastery of the world that spills over into Heidegger later thinking. Accordingly, it is appropriate to read Heidegger's reflections on the question of technology in the scope of this Weberian characterization. Heidegger's insights on dwelling, I argue, can be viewed in light of this characterization and it is exactly this pretext of destitution that underlines the potential of dwelling. For Heidegger, the world has indeed become disenchanted, demystified by the accomplishments of modern science and by rational disposition that also lead to a fall in Western thinking from the time of ancient Greece. The consequence is a destitute time – godless and disenchanted – and it is this important pretext that informs and motivates this study to examine the full breadth and potential of the concept of dwelling. In an almost direct comment to Weber's "Science as Vocation," Heidegger makes the following assessment in *Aufenthalte*:

> It seems as if we of the present-day have long been expelled from such sojourn [*Wohnen*], trapped in the chains of calculatory planning.[15]

Underway with Heidegger

At the heart of Heidegger's thinking is the motif of being underway – *unterwegs zu sein*. Heidegger himself uses the image of the pathway to describe the multiple lines of flight that permeate, encompass, and intersect throughout his own thinking. In a sense, the image of the pathway literally becomes a "method" for Heidegger's thinking. In *Sojourns*, in a play on the etymology of the Greek word μέθοδος, as method and pathway, Heidegger points to the prospect of failure and his own initial hesitation for travelling to Greece. He references his own thinking as both a Denkweg and a possible "Ir-weg," i.e., literally as ways of thinking or thinking erroneously, respectively.[16] The motif of being underway manifests itself on several levels in Heidegger's way of thinking in contrasts, as notably in his philosophical language – whether it is the forests paths, or the field paths, or simply being "underway to language." The impulse indi-

[14] Weber, Max. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Edited and translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York. Oxford University Press, 1946. 129-156. Reprinted edition, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970.
[15] GA75, p. 238. *Sojourns*, 44.
[16] I owe the reference to *methodos* to the translation of Manoussakis. The image of the way [*Weg*] is a recurring theme in Heidegger's later writings and a preferred metaphor for his own thinking.

rectly raises the perspective of the static and inactive versus the perspective of movement and direction. These dimensions come together in the study of dwelling. As such, Heidegger's late thinking is itself a landscape, a topography of sorts, in which we travel and pause, arrive and linger – reflecting, sensing, and dwelling.

To be underway is to travel, to be on the move. In this sense, this study is itself a journey with Heidegger, as it is an invitation to think on – with, against, and beyond – the thinking of Heidegger. It is to be underway in the footsteps of Heidegger's own travels to Greece while reflecting on his own impressions and reflections thereof.

The study places itself in the tension between place (to stay) and movement (to travel), and, in this respect, it reflects a fundamental tension also relating to dwelling. On the one side is the explorative impulse of travelling. The movement outwards, outbound, open toward the new and the unknown. It holds the promise of experience and of place in that it inevitably involves a breaking up with the familiar and the sense of home. This is the evolving mode of being underway, of going somewhere, of being on the move. But travelling also holds another side – the mode of arriving. This is the opposite movement of the inbound, a returning to a place or to a home. It is the homecoming – the *nostos* – of returning from travelling, and it is the sense of the familiar, the known, or the remembrance of the once forgotten.

As we shall see, this fundamental tension of the inbound and the outbound has to do with our relation to place. In this sense, travelling goes to the heart of the notion of dwelling. As it happens, dwelling has to do with being in a place. Dwelling has to do with the spatiality, the temporality, and the attention to and experience of being in a place. It is the sense of place and the staying in a place. These aspects are particularly acute when we travel. When we visit a place, we are often more keenly aware of the place we are in and of the dynamics of the particular place. And yet this is not exceptional to travelling. Dwelling can take place anywhere. The relation to place is fundamental to all aspects of our life and happens all the time. In what follows, the perspectives on dwelling and place are raised in a philosophical discussion reflecting the implications for Heidegger's thinking of dwelling in a contemporary context. Still, the figure of travelling remains a structuring principle for this study in reference to Heidegger's travels and his reflections in *Aufenthalte*. The reason for doing this is to highlight centrality of place and dwelling. Heidegger's travels are interesting in that they bring experience and sense of place to

the fore. The sense of place is not exclusive to travelling, but travelling is emblematic of the experience of place. When we travel, we realize that we are away from home, and when we travel, we realize the dynamics of new places.

We often tend to think of travelling in the formal structure of the "there, and back again," a defining model of thinking that has informed the earliest Western literature and its continuing relevance from Odysseus to Bilbo Baggins. We may take this to reflect our notion of home. In this sense, the interpretive model of home-away-home that still haunts our conception of travel and narration, is itself shaped by our preoccupation with home as found in dwelling.

The importance of home and travel, of staying and moving, sets up the tension of inbound and outbound. This tension relates to the way we are in the world and the role of place in relation to dwelling in its widest existential sense. These conflicting perspectives come together in this study of dwelling and human existence which takes its point of departure in Heidegger's notion of dwelling. To be underway with this study is to examine the concept of dwelling and, with it, the tension of inbound and outbound. This most basic of human tensions is poignantly captured in the words of Karsten Harries:

> The opposition of *Fernweh* and *Heimweh*, centrifugal and centripetal longings, is constitutive of human beings: in all of us a longing to journey, literally and metaphorically, beyond what is all too comfortable and familiar, challenges and is challenged by nostalgia, a longing to finally settle down and call some place home.[17]

At stake as we accompany Heidegger on his travels, encircling a sense of place and dwelling, is our own situation. We meet our own longing for that which was once familiar. We trace our rootedness, our belonging, our questions concerning what we came from, who we are, and where we are going. This exploring does not come easily, as it points to the question of our dwelling and how we are in the world. Heidegger's travels are spun in a field of fundamental tension concerning how we are in the world. It is the tension of exploration and loss – of longing and belonging. In this light, we join Heidegger for the journey to Greece.

[17] Harries, Karsten. "Space and Construct." *Archipelago. Essays on Architecture. For Juhani Pallasmaa.* Edited by Peter MacKeith. Rakennustieto Oy, 2006, pp. 74-85.

CHAPTER ONE: THE CONCEPT OF DWELLING

> It seems that we have lost our capacity to dwell in time. Being outside of time is an aspect of the new homelessness of the modern man.
>
> Juhani Pallasmaa, "Inhabiting Time"

Unpacking the Concept

The main focus of this study is the concept of dwelling [*Wohnen*] in Heidegger's later thinking. This task, however, immediately prompts the question of the meaning of dwelling and how it is to be understood. What is *Wohnen*? What does it mean to dwell? What is the connotation of this concept that will organize the study? It means more than merely building buildings and inhabiting them. I am going to ask the reader to rethink and open up the concept to more than what is implied when the German *wohnen* is translated to live, to reside, to inhabit, to be at home.

Many Heidegger scholars agree that *Wohnen* convey some sense of home or being at home. But there is variation when it comes to the significance ascribed to it. Julian Young identifies dwelling as arguably "the central topic of the thinking of the late Heidegger."[18] He takes dwelling to mean "being at home," emphasizing the focus on *wohnen* and implying a sense of home in terms of an ontological security. Young further connects dwelling to art and to what he describes as a form of poetic thinking that opens up a way of "inhabiting the world poetically." This reads well with Heidegger's own emphasis on the role of "the poetic" as a privileged mode of being in "Poetically Man Dwells" [*Dichterisch Wohnet der Mensch*].[19] Karsten Harries, too,

[18] Young, Julian. "What is Dwelling?" *Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity*. Edited by Mark Wrathall and Jeff Malpas. MIT Press, 2000, pp. 187-188.
[19] GA7, p. 189; Heidegger, Martin. "…Poetically Man Dwells…." *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. Harper Perennial, 2013, p. 211.

identifies dwelling as feeling or being at home, but he analyzes the concept with a stricter focus on the role of architecture and thus favors a reading of Heidegger's essay on architecture[20] and his earlier work, "The Origin of the Work of Art."[21] Mark Wrathall offers a somewhat richer reading of dwelling by calling attention to the aspect of receptivity.[22] For both Jeff Malpas and Edward Casey, the concept of place is central for understanding dwelling. According to Malpas,[23] dwelling is to be understood in terms of the topology of being, reflecting the primacy of place. Like Malpas, Casey promotes a philosophy of place based on his reading of Heidegger. Casey explores, among other things, the variety of ways to dwell in relation to place and boundary.[24] Stuart Elden's exegetic reading of the later Heidegger also ties dwelling to place. So much so, that he introduces the neology of "the platial" to account for the relation between space, place, and dwelling. Robert Mugerauer's work on Heidegger's notions of home and homecoming[25] emphasizes the centrality of *wohnen* as a leitmotif for unpacking Heidegger's late thought. By comparison, Mitchell calls attention to the aspect of relationality in that "to dwell is to be exposed to others" while also reiterating the focus of *wohnen*.[26] He thereby indirectly provides a broader understanding of dwelling in that he widens the focus from *wohnen* to include the term *weilen* in his analysis of the thing and the fourfold.

Like many of these scholars, I will agree that *wohnen* is the central concept of Heidegger's later thinking. But I will suggest that *wohnen* will only be fully addressed when supplemented with some associated and related terms, i.e., *weilen* and *aufhalten/Aufenthalt*. Furthermore, I argue that this expanded notion of dwelling is to be understood in relation to the term *Gelassenheit*, in English "releasement," as a way of being in the world that opens up a sensitivity to the particular, which has come under threat in the modern age of technology. What emerges from a thematic reading of the later writings structured by *Sojourns* is a Heideggerian idea of

[20] Harries, Karsten. *The Ethical Function of Architecture*. MIT Press, 1997.
[21] Harries, Karsten. *Art Matters: A Critical Commentary on Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art."* Springer, 2009.
[22] Wrathall, Mark. *Religion after Metaphysics*. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Wrathall, Mark. *Heidegger and Concealment: Truth, Language, and History*. Cambridge University Press, 2011
[23] Malpas, Jeff. *Heidegger's Topology. Being, Place, World*. MIT Press, 2006.
[24] Casey, Edward C. *The Fate of Place*. University of California Press, 1998.
[25] Mugerauer, Robert. *Heidegger and Homecoming*. University of Toronto Press, 2008.
[26] Mitchell, Andrew J. *The Fourfold*. Northwestern University Press. Evanston. 2015, p. 254.

dwelling further explored in dialogue with the notion of place and contemporary art and literature, and, in particular, Heidegger's own reflections on sculpture and art. This leads to the contours of what I call the art of dwelling.

Wohnen, *weilen*, and *aufhalten* each present different aspects of the general theme of *Wohnen* and are, as such, part of a coherent whole I refer to under the concept of dwelling. What follows is a brief account of the three terms, explaining how and why they differ and where they can be said to overlap and yet still represent distinctive aspects of dwelling.

I. *Wohnen*. The German term *wohnen*[27] can be translated "to live," "to reside," "to inhabit." It is a *spatial* term, referring to the spatial aspect of our being-in-the-world. *Wohnen* opens up the broad theme of home and homecoming and is arguably the most prominent aspect of dwelling as evident in Heidegger secondary literature. In this broad sense of being at home, the term *wohnen* also relates to the German word for home, *Heim*, which indirectly also echoes the existential anxiety of the term *Unheimlich*, literally, "not being at home." In the same way, *wohnen* opens up the dimension of rootedness related to the feeling of belonging and being at home. Connotations and associated terms relating to this particular aspect of dwelling thus include various trajectories, but they share a relational meaning of home, household, or domestication in its widest sense. *Wohnen* also includes the physical element of building and buildings – literally, homes, houses, dwellings. *Wohnen* has the same root as *Wohnung*, the German noun for an apartment or a flat, and it relates to the term *Gewohnte*, alluding to the everydayness of the familiar. The term *wohnen* features prominently in Heidegger's later writings as the main feature of dwelling and is widely recognized as the common understanding of dwelling in the reception of Heidegger.

The centrality of *wohnen* becomes evident when we consult one of the essays that most directly addresses the term, namely "Building Dwelling Thinking" [*Bauen Wohnen Denken*]. In

[27] The term originates from the verb *wohnen* but is normally referred to in its capitalized form of *Wohnen* to reflect the concept of *Wohnen*. The terminology itself undergoes development in Heidegger's thinking and Heidegger's own use of terms sometimes falls outside this convention. As suggested in this study, *Wohnen* is to be viewed in relation to Heidegger's use of the terms of *weilen* and *aufhalten*. Following the exposition of dwelling presented here, I therefore use the non-capitalized form of *wohnen* in relation to *weilen* and *aufhalten* to reflect the conceptual overlap. The same applies to the use of *wohnen and schonen* to reflect the activity implied in the verb. When viewed separately, as the concept of *Wohnen*, I abide by convention.

it, Heidegger dismisses the common-sense notion of building and dwelling as a means to an end. The fact that we build houses in order to live in them does not reflect the weightiness of *Wohnen*. Instead of this linear thinking, Heidegger argues for a holistic interrelationship between building, dwelling, and thinking – hence the exclusion of commas in the title. In an etymological argument, Heidegger points to the kinship of *bauen* and *wohnen*, building and dwelling, in Old High German, arguing that, linguistically, the two terms stem from the same root of the word for being. It is a rather convoluted way of saying what is in fact the main argument of the essay, namely, that dwelling as *wohnen* is fundamental to the way we are as humans. For Heidegger, the affinity between dwelling and being is testimony of the way we are. Our "basic character" is to dwell and we are dwellers, as argued in the essay, "…Poetically Man Dwells…"[28] As it turns out, dwelling as *wohnen* is fundamental to who we are, and we therefore have to understand our basic actions and dispositions in light of dwelling. This is also the case for building, which explains why Heidegger rejects the relation between building and dwelling as a means to an end. Dwelling has to do with how we are as human beings, and thus informs everything we do. *Wohnen* opens up the existential depth of being human as the essence of what it means to be human. This existential dimension of *wohnen* therefore implies the total span of human life, from birth until death, and bestows it with meaning. In a central passage in "Hebel der Hausfreund," Heidegger writes:

> If we understand the verb to dwell [*wohnen*] in a broad and essential sense, then it names the way in which humans fulfill their wandering from birth to death on earth under the sky. This wandering takes on different forms and developments. But in all of this, the wandering remains the essence of dwelling, as the human sojourn [*des menschlichen Aufenthaltes*] between earth and sky, between birth and death, between joy and pain, between work and word.[29]

To dwell is to be at home and to be at home in the world is to accept the world existentially. To be human is to be exposed, in a sense, as defined by the dimensions of existence reflected in Heidegger's thinking of the fourfold. We may think of the notion of the fourfold as later

[28] GA7, p. 189; *Poetry, Language, Though*t, p. 213.
[29] GA13, pp. 139-139. "Hebel der Hausfreund" in *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. My translation.

Heidegger's account of "world."[30] Young reminds us that Heidegger's notion of "dwelling [*wohnen*] is a belonging within the fourfold."[31] This is also why Heidegger refers to humans as mortals and why he makes reference to the elements of earth and sky. According to Heidegger, we are pending in the field between earth and sky, finity (mortals) and infinity (divinities). This is the vocabulary of the fourfold and it reflects a thinking of existential dimensionality. *The oneness of this fourfold is the dwelling of humans as mortals*. What Heidegger provides here is the constitutive backdrop for our experiencing as human being. In this thinking, we are defined and exposed by our very existence. All of this is part of dwelling as *wohnen* and the dimension of human existence. It is this outlook that is reflected in dwelling as *wohnen* and that informs the language of the fourfold.

We may think of the fourfold as Heidegger's concept of world in his later writings, the field of interpretation in which things appear as intelligible and existentially meaningful. According to Heidegger, the fourfold is opened up by dwelling [*wohnen*] as a safeguarding or sparing [*schonen*] in which the presencing of the fourfold takes place in the particularity of the thing and in the relationality of things and world.[32] This also means that *wohnen* implies *schonen*. According to Heidegger, *schonen* is essential to *wohnen* in that "*the fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving.*" [33] But this also means that to follow through on the question of *wohnen*, we have to ask ourselves: what is *schonen*?

Schonen is a sensitivity towards the world. It is sparing, a safeguarding and a caring sensitivity in and through which we dwell. As such, it is a normative concept. As Lee Braver points out, sparing [*schonen*], like dwelling [*wohnen*], is fundamental to how we are in the world: "Genuine sparing helps something achieve its own essence, rather like the way cultivating facilitates plants growing towards their *telos.*"[34] In other words, *schonen* is a trait of what it means to be human. As such, it suffuses all we do and comes together in the notion of dwelling as *wohnen*. When understood this way, *schonen* adds a worldly, relational dimension of dwelling as *wohnen*,

[30] Young, Julian. *Heidegger's Later Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 93
[31] Young, Juilian. "What is Dwelling? The Homelessness of Modernity and the Worldling of the World" in *Heidegger, Authenticity, Modernity*, p. 202.
[32] GA7, pp. 152-153; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, pp. 147-149.
[33] GA7, p. 152; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 147. The German text reads: *"Der Grundzug des Wohnens aber ist das Schonen."*
[34] Braver, Lee. *Heidegger's Later Writings*. Continuum, p. 99.

further explicated in the supplementing experiential aspects of dwelling as *weilen* and *aufhalten* in what follows. But unlike these other aspects of dwelling, *schonen* also opens up an ethical dimension in our relation to the world as responsive and responsible. It thus holds a normativity that accentuates our relation to the world.

In the essay on architecture, "Building Dwelling Thinking," *wohnen* and *schonen* are used almost interchangeably, which further makes the case for the profound character of *schonen* as an aspect of dwelling.[35] But if we peel off the language used by Heidegger, dwelling as *wohnen* refers to a mode of being in the world – a sense of belonging and being at home as already indicated in the kinship between dwelling and being. *Schonen*, for its part, indicates the caring and sheltering inclination that accompanies or correlates with the sense or feeling of home. To be at home is to be sheltered, but this sense of home also implies a disposition to shelter and protect, an expression of care and preservation. The aspect of shelter or sheltering understood in Heidegger's notion of *wohnen*, and explicitly stated in the interrelated, co-extensive terminological pairing of *wohnen* and *schonen*, also implies the notion of place. The reason for this is that *schonen* in the sense of sheltering, sparing, and safe-guarding retains the very notion of shelter, and, thereby, also the basic dynamics of inside and outside. This is brought up in Dylan Trigg's work on the phenomenology of place: "…we are faced with an archetypal distinction between inside and outside, which relies on the primordial image of shelter, and thus becomes the elemental motif in all built spaces. Indeed, given the relationship between shelter and insideness, it is difficult to conceive of dwelling as involving anything less than an unequivocal division between inside and outside."[36] Trigg's observation reflects the dimension of place and the place-character essential to dwelling, and it hinges on the idea of "insideness of place" previously established in the field of human geography by Edward Relph[37] and David Seamon,[38] respectively. The same distinction can be applied to the thinking of Gaston Bachelard, whose work, *The Poetics of Space*, examines poetic spatiality in his psychological topo-analysis of the childhood

[35] The linkage of *wohnen* and *schonen* is not exclusing to the essay on architecture. Heidegger brings up the reference to *schonen* already in the 1949 lecture "The Thing" (GA79, p. 20) and again in "The Turn" (GA79, p. 72) where *schonen* (although not yet capitalized as a concept) as the definition of saving [*Retten*].
[36] Trigg, Dylan. *The Memory of Place*. Ohio University Press, 2012, p. 109.
[37] Relph, Edward. *Place and Placelessness*. Sage, 2008, p. 49.
[38] Seamon, David. *A Geography of the Lifeworld*. Croom Helm, 1979, p. 89.

home. In the words of Bachelard, "Memories of the outside world will never have the same tonality as those of home."[39] Trigg reconnects to Bachelard's insights as he examines "the experience of place-insideness, marked by a sense of belonging and homeliness."[40] In doing so, Trigg joins Relph and Seamon in following Heidegger's lead on the metaphor of home. For Bachelard, the distinction belongs to the realm of psychology, and yet, the same basic feature of inside-outside is at work in the constitution of how we as humans inhabit the world, be it psychologically, physically or existentially. For Heidegger, the connection between dwelling [*wohnen*], shelter, and place opens up another perspective. It involves the idea of the border as boundary in keeping with ancient Greek thinking. It involves a discussion of space and place, as will be addressed in chapter 5 in connection with Heidegger's reflection on sculpture. The notion of boundedness in relation to dwelling as *wohnen* should be cast in terms of finitude. In Malpas' reading of place, the boundedness of place and placement opens up the existential perspective of finitude in terms of the bounded character of our being as mortals fated to die.

As already indicated, what comes to the fore in the sections on place and technology is an aspect of *schonen* as a disposition of sheltering and care, which comes with great consequences and responsibility in terms of how we relate to the environment and the world. Indeed, "mortals dwell in that they save the earth,"[41] Heidegger writes. *Schonen* implies the propensity to save or redeem.[42] As we come to terms with the caring qualities of *schonen*, we may understand the term as loosely associated with the earlier notion of *Sorge*. But while *schonen* is not without overlap and familiarity with *Sorge*, in his later writings, Heidegger has left behind the terminology of *Being and Time* and has found no need to underline the connection. The reason is that the notion of *Sorge* belongs to the earlier project of analyzing the fundamental ontological structures of existence. Likewise, *Sorge* is a formal concept, unlike the later notion of *schonen*. *Schonen* is without

[39] Bachelard, Gaston. *The Poetics of Space.* Beacon Press, 1994.
[40] *The Memory of Space*, p. 109.
[41] GA7, p. 152. *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 148.
The quote refers to the fourfold of earth and sky, divinities and mortals. The reference to earth as it emerges in the fourfold through dwelling calls attention to the discussion of ecology and to our relation with the world. The same is true for the concept of *schonen* as a function of dwelling.
[42] The German term is *Retten*, as used by Heidegger. In the lecture "The Turn," Heidegger makes a similar point by listing "*schonen*" (GA79, p. 72) as the answer to the question of what saves us. Only at this point, "*schonen*" has not yet fully developed into the capitalized, substantiated concept of *Schonen* in "Building Dwelling Thinking."

such formal restrictions, and therefore implies a deeper and richer relation to the world in the terminology of Heidegger's later thinking. This is the reason for the recoding of terminology and why Heidegger does not refer to these features under the concept of *Sorge*. Instead, he describes the nurturing, sheltering, caring, and sparing qualities pertaining to *wohnen* with the term *schonen*. The gesture of *schonen* calls for a deeper relation to the world and it opens the door to environmental dimensions or implications. It is the ecological demand of *schonen* and, as such, it speaks to the intertwining of *schonen* and *wohnen*. After all, the word "ecology" derives from the Greek root *oikos*, meaning house or household. In this way, the concept of dwelling can be said to reflect an ecological ethos in Heidegger's later thinking.[43]

But there is another sense in which *schonen* can be said to go beyond and differ from the formal sense of *Sorge* in *Being and Time* – a sense that adds a crucial dimension to the concept of dwelling. So far we have identified *schonen* as sparing, focusing on the safeguarding, sheltering aspect of the word. But dwelling as *schonen* is also connected to the coining of the fourfold and the things:

> Dwelling [*Wohnen*] itself is always a staying [*Aufenthalt*] with things. Dwelling [*Wohnen*] as preserving [*Schonen*] keeps the fourfold in that with which mortals stay: in things.[44]

Dwelling as *schonen* is associated with the appropriation of the fourfold and the things in that it allows for the fourfold by sparing and preserving it. In Heidegger's understanding, dwelling as *schonen* is that which protects [*hüten*] the fourfold in its essencing. What this means is that it is dwelling that allows for the fourfold to appropriate. Mitchell explains this in terms of radiance.[45] Understood this way, dwelling as *schonen* is a conditioning relation that allows for something to

[43] The work of Michael Zimmermann reflects the range of this debate. In his early work, Zimmermann opens the field by portraying Heidegger as a forerunner of deep ecology whereas his later writings come to question this position. According to this later view, radical environmentalism presupposes a possible post-technological age which is inconsistent with Heidegger's history of being despite our human inclination to dwell and save the environment: Zimmermann, Michael. "Toward a Heideggerian Ethos for Radical Environmentalism." *Environmental Ethics 5*, no. 2, 1983, pp. 99-131.
---. "Rethinking the Heidegger Deep-Ecology Relationship." *Environmental Ethics 15*, no. 3, 1993, pp. 195-224.
[44] GA7, p. 153; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 149.
[45] *The Fourfold*, p. 256.

"shine." As will become clear over the course of this study, I understand this in terms of a receptivity and responsivity. The gesture of allowing is also a receiving. In terms of the exposition of dwelling [*wohnen*] in Heidegger's essay on architecture, *wohnen* and *schonen* are tied together in that the fundamental character of *wohnen* is *schonen*. As such, they open up for the fourfold to take place.

In regards to our relation to the fourfold, Heidegger understands our place in the world as "mortals," pointing out the defining character of finitude and mortality of the human condition. As mortals, we are exposed and open to the world which, in turn, characterizes our relation in the fourfold. Again, this is new vocabulary. In the later writings, the term *Dasein* is described in terms of "mortals," defined by our finitude, the ability to die. The later Heidegger thus rearticulates our relation to the world in existential terms as mortals in relation to the fourfold and without the formal structures of the earlier thinking. In this regard, dwelling [*Wohnen*] is indicative of this development in Heidegger's thinking. Dwelling is no neutral concept, nor does it leave room for formal descriptions of the ontological structures of existence. Rather, as a mode of being in the world, dwelling is exactly the opposite: a non-neutral, engaged entanglement with the world in and through the particularity of place. Dwelling [*Wohnen*] opens up the existential perspective of being in the world. Reflecting this thinking, Norberg-Schulz views dwelling in terms of an "existential foothold," while Wrathall understands dwelling in terms of allowing oneself to be conditioned by the world we live in so as to be in a position where demands can be made on us. According to Heidegger, dwelling is the way in which the existential dimensionality of the world appears to us – as we resonate with the world in place and with the things.

II. *Weilen*. The German verb *weilen* means to linger or be somewhere for a limited period of time, to abide for a while. It is a *temporal* category accentuating the aspect of time and duration. The verb relates to *verweilen* (to stay, to dwell) and the substantiation of *weilen* is *Weile*, which translates into English as "a while," a limited span of time. It is the root of the reflexive verb *sich langweilen*, which means to be or feel bored and in the substantiation *Langeweile.*[46] Anticipating

[46] In *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger offers an account of boredom [*Langeweile*] as a mood or feeling of being bored. Profound boredom, it turns out, is a basic mood [*Grundstimmung*] related to ground of existence. It involves his thinking of attunement [*Befindlichkeit*] and affectivity and points to the facticity of *Dasein*.

his later thinking, Heidegger gives the following account of the kinship and significance of *weilen* in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, in which he emphasizes the temporal and contemplative aspects of the word:

> "What is at issue in Boredom [*Langeweile*] is a while [*Weile*], tarrying a while [*Verweilen*] a peculiar remaining, enduring. And thus time, after all. And, as opposed to that, passing the time."[47]

It is this notion of temporality and contemplative time that reemerges in Heidegger's later thinking as a form of abiding or poetic, "thick" time. It is the dwelling that takes place and the contemplation of pausing. *Weilen* and *verweilen* refer to a duration or span of time. It is lived time, or elemental time, as examined by Bergsson in his concept of *la durée*, in contrast to measured time, i.e., the physical, organized concept of time as illustrated by the scale of the clock. *Weilen* is a free expanse of time and, in this respect, disruptive of the measured time we live by in the technological age of modernity.

The temporal aspect of *weilen* is integral to the meaning of Heidegger's *Wohnen* in his later writings, although the term already appears in another central passage in Heidegger's thinking. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger refers to this aspect of *weilen* during his analysis of moods [*Stimmung*] and attunement [*Befindlichkeit*], describing the way *Dasein* is attuned to the world, preconditioning the very way we are in the world. According to Heidegger, it is because of our attunement, our "attuned being-in-the-world," that we are able to be "touched" [*gerührt*][48] and "have a sense for something" so that what touches us shows itself in an affect [*Affektion*]. In this context, Heidegger refers to the "tranquil dwelling" or "lingering" [*ruhigen Verweilen bei…*] as a contemplative attitude.[49] In Heidegger's later thinking, the while [*Weile*] takes on a more central

[47] GA29-30, p. 145; Heidegger, Martin. *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. Translated by William McNeill and Nicolas Walker. Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 96.
[48] Heidegger, Martin. *Sein und Zeit*. Niemeyer, 17th ed., 1993, p. 137 (§29). *Being and Time*, p. 134.
[49] Ibid, p. 137 (§29). Ibid, p. 134.
The German text reads: "*ruhigen Verweilen bei….*" In the 1962 translation by Marquarrie and Robinson this is translated as "tranquil dwelling." In the translation Stambaugh, the term reads: "a tranquil lingering." The section in *Being and Time* on moods and attunement thus already anticipates the conceptual range and interrelatedness of the concept of dwelling as a composite term emerging in Heidegger's later writing.

role.[50] In "The Thing," Heidegger describes how the essence of the jug is "in a while," which may be taken to say that the thing is itself dependent on the while – the abiding span of time during which the thing things in its gathering of the fourfold:

> The jug's presencing is the pure, giving gathering of the onefold fourfold [*des einfältigen Gevierts*] into a single time-space, a single stay [*in eine Weile*].[51]

In an even more extraordinary formulation, implying the appropriation of the event [*Ereignis*], Heidegger makes the following observation: "Staying appropriates" [*Verweilen ereignet*].[52] In other words: dwelling [*weilen*] appropriates.

Since the aspect of *weilen* is the temporal aspect of dwelling, it connects well with Heidegger's understanding of *Gelassenheit*. In English, the term translates "meditative thinking" or "releasement." This latter translation is preferable, as it reflects the original verb "to release," and thus alludes to the sense of free and open contemplation that also resonates in the word. The idea of releasement, however, is also related to *wohnen* as it comes up in Heidegger's thinking to counter what he views as the domination of our technological age and the *Gestell.*[53] It represents a contemplative mode of being in the world that resists the leveling drive of technology, and offers instead, in Heidegger's own words, nothing short of "the possibility of dwelling [*wohnen*] in the world in a totally different way."[54] Additionally, Heidegger ties this mode of being in the world directly to the things in the words of an old German idiom: "releasement toward things" [*Gelassenheit zu den Dingen*].[55] The idea of releasement takes up a central place in this study, as it is in fact closely tied to all three aspects of dwelling presented here: *wohnen*, *weilen*, and

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[50] As Mitchell notes in his reading of Heidegger, *weilen* reemerges prominently in the relation of thing and world as the temporality and appropriation of things in the fourfold (*The Fourfold*, p. 297). The thing abides. Although the status of *weilen* changes over the course of Heidegger's authorship, the concept reemerges in the 1940'es and in his later writings. In Heidegger's essay on "The Thing," *weilen* takes on a constitutive character as the appropriating concept of temporality and the fourfold.

[51] GA79, p. 13. *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 171. The German text reads: *"Das Wesen des Kruges ist als die reine schenkende Versammlung des einfältigen Gevierts in eine Weile."*

[52] GA79, p. 12. *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 171.

[53] The *Gestell* refers to the leveling drive of the technological world in which everything is reduced to resource in stock [*Bestand*]. Heidegger's analysis of the *Gestell* and the technological world is discussed in Chapter 2

[54] GA16, p. 528. *Discourse on Thinking*. Translated by J. M. Andersen and E. H. Freund. Harper & Row, 1966, p. 55.

[55] GA16, p. 527. Ibid, p. 54. The quote is attributed to the German mystic, Meister Eckhart.

aufhalten. For this reason, it deserves mentioning at this point, though a closer examination of the concept of releasement is presented in the following chapter in the discussion of technology. For now, it should be noted that (similar to *weilen*) the idea of releasement involves a shift in temporality that informs our relation to things and thus prompts an alternative mode of thinking and being in the world.

Weilen is also intimately connected to things. In his essay "The Thing," Heidegger emphasizes the temporal aspect of dwelling and directly ties it to the thing through the notion of *Weile*, in the sense of "a while" and *Verweilen.*[56] In this key text, the thing seemingly takes center stage. And yet the thing is only there for a while [*Weile*] in the impermanence in which it appears to us mortals in the scope of the fourfold. Heidegger's own phrase for this is "the thinging of the thing," a reference to the way in which the fourfold comes together and appears to us in its durational character. It turns out, the temporality of dwelling in the sense of *weilen* is intimately connected to the way things appear to us. The thing abides [*weilt*], which also implies that *weilen* is constitutive for the thinging of the thing.[57] This connection between temporality and the thing is laid out in Mitchell's analysis of the fourfold.[58] Mitchell offers the translation: "abiding is an open-ended lingering,"[59] thus tying the temporal quality of dwelling as *weilen* to the thing.

III. *Aufenthalt / sich aufhalten*. The third term for understanding the meaning of *wohnen* in Heidegger's later writings is the noun *Aufenthalt* and the verb *sich aufhalten*. It grasps a multitude of aspects in Heidegger's thinking on dwelling and is indicative of an accentuation of *wohnen* as a verbalization bringing to the fore the element of *experience*, *attention*, and *action*. It is a reflexive verb that carries with it the subject. Contrary to *wohnen*, the reflexive element of *sich aufhalten* calls attention to the one who is *aufhalten* and it adds a self-reflecting element of

[56] GA79, p. 13. Heidegger, Martin. "The Thing." *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Translated by Albert Hofstädter. Harper Perennial, 2013, p. 172.
[57] GA79, p. 19. In a play of words, Heidegger refers to the oneness of the fourfold. The German text reads: "*die Einheit der Gevierts ist die Vierung."*
[58] In his examination of the fourfold, Mitchell also emphasizes the importance of *weilen*. Although his interest is with the relationality of the thing and the fourfold, Mitchell's work indirectly paves the way for the study on dwelling when associating the spatial concept of *wohnen* to the temporal sphere of *Weile and verweilen* through his study of the thing.
[59] Heidegger, Martin. *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*. Translated by Andrew. J. Mitchell. Indiana University Press. Bloomington. 2012, p. x.

individuation that echoes *Dasein* and Heidegger's emphasis on existence in his earlier work. In its substantive form, *Aufenthalt* also implies connotations to history. *Sich aufhalten* translates into English as "to stay with something," "to linger," "to pause," or "to take a sojourn." It is a multifaceted term and perhaps the most fruitful and comprehensive for understanding the wide sense of dwelling at work in Heidegger's later writing. The term entails both temporality and an element of attention and interest. To stay with something means to spend time on or with something, to find interest in something, to let oneself dwell. When you stay with something, it holds the focus of your attention. To stay with something implies that you are in a place and that you spend time with something. This aspect points to the centrality of the experience of place, that is, of being open and receptive to this particular place.

For Heidegger, the term *Aufenthalt* also, and critically, implies a historical dimension. The double meaning of *Aufenthalt* hinges on a distinction in Heidegger's later thinking between two separate levels of interpretation. On one level, Heidegger's thinking constitutes a continuous focus on human existence – from the earlier insights in the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time* to the later writings on dwelling and the fourfold, as well as the sensitivity toward a sense of place and the particularity of the particular, as we explore in this study. This line of thinking pertains to the way we are in the world and opens to aspects of authenticity and human existence. Parallel to this plane of thought, Heidegger's later thinking also reflects the thinking of the history of being. The double meaning of *Aufenthalte*, reflected also in the English title of *Sojourns*, is indicative of Heidegger's theory of history. Presupposed in Heidegger's formulations on dwelling – most explicit in his use of the term *aufhalten* and the play on *Aufenthalt*, but also implicit in the term *wohnen* – is a thinking referred to as the history of being [*Seinsgeschichte*]. According to Heidegger, being is revealed or understood differently over the course of history, each way of being constituting a particular order of intelligibility or revealing unique to the particular epoch. This is why, as Heidegger points out, being will only ever appear to us in the shape and form of our current technological age. Our access to the history of being is thus restricted to philosophical reflection on this history and in this line of thinking. Heidegger refers to our particular period of time history as an epoque or an *Aufenthalt*.

Under this distinction, the double meaning of the title of Heidegger's travel book, *Aufenthalte* – in English, *Sojourns* – comes into full view. The German title, *Aufenthalte*, in one sense,

refers to the particular trip to Greece as a stay in a foreign place, a temporary dwelling away from home under the scheme of a journey. But in another sense, *Aufenthalte* refers to the history of being and is a reference to the time of ancient Greece. In the book, Heidegger sets up the contrasting worldviews of the pre-Socratics and ours, and the tension sets up a structuring narrative for the book. For Heidegger, ancient Greece represents a golden age, authentic and unspoiled by the flawed tradition of Western metaphysics, uncompromised in its relation to nature and thinking. It presents an altogether different way of relating to being, and being reveals itself not in the guise of technology, but rather in the guise of the world of the Greeks, i.e., as truth, *aletheia*. According to Heidegger, the Greeks had access to the gods, whereas we, in the age of modern technology, are left with the traces of something that once was.

Along those same lines, the versatile term *Aufenthalte* is also a reference to mortality and human existence itself. The finitude of human existence is sometimes referred to as our time on earth or "*Aufenthalt*." Life is short, and the time we have is our *Aufenthalt*, our time on earth. Lingering in the background is a quasi-religious language, presupposing another, otherworldly existence or time. As an *Aufenthalt*, our stay in the world is temporary and limited. *Aufenthalt* thus also indicates the finitude of human existence and alludes to the human mortality and impermanence also captured in the characterization of the mortals in the concept of the fourfold.

Heidegger himself links the terms *wohnen* and *Aufenthalt*, and at times uses the two interchangeably – as is in this key passage in "Building Dwelling Thinking" in which he underscores the sensitivity toward place and the connection to things in their particularity in relation to the fourfold: "To say that mortals *are* is to say that *in dwelling* [*wohnend*] they persist through spaces [*Räume*] by virtue of their stay [*ihres Aufenhaltes*] among things and locations [*Orten*]."[60] However, Heidegger also distinguishes between the two as when using *aufhalten* or *Aufenthalt* in the sense of a mode or way of "staying with things." It was this particular use of the term that enabled him to make the connection to the relation to things and the sense of place in which he finds the unity of the fourfold: "staying with things is the only way in which the fourfold stay

[60] GA7, p. 159; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 155. The German text reads: "*Die Sterblichen* sind*, das sagt:* wohnend *durchstehen sie Räume auf Grund ihres Aufenthaltes bei Dingen und Orten."*

within the fourfold is accomplished at any time in simple unity."[61] This fourfold stay seems rather circular on the surface. We are asked, in short, to entertain the idea that the activity of dwelling entails the activity of dwelling. But what is anticipated here is the element of receptivity that needs to be taken into account and that is examined in the discussion of sculpture. This use of the term *Aufenthalt* or *sich aufhalten* as a "staying with things" as a mode of being in the world is reflected in Heidegger's thinking of sculpture and dwelling as in the essay, "Art and Space," examined in Chapter 5. In his reflections on sculpture, Heidegger elaborates on dwelling as *sich aufhalten* in the sense of staying with things in relation to sculpture and the sense of place.

In sum, the reading of Heidegger's later thinking proposed in this study argues that the concept of dwelling is in fact a composite term, that the emphasis on dwelling in Heidegger's late thought is best captured as a three-way emphasis of overlapping concepts. Central is the notion of *wohnen*, but important new dimensions are added when including the supplementary aspects of *weilen* and *aufhalten* to a reading of dwelling. The conceptual overlap in Heidegger's own use of the terms suggests this reading. As a consequence, dwelling can be understood as more than the traditional reading of dwelling as *wohnen*. A clue to this overlap may be found in the role of *weilen* and the abiding character of how things appear to us in the fourfold. Another argument for the expanded notion of dwelling is the range of the term *aufhalten* and *Aufenthalt*, and the way Heidegger makes use of the multiple aspects of the term. Playing on the ambiguity of the plural *Aufenthalte*, Heidegger is able to allude to both a historical dimension of dwelling and an experiential dimension of dwelling – as evident in title of his travel book, *Sojourns*.

An Especially Felicitous Translation

It is worth noting that all three German terms, *wohnen*, *weilen*, and *aufhalten*, can be translated into English as "dwelling." They overlap in that they are all important aspects of dwelling and share a family resemblance. In this study, this interrelatedness comes to the fore in the treatment of Heidegger's thinking of sculpture and his reflections on art and sense of place.

[61] GA 7, p. 153; Ibid, p. 149. The original German reads: "*der Aufenthalt bei den Dingen ist die einzige Weise, wie sich der vierfältige Aufenthalt im Geviert jeweils einheitlich vollbringt."*

Heidegger's multifaceted emphasis on this theme constitutes a thinking that presents, as we shall see, the potential for an alternative mode of being in the world in contrast to the technological age we live in, but that also calls for reflection in order to be unfolded. It is to inform this reflection and unfolding that the study suggests using the English translation *dwelling* when reading Heidegger's later writings in which he encircles various aspects of dwelling through a number of interrelated terms and formulations. Because of the obvious difficulties in translating Heidegger's language and thought into English, translations often fall short of grasping and conveying the depth and accuracy of Heidegger's linguistic – and intrinsically German – thinking. The exception to the rule is "dwelling." In the particular case of the English translation, dwelling, I argue, there are important advantages to be gained with regards to the overarching theme of dwelling and how to dwell. Translating *wohnen* as dwelling suggests thinking of both *weilen* and *aufhalten* at one and the same time.

This approach to reading Heidegger has the following advantages: First, the English word "dwell" meaning to tarry, to delay, is related to the Old Norse *dvelja*, from which it has adopted the sense "to abide, to stay"[62] – which captures in English an important dimension in Heidegger's thinking. The Old Norse root of dwelling, *dvejla*, thus captures a significant connotation of *wohnen*. What is established is an expanded notion of dwelling that includes the Old Norse sense of the word. As noted, the study will argue that this expanded notion of dwelling includes aspects of the activity of contemplation and temporality implied in the English "dwelling." These elements are present in Heidegger's later thinking, but they remain underexposed when read under the lens of mere inhabiting, or living. The concept of *wohnen* applied here and organizing this study calls attention to these aspects.

These supplementary aspects of *wohnen* – i.e., *weilen* and *aufhalten* – are consistent with a line of thinking and of being in the world that constitute the potential of dwelling by pointing to an alternative mode of being in the world in a destitute time. Thus, in line with Heidegger's earlier thinking, *wohnen* is a fundamental ontological structure in the way we are in the world: We

[62] According to *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*, "dwell" has adopted the sense to tarry, to stay from the Old Norse *dvelja*. In Danish, the word *dvæle* (to linger; to tarry; to contemplate; to dwell) is related to the English dwell. Both words derive from the same root of *dvelja* and still reflect the sense of staying. Dwelling or dwell can also be traced back to other roots with contrasting meanings now obsolete: in Old English, *dwellan* and *dwealde* meant lead astray." In Middle Dutch, *dwellen* meant stun, perplex.
Hoad, T. F. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*. Oxford University Press, 1996.

inhabit the world and our being-in-the-world as inhabiting-the-world in terms of dwelling-as-*wohnen* is constitutive and transcendental in that we cannot *not* inhabit the world we live in. In this perspective, *wohnen* refers to *that* we are in the world. And yet, Heidegger can still reflect on how we are in the world and how we dwell in terms of *wohnen*. This has to do with his critique of the modern technological age and with the shallowness, or rootlessness, he detects. This is why in *Sojourns*, he can refer to the "groundless of home-ness"[63] in a discussion of our modern notion of home and the ramifications of the *Gestell*. At stake here is the distinction introduced in the section above between two separate levels of inquiry in Heidegger's later thinking. We live the lives we live in light of our own existence and the dimensionality of the fourfold, but we cannot move beyond the structure of *wohnen* or not *wohnen*. This would require a thinking on the level of the history of being. To recognize this circumstance is to acknowledge our finitude. Heidegger is keenly aware of this fact. Throughout his thinking, Heidegger stresses the perspective of finitude and the meaning it bears on the way we perceive the world, as apparent in the discussion of the fourfold. In his later writings, Heidegger refers to humans as mortals for the same reason. It is to emphasize the condition of finitude as the horizon of humanity and the existential dimensionality of the fourfold in which we stand as mortals.

Having now established the linkage of *wohnen*, *verweilen*, and *aufhalten*, more can be said about dwelling and the overlapping of the aforementioned terms. One way to bring this out is to examine more closely the dynamics of dwelling in relation to Heidegger's understanding of the thing and the fourfold.

The Thing and the Fourfold

As mentioned in the exposition of dwelling, in order to fully grasp the scope of *wohnen*, it is to be understood in relation to the notion of the fourfold. With this in mind, let us therefore return to the passage in the essay on architecture[64] that we have already consulted in parts, so that we

[63] GA75, p. 234; *Sojourns*, p. 37.

[64] GA7, p. 153. Like so many of Heidegger's writings, "Building Dwelling Thinking" originates from a lecture. In 1951, Heidegger addresses a group of architects during a conference in Darmstadt entitled "Man and Space." Following the destruction of WWII, Darmstadt lay in ruins and the context of post-war Germany adds a sense of urgency to the lecture. It is on this backdrop of destitution and housing shortage that Heidegger addresses a room full of architects. As Heidegger point out the kinship of building [*Bauen*] and dwelling [*Wohnen*], the redeeming qualities of dwelling takes on new meaning in the context of the destroyed city.

can consider the full context of the relation between dwelling and the fourfold. Heidegger writes the following:

> In saving the earth, in receiving the sky, in awaiting the divinities, in initiating mortals, dwelling occurs as the fourfold preservation of the fourfold. To spare and preserve means: to take under our care, to look after the fourfold in its presencing. What we take under our care must be kept safe. But if dwelling preserves the fourfold, where does it keep the fourfold's nature? How do mortals make their dwelling such a preserving? Mortals would never be capable of it if dwelling were merely a staying on earth under the sky, before the divinities, among mortals. Rather, dwelling itself is always a staying with things. Dwelling, as preserving, keeps the fourfold in that with which mortals stay: in things.[65]

In this passage, Heidegger offers a characterization of *wohnen* that ties together some of the key aspects in dwelling. Unpacking these ties paves the way for a more nuanced understanding of dwelling, while at the same time situating the notion of dwelling in the larger landscape of Heidegger's cognate terms and concepts. The quote explicitly ties *wohnen* to the concept of the fourfold [*das Geviert*] and to the things [*den Dingen*].[66] In doing so, Heidegger pronounces an existential dimensionality to dwelling and our relation to the world. Our relation to world is thus given in terms of our relation with things as they are imbued with meaning and reflect the dimensionality of the fourfold. But how are we to understand the notion of the fourfold, we might ask.

The fourfold is perhaps a somewhat puzzling idea in Heidegger's authorship and one that takes unpacking as it intersects with other prominent themes, such as dwelling. Commentators such as Mitchell have come to regard the notion of the fourfold as the main path to understanding Heidegger's late thought. As we will see, the fourfold has to do with things and the sense of place and experience that comes to the fore in the later writings and as such is coreferential for a

[65] GA 7, p. 153; *Poetry, Language, Thinking*, p. 149.

[66] The notion of the fourfold and the rethinking of concept of the thing are both introduced during the 1949 Bremen lecture cycle *Insight Into That Which Is*. It marks a shift in Heidegger's thinking in which the concept of world is now conceived of as our relation to things and – through them – to the fourfold. Heidegger introduces another key concept that come to define his later thinking, namely the *Gestell*, rolled out in the analysis of our technological age from the same lecture cycle.

study of dwelling. That is not to say the fourfold is not without problems. Only that, for Heidegger, the concept is closely linked to his understanding of things and dwelling.

Part of the difficulty in teasing apart the notion of the fourfold is that it only ever takes up a "background status." While it serves as the referential backdrop for any given thing or artwork to be analyzed, the fourfold remains in the background – sometimes at the expense of clarity. As suggested by Young, we may understand the notion of the fourfold as Heidegger's account of "world."[67] What this means is that the fourfold sets up the conceptual framework or field of interpretation that imbues meaning on experience. In this way, the fourfold constitutes the referential totality of a world. The notion itself echoes what Heidegger referred to as the twofold of "world and earth" in his earlier work, "The Origin of the Work of Art."[68] The fourfold has to do with the existential meaning or resonance that we experience in the particular things we encounter in the world. But it also exceeds the two-way relation of an encounter in that it is relationality as such.

According to Heidegger, the fourfold involves four distinctive elements: *earth*, *sky*, *divinities*, and *mortals*. As such, the fourfold casts the world in existential terms. If we think of the fourfold as the field of interpretation by and within which we understand the world as existentially meaningful or value-given, then the fourfold marks the dimensions by which we ascribe meaning. In this field of interpretation, humans are mortals. That is to say, we are defined in terms of existence and finitude, the fact that we are fated to die. The fourfold is a relational structure. The predominant feature of the concept of the elements and the field in which we are inscribed as mortals, is its relationality. For the fourfold is precisely a field of relationality. It is the indeterminacy of our relational being in the world. The notion of the fourfold outlines the existential boundaries of human existence. But when understood in is relationality, as a relational field unfolding, the fourfold is essentially dynamic and indeterminate. We may think of Heidegger's notion of the fourfold as the medium for an existentially bounded field of intelligibility that is at the same time relational and indeterminate insofar as "the world worlds."

[67] *Heidegger's Later Philosophy*, p. 93.
[68] GA5, p. 42. Heidegger, Martin. "The Origin of the Work of Art." *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Translated by Albert Hofstädter. Harper Perennial, 2013, pp.53-54.

In his analysis of the fourfold, Young explains this ongoing relationality by examining the relation of the four dimensions that constitute the fourfold in Heidegger's thinking. Young calls attention to Heidegger's own description of the fourfold as "the un-ending [*un-entliche*] relationship" in *Hölderlins Himmel und Erde*:

> None of the four stands and goes one-sidedly for itself. None is in this sense ending [*entlich*]. None is without the others. *Un*-endingly they hold themselves towards each other, and are, what they are, out of the un-ending relationship, are this whole itself. [69]

According to Young, this ongoing unfolding of the relationality of the four is "the shining of things" which he labels worlding of the world." Elsewhere, in the essay in "The Thing," Heidegger phrases this relationality involved in the shining of things in terms of a "ringning" or an "appropriating mirror-play." Put differently, the world worlds as the ongoing unfolding of the field of interpretation in which we make sense (of things) in the world.

Heidegger's notion of the fourfold and his rethinking of the thing are intimately related and coreferential. In his 1949 essay on "The Thing,"[70] in which the notion of the fourfold is first introduced, Heidegger presents an altogether novel understanding of "the thing," while also dismissing any traditional notions of the thing as an object or a representation in the world. According to Heidegger, the essential meaning of the word "*thing*" is in fact a "gathering," i.e., the essential feature of the thing is that it brings together, that it gathers. This is referred to by Heidegger as "the thinging of the thing"[71] and it is in this sense – much like in Heidegger's understanding of place, as we shall see – that the thing is redefined and reintroduced. Not in the guise of an object in the traditional representational thinking that he opposes, but rather as a juncture of meaning in which the dimensions of the fourfold come together. Things, it turns out, are gathering points in which the dimensionality of the fourfold comes together, allowing for a deepened, existential sense of being and world.

[69] GA4, p. 170. As quoted by Young in *What is Dwelling*, p. 203.
[70] "The Thing" is part of the 1949 Bremen lecture cycle *Insight in That Which Is*.
[71] " GA79, p. 13. *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 172.

In his single page foreword to the publication of the lecture series, *Insight into That Which Is,*[72] directly prefacing the essay on the thing, Heidegger offers an interesting reflection on the changed nature of distances in which he refines the focus on nearness [*Nähe*].[73] The preface is entitled "*Der Hinweis*," literally, "the reference" or "the hint." What is hinted, it turns out, is a change in the way the world is. A change has occurred in which all distances – the far and the near – have become indifferent. According to Heidegger, it is the result of the accelerating drive toward commodification and our modern technological age, a leveling that is gaining in force. This leveling threatens the proximity of things as it threatens all distances. The world is fading.

The pretext to the essay on the thing signifies not only the preface of a lecture cycle; but rather, it forebodes a development in Heidegger's thinking. What is indicated here is not the dramatic buildup of a lecture or the hook upon which a story is told; rather, the entrance marks a more fundamental shift in Heidegger's thinking. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger understood our relation to things in terms of use, as tools and equipment that disappear or dissolve as the immediacy of our being-in-the-world. By the time of the Bremen lecture cycle, however, Heidegger's understanding of thing has developed and with it his thinking in general. This is the development of the concept of dwelling and of the notion of the fourfold discussed previously.

For Heidegger, the thing is the gathering point in which the dimensionality of the fourfold is gathered in its oneness in the character of world. It is a meaning-structuring or meaning-bestowing gateway through which existential dimensionality appears to us in dwelling. Taken together, the dimensionality of the fourfold constitutes the existential depth that confronts and accentuates human life. As mortals, we are dwelling as *wohnen* in the world, and in this dwelling the things open up the existential dimensionality of the fourfold. This is the structure of the relation between dwelling as *wohnen*, the thing and the fourfold according to Heidegger.

Following the examination of the full range of the concept of dwelling as a composite term earlier in this chapter, we opened this section with the quote to further contextualize

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[72] GA79. Heidegger, Martin. *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*. Translated by Andrew J. Mitchell. Indiana University Press, 2012.

[73] This preface is in fact a later edit made by Heidegger in 1950 in which he changing the first seven paragraphs of the original lecture into "*Der Hinweis,*" adding importance to the paragraphs and elevating the reflections on distance and leveling into the point of overarching statement reflecting the entire lecture cycle. Hofstadter's translation misses this point by including the paragraphs to the original manuscript of the thing. Whereas Mitchell's translation of the Bremen lectures reflects Heidegger's edit.

wohnen by unpacking the notion of the fourfold in this section. We are now in a position to re-visit the quote from "Building Dwelling Thinking" one last time, to fully explore the relation of *wohnen* and *aufhalten* as a supplementing aspect of dwelling. Reiterating the final sentences of the quote, it now appears in a new light following the expanded notion of dwelling argued here:

> Dwelling [*Wohnen*] itself is always a staying [*Aufenthalt*] with things. Dwelling [*Wohnen*] as preserving [*Schonen*] keeps the fourfold in that with which mortals stay: in things.[74]

We now notice that – in keeping with the thinking on the fourfold – Heidegger literally places dwelling in the midst of things. The crucial insight that mortals dwell in that we stay with things in the midst of things is reflected in the term *aufhalten* and hence refers to dwelling under that notion. This staying with the things also implies the temporal and spatial aspects of dwelling. What emerges is the centrality of the term *Aufenthalt* that will be further explicated in the chapters to come as emblematic not only for the study of the journey to Greece but for any contemporary understanding of dwelling. "The staying with things" calls attention to the connection between dwelling and the particularity of things. We may think of this connection as a form of directed dwelling or intentionality, but such a characterization seems misplaced and would imply an unnecessary return to Husserlian phenomenology which Heidegger dismisses. Instead, I suggest addressing the connection between dwelling and things more plainly by simply referring to the notably "placed" character of dwelling. Dwelling takes place in the *Aufenthalt* among the things [*in den Dingen*].[75]

Dwelling stand in a relation with the concrete. It is this emphasis on the particular in its particularity that now emerges in the quoted passage. It is within the sphere of the particular that dwelling takes place in the *Aufenthalt*. Only in the gathering point of the things – in the particularity of the concrete – does the fourfold appear in its oneness. Dwelling takes place amongst the things in the particularity of the particular in a staying with the thing.

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[74] GA7, p. 153; *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 149.

[75] A discussion of place and experience is provided in chapter 3. The centrality of the term *Aufenthalt* in regards to the fourfold is introduced in chapter 2 in relation to the visit to the Acropolis and, again, in chapter 6.

Anticipated here is the central theme of the study: the exploration of dwelling as an expanded notion of dwelling as a composite term. I end this chapter by calling attention to the lines of development implied in the conceptual exposition of dwelling here presented. In the above, I established the full breadth of the concept of dwelling in terms of *wohnen*, *weilen*, and *aufhalten* in a contextualization of Heidegger's later thinking on the fourfold. What follows is an exploration of the thinking of dwelling and place in Heidegger's later thinking through a study of *Sojourns* informed by the expanded notion of dwelling as established in this chapter. As we follow through on these lines of development in conversation with Heidegger's texts, and contemporary modern art and literature, what will emerge is a contemporary thinking of dwelling informed by a Heideggerian notion of dwelling. Yet to bring ourselves in a position to adequately access these burgeoning questions, we must first follow through on the newly established understanding of dwelling in conversation with Heidegger's later writing. To do so, we set sail and join Heidegger on the exploration of Greece.

CHAPTER TWO: ARRIVALS

> Modernity stands at risk of no longer hearing the world and, for this very reason, losing its sense of itself.
>
> Hartmut Rosa, *The Uncontrollability of the world*

> Our epoch does not love itself. And a world which does not love itself is a world which does not believe in the world—we can only believe in what we love. It is this situation which renders the atmosphere of this world so heavy, stifling and anguished.
>
> Bernard Stiegler, "The Disaffected Individual"

> Science manipulates things and gives up living in them.
>
> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind"

The Project of *Sojourns*

Even before reaching the banks of the Greek mainland, Heidegger is worried about the success of his undertaking. As he sails through the Ionian Sea bound for Ithaca, the epic home of Homer's Odysseus, Heidegger poses the following question:

> Can Greece still "speak" what is proper to it and claim us, the people of today, as listeners to its language, we the people of an age whose world is throughout pervaded by the force and artificiality of the ramifications of the enframing [*Gestell*]?[76]

[76] GA75, p. 219. *Sojourns*, pp. 9-10.

The question reflects the underlying tension that frames Heidegger's journey to Greece. Are we able, really, to fathom this encounter with ancient Greece? It is in part a rhetorical question, setting the stage for the narrative to come. Heidegger is well aware of the theater involved in making the trip to Greece[77] and partly he wants to spin a narrative of suspense and speculation by putting the success of the journey in question. And yet, the question is real. It presents the hermeneutical task of understanding and interpreting our past. As such, it signals a tension that runs through *Sojourns* and is more than an artistic grip of suspense in a carefully crafted rhetorical afterthought. Much rather, it beckons a challenge to be overcome that here surfaces and finds its programmatic formulation. The question at hand is profound because it changes the very nature of the inquiry from one of outbound discovery and exploration to one of introspection as well. The quest for "Greece proper" becomes a question of the questioner herself. Heidegger flips the direction of questioning by holding up a mirror: Who are we, the people of today, he asks, to understand such language that calls us from afar? What is on the line here, then, is not only what there is to be heard, but who we are to hear it. The reversal of focus holds implications for the outcome of the journey. What emerges is a problem of transcendental proportions. If the antenna is broken, how does one hear the music? Or rather: how do we even tune in, if we are not on the same frequency?

Already in the opening lines of *Sojourns*, Heidegger calls attention to a dialectic of calling and hearing. In doing so, he lays out a methodological path for possibly understanding that which calls us. What this is, exactly, remains to be seen, but as a preliminary reflection, the question of the questioner becomes one of urgency. In a way, Heidegger's question supersedes all other questions regarding the "language of Greece proper," for without adequately addressing this challenge, any serious attempt to reflect on Heidegger's thinking and the journey to Greece is undermined and falls short of its goal before it even gets underway. If, on the other hand, we follow the question of the questioner, what we might gain is not restricted to Heidegger's hope of hearing, but also the hermeneutical scenery that conditions the very study thereof. What comes to the fore, then, is the question of the *Gestell* and the position of the visitor. This is what Heidegger points to as he arrives at the shores of Greece. The question displays a concern that

[77] Heidegger's reluctance to making the trip had been years underway, as documented in the correspondence with Erhart Kästner. Heidegger calls off an initial plan for a trip. In 1962, he finally ends up going on his wife's invitation.

frames and conditions Heidegger's own expectations and thinking on Greece. In this sense, *Sojourns* is set in a destitute time.

To sum up the significance of the opening quote, Heidegger's question of the *Gestell* opens up two avenues of investigation concerning Heidegger's project in *Sojourns*. More than an uncomplicated cruise of confirmation wrapped in the guise of a gift from his wife, Heidegger's opening question reveals a deeper significance, laying bare two trajectories that I identify as the negative and a positive project, respectively. At work here are two complementary narratives creating an ongoing tension that runs through *Sojourns* as a whole, from the opening pages and unfolding during the journey to Greece:

1) ***The negative project***. The negative project is the mask of modernity, i.e., the conditioning veil of the *Gestell* that Heidegger tries to unmask and escape for every visit he makes. *Sojourns* calls attention to the fact that we cannot see. It is the story of our own limitation as moderns. In this respect, Heidegger's book is a reflection on how and why we are in fact restricted and removed from the epochal insights that Heidegger is seeking. In his view, we are, as moderns, fundamentally removed from the world of ancient Greece. The tension of calling and hearing that runs throughout *Sojourns* is more than a model for understanding. It is a reflection of our inability as moderns to overcome the unobtainable distance of the past. This is the great irony of the undertaking and the reason for Heidegger's own hesitation. Heidegger presupposes that we cannot connect to the spiritual life and past of the Greeks and that this ancient world can no longer become alive to be shared by us moderns. When read in this way, the journey to Greece is doomed before it even gets underway. Heidegger becomes a tragic figure, much like "the Knight of the Sad Countenance," pursuing windmills of old while pretending to defend the illusionary calling from a golden age in the guise of romanticism. The reason for this tragedy lies in the epochal disconnect that Heidegger refers to as the history of being. The negative trajectory in *Sojourns* thus lies in exploring this gap and bringing about an awareness of our categorical removal from the world of ancient Greek thinking. Understood in this way, *Sojourns* displays "the force and artificiality of the ramifications" of the *Gestell*, and the journey to Greece is testimony of our own limitations in this respect.

2) ***The positive project.*** The positive project is the possibility of dwelling. It presents the other enterprise running through *Sojourns* and is defined by its opposition to the negative project. It is phrased by Heidegger in terms of listening and in his insistence that the question of hearing the calling of Greece is in fact an open question.[78] In this understanding, *Sojourns* is not a tragic undertaking – the outcome of which is already determined beforehand and thus dutifully executed as per request. Rather, the project of the journey to Greece presents the openness of possibility. The impulse of *Sojourns* is to explore the possibility of experiencing something like a revelation of Greek spirituality "in order to allow the Hellenism that is sought even here in Athens to show itself."[79] Heidegger wants to bracket the technological guise of our modern situation and its epochal removal to allow for a sense of place and experience to come to the fore in the Greek landscape. In the open gesture of exploration and inquiry, Heidegger asks that "in such time, amidst the lack of vision, the suspicion awakens that such a sight is possible indeed. A sight that, since it exists, demands that we look even farther."[80] This is the essence of the positive project in *Sojourns*. Heidegger insists on the possibility that "a sight is possible indeed" regardless of whether the gods have fled, and he insists that the calling of Greece is a demand on us, despite our modern situation. Unlike the tragic trajectory of determinism, Heidegger calls attention to the possibility of dwelling and asks that we examine the traces of old with the open gesture of receptivity that a sojourn, an *Aufenthalt*, may be granted.

The two currents described here as the negative and the positive project are both present in Heidegger's book on Greece. They coexist and are interdependent in that the actualization of either one implies the negation of the other. It would seem that only one of them can be true. Furthermore, the competing narratives are both carefully crafted and laid out by Heidegger as the

[78] We shall return to the theme of listening and the dialectics of calling and hearing in chapter 5 and 6.
The issue of whether Greece can in fact "speak" to "us moderns," mirrors a tension in the Addendum to "The Origin of the Work of Art." In this later appendix to the essay, Heidegger remains indeterminate in regards to Hegel's position on the role of art as something of the past.
[79] GA75, p. 236. *Sojourns*, p. 39.
[80] Ibid, p. 215. Ibid, p. 2.

dramaturgical structure of *Sojourns*, setting up the argument that drives the book. In this way, they are part of a design by Heidegger to set the stage for the histrionic drama of Greece and the story to unfold. But it is important to note that Heidegger's spin does not mute the argument he poses. The tension of the negative and the positive project is genuine and it cannot simply be dismissed as prearranged pretense or rhetorical charade. It is a lasting tension and Heidegger is careful not to rule out the possibility of either one prematurely. But before we begin to examine the drama of *Sojourns*, we must first turn our attention to the underlying question of the *Gestell*.

What becomes obvious is that both the negative and the positive project in *Sojourns* are conditioned by the notion of the *Gestell*. More than an afterthought, the idea runs through the book as a whole and the opening quote is indicative of the prominence of the concept in Heidegger's later thinking. As a reoccurring theme, it conditions Heidegger's thinking on dwelling. But what is the *Gestell*? To answer this question, we must examine the reasoning behind the negative project. It thus becomes pertinent to unfold Heidegger's concept of the *Gestell* and the thinking surrounding it. Only through an examination of the negative project as defined by the *Gestell*, are we able to arrive at the indeterminate question of the positive project in *Sojourns*. In order to get there, we must now examine the concept of the *Gestell* and the state of disconnect with the world of the Greeks.

The Age of the *Gestell*

First introduced in the 1949 lecture cycle, *Insight Into That Which Is*, under the title *Das Gestell*, and subsequently expanded into the 1953 essay "The Question of Technology," Heidegger's thinking on technology continues all the way to his final years as evident in the 1966 interview with *Der Spiegel*, "Only a God Can Save Us," published posthumously in 1976. In his reading of Heidegger, Hans Ruin makes the case that Heidegger's interest with the question of technology can in fact be traced back to the lectures on Aristotle and causality in the early 1920s, and that it in fact constitutes a long-lasting thematic focus throughout the authorship.[81]

[81] H. Ruin. "*Ge-stell*: Enframing as the essence of technology" in *Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts*. Ed. Bret w. Davis. Routledge, 2014, p. 184.

Furthermore, Heidegger's thinking on technology is in part influenced by Ernst Jünger's dystopian thoughts on the "The Worker" and the *Gestalt* in which human life is dominated under the new order of technology and modernity. Similarly, the work of Oswald Spengler sets a similar pretext for the reflections on technology.[82] In turn, Heidegger's own analysis can be seen to supplement some of Max Weber and Georg Simmel's earlier observations on culture and modernity. Acknowledging these influences as a philosophical backdrop for Heidegger's later thinking, the 1949 lecture cycle, constitutes a natural starting point for a study of Heidegger's thoughts on dwelling and technology. Many key ideas in Heidegger's later thinking first introduced here come to define and shape his thinking of dwelling – most noticeably, the concept of thing, the fourfold, and the *Gestell.*[83] The lecture cycle foreshadows Heidegger's essay on "The Question Concerning Technology," where he offers the fullest account of the concept of the *Gestell*. Together, these texts form a conceptual foundation for Heidegger's later writings, including his reflections on the journey to Greece.

As referenced in the opening quote, John P. Manoussakis' English translation of *Sojourns* translates *Gestell* as "enframing." This is by all means a common translation in Heidegger scholarship and the strength of this translation is the implicit reference to the scaffolding or structuring element of the German *Gestell*. However, some English translations of Heidegger's writings on technology prefer with good reason the term "positionality" over "enframing." Following Mitchell's translation of the Bremen lectures, this study advances the term *positionality* as it more fully captures the breadth of what Heidegger envisions by the term *Gestell*.[84] *Ge-Stell* is strictly speaking not a supporting or containing structure in the sense of a with-holding or containing of the

[82] In *Der Mensch und die Technik*, Spengler describes a "Faustian technology" by which machines are said to enslave humans in a process ultimately resulting in the downfall of humanity.

[83] The lecture series, *Insight Into That Which Is*, can be seen as marking the beginning of Heidegger's later thinking. In his reading of Heidegger, Mitchell argues that the lecture on *The Thing* represents a radical recalibration of our relation to the world from the single-centered, Dasein-oriented description of being-in-the-world in *Being and Time* to a multicentered sense of being-in-the-world in Heidegger's later thinking. The ontological status of things is reassigned to the level of *Dasein* as ecstatic being, standing out alongside the existence of the sensing subject – once referred to as *Dasein*.

[84] *Gestell* is a neologism constructed by Heidegger and apart from the central verb *stellen* [to position, to place, to put], it alludes to a series of affiliated German terms such as *vorstellen* [to represent], *herstellen* [to produce], and *Gestalt* [figure]. In addition to this, Heidegger emphasizes the importance of the hyphen and the prefix *Ge-* which in German implies a gathering (such as in *Gebirge*, a gathering or chain of mountains) over that of *die Gestelle* [framework or scaffolding]. Positionality is understood here as a philosophical term and not as social positionality.

things, but rather a form of rationality or domination that adopts and enlists whatever it encounters to the order of the standing reserve. The term positionality is particularly advantageous because it reflects the centerless drive of the *Gestell*. One of the striking features of the *Gestell* is the leveling circulation of replaceability that characterizes its decentered organization, a feature well-captured in the term positionality. Echoing the Cartesian plane of indifference or the notion of absolute space in Newtonian physics, positionality is characterized by decentralization and indifference, but offers no association to a framing or containing structure or figure. For these reasons, I prefer the term positionality and will use this translation henceforth.

Heidegger's thinking on technology from the time of the Bremen lecture cycle and hereafter[85] is centered around the notion on positionality which Heidegger defines as the essence of technology. Positionality, examined in more detail in what follows, can be understood as the universal drive towards replaceability and consumption in the age of technology. In Ruin's wording, *Gestell* is "the sense and significance of the increased technologization of the world," which also implies a form of leveling force or domination integral to the essence of technology. For Heidegger, the drive of positionality is a leveling of things (and humans) as they are reduced to objects, commodities, and mere resource as part of a "standing reserve" [*Bestand*][86] – always available, always replaceable and in stock. This process is characterized by a circulation as things become objects or commodities at hand for our convenience. Understood in this way, positionality marks a *transformation* of being in that the essence of technology transforms the way in which being is revealed. But the leveling drive towards replaceability has a cost – not unlike the critique of fetishization and reification raised by the Frankfurt school.[87] What is lost is the particular in its particularity, so to speak, or the uniqueness of all things and places. This has a tremendous impact on the way we experience the world. Because of the universal transformation in the way being is revealed to us through technology, everything – and every *thing* – loses its

[85] During the 1930's and before the Bremen lecture on the *Gestell*, Heidegger's thinking on technology is focused around the term "machination" [*Machenschaft*] which appears in "Contributions to Philosophy" in relation to his notion of "the abandonment of being" as *Seinsverlassenheit*. (*Contributions to Philosophy*, p. 107.). Heidegger is here notably influenced by Jünger's thinking on technology and *The Worker*.

[86] The term *Bestand* refers to the way in which things become resources in Heidegger's analysis of technology. As resources, they are stored and made constantly available, always at hand and in stock. The term, "standing reserve," is preferable English translation because it reflects both of the two most central features of *Bestand*, namely storage (reserve) and availability (standing). The English term also grasps the sense of mobilizing urgency implied in Heidegger's analysis of technology.

[87] Despite the apparent overlap, there are fundamental differences undermining the parallel. The social and critical theory associated with the Frankfurt School is in effect worlds apart from Heidegger's conservative romanticism.

inherent properties and is devalued. More radically, experience itself is degraded in the age of technology. One of the great costs in this process is that we "lose touch" with the world, such that our relation with things is no longer that of the object understood in the German sense of the word as a *Gegenstand*, i.e., something concrete that stands in front of us and that we can encounter and experience in its materiality and alterity. Instead, we have become so engulfed in runaway consumerism and the logic of the standing reserve, that things become mere resources, disposable and with no inherent properties. Stripped of these features, things lose their value to us and are reduced to mere resource. The ultimate sickness of positionality is the inability to have objects understood in this way. As an effect, we lose touch with the world in a lack of dwelling and authenticity. We arrive then at the familiar conclusion of disenchantment as the inherent problem of modern lives. Heidegger describes a lack of authenticity as we lose touch with the world in any genuine sense through the leveling of positionality.

Perhaps the best way to explain leveling is to recall the opening lines of the Bremen lecture cycle. The so-called *Hinweis*[88] serves as a prelude to the entire cycle of lectures. In it, Heidegger calls attention to the status of distance and nearness: "All distances in time and space are shrinking" but the mediation of technology "brings no nearness."[89] In other words, the leveling drive of technology nullifies both distance and nearness. According to Heidegger's radical overture, everything is either "equally far and near" or "neither far nor near." In the era of technology, the mediation of technology implies a leveling so profound that it corrodes relationality –in the leveling of technology, the sense of depth and dimension are compromised. As we shall see, Heidegger calls attention to the sense of place and home that are exposed in light of the unrooted universality of technology. The leveling drive of the *Gestell* is the diametrical opposite of dwelling, and what emerges from Heidegger's analysis is exactly that – the underlying pairing and opposition of positionality and dwelling. The age of technology comes with the illusion of control and mastery in all our relations, with an instrumental thinking that permeates our lives in fundamental ways. We optimize work productivity through time management and consult coaches to manage the calculus of work-life balance much in the same way as we seek optimization of our bodies through fitness programs and self-discipline. This is the internalized logic of

[88] The *Hinweis* is the prelude to the lecture circle that was later incorporated into the first essay, *The Thing*, but that was originally presented as an opening comment in its own right contextualizing the lecture circle in its entirety. The subtle sense of the German heading as a hint, a clue.
[89] *The Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, p. 3.

an instrumentalist paradigm. But part of Heidegger's project is to undermine the illusion that we are as humans in complete control of the world and our own lives and prosperity. Towards the end of the essay on technology, Heidegger associates dwelling with a notion of poetic thinking, through which he specifically identifies dwelling as the resisting remedy against the leveling forces of technology and optimization. It is exactly against the leveling force of modern technology that we are to understand dwelling. In this respect, dwelling and the *Gestell* form a fundamental opposition in Heidegger's thinking. What follows is an examination of Heidegger's thinking of technology and its implications in relation to his reflections and observations in *Sojourns*. On the line here is the very role and function of experience and sense of place that come under threat by the logic or configuration of the essence of technology that for Heidegger define our time and age.

Presupposed in this discussion of Heidegger's analysis of technology is a theoretical model of experience. In the analysis of technology, Heidegger calls attention to the fact that in our time, technological thinking has become a condition for the very possibility of experience. This is a thesis that emerges in *Sojourns* with particular urgency, but as a philosophical proposition the assertion is of a general nature. Accordingly, in the present analysis of technology, experience is understood in terms of objectification of experience in the context of the conditioning of technology. Let us first examine Heidegger's thinking on technology and the objectification of experience.

The question of technology is already the focus of Heidegger's opening quote before he arrives in mainland Greece. In *Sojourns*, the issue takes on the role of a silent antagonist against which Heidegger sets up his argument. For every visit he makes, the mask of modernity comes to the foreground as a conditioning veil that Heidegger tries to escape and unmask. It is the guise of positionality that we defined as the negative project of *Sojourns*. But in order to understand the nature and scope of this veil, that is, "the force and artificiality of the ramifications of positionality," it is necessary to follow through on the examination of positionality by consulting Heidegger's essay on technology. The task of unpacking the concept of positionality falls in the following three concentrations: *The Essence of Technology*; *The Sojourns of Greece and Today*; and *Dwelling in the Age of Technology.*

The Essence of Technology

Heidegger raises the question of technology out of a concern for human freedom and the role of technology on human life. For Heidegger, the question of technology is an emancipatory endeavor of trying to understand and come to terms with the influences that technology has on our lives. The question of technology has to do with freedom. In order to think on technology, we must free ourselves from the illusion that technology is neutral. One of Heidegger's underlying points is that technology is not neutral, and the very idea that it would be is testimony that it is not. The idea of the neutral is simply an indication of the bounds of technology that we live by. This is Heidegger's point of departure. His claim is that technology produces an illusory sense of neutrality and transparency that "we, the people of today" adopt and live by, but only to thereby fundamentally undermine our own freedom and the very ability to see and reveal those same bounds. We tend to think of technology in conventional terms of causality and reason, but Heidegger wants to show that there is more to the concept of technology. The world of today is technologically mediated and works in this way of logic and rationality. But this is also Heidegger's reservation: there may be reason to reevaluate this relation to find a deeper understanding of the forces that shape our being-in-the-world in an age of technology. One way of doing this is to follow Heidegger all the way back to the Greek view of the world and to explore some of the fundamental traits at stake in our relation to being, in the hope of paving the way for a richer understanding of the world and a relation to being that does not hinge on the drive of technology as something neutral and unreflected.

According to Heidegger, it is the key to understand what has happened to our world as transformed by modern technology, but in order to understand that we have to look at technology in general, and that includes both modern machine technology and ancient craftsmanship. Heidegger's take on technology relies heavily on Greek thinking as exemplary and implies an underlying discrepancy between an ancient and a modern outlook on technology. The former is seen as truly original – poetic, in fact – whereas the latter is deemed conventional and instrumental in character. To make this argument, Heidegger turns to the doctrine of the four causes and Aristotle's discussion of craftmanship.[90] It is this treatment of Greek thinking, the analysis of

[90] The Aristotelian pretext unfolds its investigation of craftsmanship in reference to statues and the art of sculpture. Heidegger's treatment of the process of making or bringing-forth (*poesis*) thus originates in sculpture, foreshadowing Heidegger's own interest thinking of sculpture as it develops years later following the journey to Greece

causality and craftmanship, that leads to the most central insight in Heidegger's examination, namely the claim that the essence of technology is a mode of *revealing*. This is the essential point that drives Heidegger's thinking on technology:

> What has the essence of technology to do with revealing? The answer: everything. For every bringing-forth [*Her-vor-bringen*] is grounded in revealing [*Entbergen*]. Bringing-forth, indeed, gathers within itself the four modes of occasioning—causality—and rules them throughout. Within its domain belong end and means as well as instrumentality. Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology. If we inquire step by step into what technology, represented as means, actually is, then we shall arrive at revealing. The possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing.
> Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth. [91]

Heidegger's message is that technology is revealing. Technology can be thought of as a form of revealing in different ways. It reveals something about us and it reveals something about the material we are working with. We can illustrate this point through Greek thinking and the analysis of craftmanship. Heidegger references the work of a silversmith, while Aristotle's original argument comes from sculpture and the sculptor working on a block of marble. Both cases illustrate the same point, and both make the distinction between the craftsman and the raw material, i.e., the "matter" that things are made of.[92] The basic idea of craftmanship is that the craftsman already has some kind of program or plan for how to make products out of the material. To make something such as a statue, for instance, out of a block of marble by carefully chipping off the small chucks of marble is a way of revealing or unveiling. In the Greek mindset, the statue was already in there, inside the block of marble. The craftsman, in this case a sculptor, simply removes the superfluous pieces of marble to reveal the statue inside. The idea is that the statue is

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and the visit to Olympia. This encounter is discussed in chapter 5 where Heidegger's reflections on sculpture are examined in more detail.

[91] GA7, p. 13. *Basic Writings*, p. 222.

[92] Heidegger references Aristotle' use of the Greek word for wood, *hyle*, meaning the raw material or matter that goes into the process of poesis. For instance, in the case of sculpture, the raw material that is sculptured and molded into a statue by the sculptor, is the marble. (GA7, p. 10. *Basic Writings*, p. 220]

always there, but takes the sculptor's skill and intention to be able to emerge. Intention is key to the process, such as the ability to envision the completed product. This intention takes the form of a vision and it is that vision that drives the craftsman or sculptor forward in an artistic revealing of the statue that by itself will not come forward. It is an art of careful crafting, not far from the nurture and care aspect found in the gesture of *Schonen* as dwelling, in that the craftsman can be said to help the marble sculpture achieve its own essence through revealing. One way to summarize this thinking is to say that making things craftfully is a way of removing the veil.

Behind this analysis of the process of crafting or making lie the Greek concepts of *techne* and *poiesis.* The implicit point in Heidegger's thinking on technology is that, in Greek thinking, the two are connected. Heidegger identifies the process of making or producing by the Greek term *poiesis*. His own word for *poiesis* in German is *her-vor-bringen*, which literally means "bringing-forth."[93] In the passage quoted above, Heidegger thus establishes the connection in Greek thinking between revealing as a way of bringing-forth (or unconcealing) things and crafting or making things at all: "Bringing-forth indeed, gathers within itself the four modes of occasioning—causality—and rules them throughout." Following the same example of the sculptor and the block of marble, the skill and intention that it takes for the sculptor to envision and craft the statue – to make it come out of the marble, so to speak – is *techne*. In English, *techne* is the word for "skill" just as it is the root of the words "technology" and "technique." In German, however, these aspects merge into just one word, *Technik*,[94] which allows for a more straightforward understanding of the range of the original Greek. Heidegger makes clear that in Greek thinking, *techne* implies a form of knowledge and is not to be understood merely in terms of a set of skills or something practical:

> We must observe two things with respect to the meaning of this word. One is that *techne* is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. *Techne* belongs to bringing-forth, to *poiesis*: it is something poetic.[95]

[93] GA7, p. 13. *Basic Writings*, p. 220
[94] For the same reason, the original German title, *Die Frage nach der Technik*, can be translated in English as *The Question Concerning Technology*.
[95] *Basic Writings*, p. 222.

The argument that Heidegger wants to make here is the fact that there is a significant difference in how to understand the word technology today and how it was originally conceived in Greek as *techne*. This is exactly the difference that Heidegger detects between the Greek thinking of *techne* in contrast to technology in the form of positionality today.

What emerges in Heidegger's analysis of technology, then, is a schism between an ancient Greek thinking of technology as *techne* in relation to *poiesis* on the one side, and our modern sense of technology as something neutral in terms of conventional causality on the other. In Aristotle's thinking, all things have causes and all things hold potential to be actualized through a cause. But Heidegger wants to tell us something else about technology. The question concerning technology will eventually need to go *beyond* our conventional idea of technology. But that is not to say that Aristotle is the enemy here. It only means that he did not anticipate our modern mindset. Heidegger is, however, sympathetic to Aristotle as the problem lies elsewhere. It may certainly be true that we think of the world in Aristotelian terms, through reason and causality, and there is a perfectly good explanation for this. Applying peripatetic thinking to our modern lives makes sense. Getting our everyday life and technology to function in a way that complies with the structures we live in and by is in fact utterly practical and rational. But the problem for Heidegger is not Aristotelian thinking. But according to Heidegger, modern technology is stripped of the poetic thinking that characterizes the affinity of *techne* and *poiesis,* and that makes possible the artistic crafting of the sculptor. The enemy here is a modern outlook that has stripped the formal and final causes from our reality and now only have room for efficient causes and material causes. What is really eating away our souls, in Heidegger's view, is not Aristotle's thinking or terminology. It is the modern mindset as a way of consistently reducing what could be objects to us into mere standing reserve for some process that we have already committed ourselves to.

One way of illustrating Heidegger's thinking on technology in our modern age is to consider the storage and distribution of modern energy: We live in a world where elemental materials like oil, coal, sunlight, waves, and wind are turned into energy, so that the electric sockets in our homes can be used at our convenience. Modern energy is invisible, just like a statue-to-be lies hidden within a block of marble, awaiting the inspiration and craftsmanship of the sculptor.

And yet the energy in our electric sockets and wires is infinitely further removed from us. It is hidden beneath layers by layers of production and supply chains and intermediaries as part of an amazingly complex system of delivery. All of this is hidden to me as a consumer, but electricity is available to me at all times, wherever I go. This is the storage [*Bestand*] and extraction of nature in the age of technology. Modern technology allows us to extract energy from all kinds of sources and to store it and use it as we please. The energy in the socket in the room is the symbol of the "standing reserve," which is at the very heart of Heidegger's understanding of technology as the result of a requisitioning drive of positionality. In the Bremen lecture on positionality, Heidegger makes this point as he ties the demand of technology to the idea of inventory and resource:

> Let us now enter into the meaning of the word "to position, place, set" [*stellen*] so as to experience what comes to pass in that requisitioning through which an inventory arises [*der Bestand steht*] and is thus a standing reserve.[96]

The example of electricity also reveals the features of repeatability and decentralized circulation. It involves the extraction of energy and the drive toward leveling as things and the elements of nature are turned into the indifference of recourses stored and available at all times. And finally, the example of energy calls attention to the stealth mode of technology as an art background relation, that is, as something hidden and unnoticed that remains nonetheless an integral and fully functioning part of our everyday lives.[97] All of these features are central elements in the concept of positionality in Heidegger's analysis of technology. Together they constitute the conditioning power that Heidegger sees as characterizing our current age. In its essence, the dominating drive

[96] GA79, p. 27. *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, p. 26.

[97] The function and status of technology and technological artifacts has been analyzed in the works of Don Ihde. Ihde recognizes the silent mode of technology in the way we live with and by technology in our everyday lives as a background relation, but he argues that our relation with technology (or rather technological artifacts) is multifaceted. Skeptical of the grand narratives of technology, Ihde's postphenomenology develops a relational ontology that rethinks the human-artifact-world relation as co-constitutive, identifying multiple ways in which our relation to technology is determined. To illustrate this point, Ihde calls attention to the alternating character of technological artifacts and introduces the concept of *multistability*.
Ihde, Don. *Heidegger's Technologies: Postphenomenological Perspectives*, Fordham University Press, 2010.
---. *Experiential Phenomenology: Multistabilities*, SUNY Press, 2012.

of positionality – as a way of living, thinking, organizing, being, and revealing – is also a violating and dominating force of mastery over the world through which everything partakes in a logic of circulation and replaceability, that ultimately results in the objectification of things and the reduction of everything to sheer resource. This is because, in the logic of the standing reserve, everything is replaceable, available and exposed to consumption. In this respect, nothing exists outside of the endless circulation of the standing reserve. In the world era of technology, not even humans go untouched of the universal drive of positionality. We are claimed by technology as the way being is revealed, the way the world worlds. As it is, the demands and expectations of consumerism have become unavoidably engrained into the way we live and conduct our daily lives. We are touched by the world and in this respect, we are ourselves part and parcel of the circulation of the standing reserve. Such are the implications of positionality. But, for Heidegger, the coin is two-sided, in the sense that while modern technology turns things into stock and storage, it is the very same standing reserve that makes things into what they are. This paradoxical point is argued by Mitchell in his reading of Heidegger.[98] According to Heidegger, technology is being as revealing, which means that positionality constitutes the epochal horizon, i.e., the field of referentiality and meaning, that permeates all rationale in our current age. Without the standing reserve, there would be no things exactly because the things get their meaning from what they are in the referential web of meaning – or world – that characterizes our technological age. In the age of modern technology, positionality is the way the world worlds.

The Sojourns of Greece and Today

The apparent disparity between ancient and modern thinking prompts another question in regards to Heidegger's main claim. If technology is to be understood in terms of revealing, what is it that is revealed? Heidegger's way of talking about this is to say that being reveals itself, but what is presupposed here and in *Sojourns* is a theory of *the history of being* which Heidegger applies in his later thinking. It is the idea that the history of being falls into a series of different epochs or worlds, and that each epoch is distinguished by a separate order of intelligibility. This means that the field of referentiality and meaning only makes sense within each particular epoch. While the Christian god is a source of the explanation and meaning in the middle ages, this outlook

[98] *The Fourfold*, p. 8.

changes in the modern epoch. In other words, being reveals itself in different ways over the course of history respective to each epoch or world. This is why Heidegger can say that technology is revealing. For the current age is the age of technology. Just as the outlook or worldview of the Middle Ages is dependent on a different field of referentiality, so is our current modern world characterized by the age of technology. The essence of technology permeates all meaning and rationale in our current age, according to Heidegger. Technology is omnipresent. It is a universal, driving logic so internalized and engrained in our way of thinking and in the technological rationale of the world that we do not even notice it. As an art background relation, the essence of technology has become so entrenched in our daily lives that we no longer reflect on the technological nature of the world.

There is a lack of consistency characterizing Heidegger's thinking on the history of being in regards to the connect-disconnect relation between epochs. At times Heidegger likes to suggest the tenuous, withering bound between epochs, while elsewhere he is adamant in outlining the state of disconnect and incongruency separating each epoch of being. The tension can be summed up in a passage from *The Principle of Reason*: "The epochs can never be derived from one another much less be placed on the track of an ongoing process. Nevertheless, there is a legacy [*Überliefung*] from epoch to epoch."[99] Despite this tension, the idea that every epoch is characterized by its own particular set of beliefs or order of intelligibility still stands. Part of its appeal is that the thesis of the history of being offers an explanation for the historical and horizontal nature of understanding. When seen through a contemporary lens, the thesis serves to explain our perceived disconnect with the past. It provides a model for understanding the withering and decaying of worlds which Heidegger describes in "The Origin of the Work of Art" as it outlines the *historicity* of understanding. When an oral tradition, say the stories of Homer, at some point in time is written down, the narrative becomes frozen in time. As a bearer of meaning, the tradition in its new form loses its ability for adaptation and cultural appropriation as it no longer holds the flexibility of the oral tradition. It therefore slowly but inevitably loses its rele-

[99] GA10, p. 135. Lilly, Reginald. *The Principle of Reason*, Indiana University Press, 1991, p. 91. In *The Origin or the Work of Art*, Heidegger describes the slow withering of worlds by way of the work of art, thereby emphasizing the gradual, slow decay in meaning and relevance over time. The opposite can be said of the emphasis on epochal discontinuity in *The Principle of Reason* [*Der Satz vom Grund*].

vance over time. When we no longer live under the same epochal sky in the same order of intelligibility, our relation to the myths and stories of cultural importance changes and instead we feel detached from the – seemingly old – world of the tradition. In the terminology of "The Origin of the Work of Art," the work of art is no longer working – be it the fading of myths or the withering of a work of art. This is because being, or rather the world, reveals itself differently in different epochs. "The world worlds," which is to say that any given epoch constitutes a meaningful set of beliefs specific to that particular epoch. For the same reason, the series of epochs in the history of being is characterized by incongruence and rupture. But because each epoch presents a separate set of beliefs or field of referentiality, each epoch is prevented from experiencing the others, which is also why each epoch seemingly resists our attempts to fully comprehend why they are the way they are. Heidegger's analysis of the Greek temple in "The Origin of The Work of Art" tells this story. The temple still stands, but the world of the Greeks is no more. The temple was once a sacred place of worship for the gods to reside, but the world of the Greeks has disappeared. In *Sojourns,* Heidegger takes up the same tension as he revisits the question from our modern sojourn of technology. He clearly registers a change in outlook and laments the function of positionality today in the following remark:

> What for us today is called world is the inestimable entanglement of a technological apparatus of information that confronted the unscathed φύσις and took her place, while the function of the world became accessible and tractable only by calculation.[100]

This speaks to a state of disconnect between the world of today and that of the ancient Greeks that Heidegger is still hoping to trace in *Sojourns*. To the Greeks, being was still accessible in terms of *fysis*,[101] but this is no longer the case for us today. It appears "the technological apparatus of information" has taken the place of *fysis* and changed the way the world appears to us. This is the essence of Heidegger's concern with technology: it changes the way we engage with the world and come to understand it. The familiarity with things as they appeared to the Greeks is lost. For Heidegger, the essence of technology is in the way the world appears to us today, in how being is revealed to us today. But implicit in this thinking of the history of being lies also

[100] GA75, p. 233. *Sojourns*, p. 35.

[101] The Greek word φύσις roughly translates into English as "nature" or simply "being" and is transliterated as *fysis*.

the reason for the discord between ancient Greece and the technological world of today. Both of them express a historical sojourn – a historical *Aufenthalt*. It is this tension that inspired Heidegger to the title of his travel journal and it is this epochal drive that set up the drama and underlying tension throughout *Sojourns*.

The split between an ancient and modern outlook that fuels the narrative of *Sojourns* thus reflects Heidegger's thinking on technology in which he observes the same fundamental division between ancient and modern conceptions of world. Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, Heidegger begins the essay on technology by dismantling the objection that modern technology is fundamentally different from ancient technology. According to Heidegger, ancient and modern technology share the same basis or essence in that they are both modes of revealing. The fundamental characteristic of technology as a revealing is universal and it remains the same despite our ability to optimize and sophisticate the tools and equipment we use to make, for instance, electricity, across history. But there is a difference nonetheless. The difference is that the kind of revealing that happens with modern technology is of a *different* sort. It is the sort of revealing referred to by Heidegger as *herausfordern*,[102] in English "challenging." If we read this in the context of Heidegger's theory of the history of being, it turns out that the world of the Greeks and the technological world of today are not in fact fundamentally different. The reason for this is that across the different worlds, or regimes of intelligibility, that which reveals itself remains the same, namely being. What differs, however, is the guise in which being appears. If we were to live in the world of the pre-Socratics, being would appear in the guise of *fysis* and *alethia*, whereas, being understood today stands under the intelligibility regime of the technological age and will thus appear as such. This is also the reason why revealing in the age of technology comes in the guise of challenging [*herausfordern*].

Because of this difference in the way being appears – as *challenging* revealing – the current age of modern technology presents a radical difference. It breaks with all previous epochs and presents a rupture in that it conditions how we understand being. This has to do with the way being is revealed in the age of technology. Unlike any previous epoch, the current order of intelligibility is characterized by the essence of technology which for Heidegger implies logic and function of positionality. It is this impetus that fundamentally changes our way of understanding

[102] GA79, p. 27. *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, p. 28.

or accessing the world. What becomes apparent is a schism between our modern way of going about in the world using technology and the way the Greeks thought of *techne* and *poiesis*. It is a difference in how to perceive the world and it is this difference that drives the inquiry into technology. For Heidegger, revealing in Greek thinking implies an attitude of care and nurture as in the intertwining of *techne* and *poiesis* in the notion of craftmanship. By contrast revealing in the age of technology is a *challenging* that shapes and dominates the world through positionality. In the modern age of technology, the world is stripped of the caring mode of nurture and cultivation that characterized the careful crafting of the craftsman. The caring impulse of sparing that we identified in the composite term of dwelling as *Schonen* is no longer part of the way we experience or go about in the world. Instead of dwelling, we are left with the leveling force of positionality.

In order to understand just how far apart these two views of the world have come, consider the way the Greeks would think of history and with that, the cause or origin of the world we live in. According to the ancient Greek worldview of Heraclitus, detectable still in Plato and Aristotle, history is an eternal circle and has no linear beginning. From this view comes the idea that there are only a finite number of souls in the world circulating through the system. However bizarre and strange this may sound to "we, the people of today," the underlying idea is that there is no basis for expansive thinking. The world has always been there and everything that happens have already happened before. Parmenides' notion of being and change hinges on the same idea. The thinking of the Greeks takes refuge in eternity.

The modern mindset of today, however, is strikingly different. To think through technology today also means taking into consideration widely held facts and conceptions of the world and its trajectory that we may well call dystopian or sincere. We stand at the end of a population explosion and a one-way warming of the earth. We live in the reality of pandemics that for better or worse also add awareness of the planetary nature of human life. The age of technology is a demythologized, disenchanted era, but it is also the era of the centrality of the human. This view of the role of the human as the dominant species whose actions hold a defining impact on the planet has been described in terms of the Anthropocene, the age of man. It is the idea that humanity holds the keys to the planet. Through technological advancement, the human has risen to become

the one central, decisive agent in a planetary perspective – hence the geological term.[103] The Anthropocene is the era of the human because our actions or inaction hold the decisive and destructive power to sustain or destroy the ecosphere of the globe. Heidegger's reflections on technology predates the conceptual thinking of the Anthropocene, but it can still be said to hold all the ingredients that labels the perspective. It is the kind of grand narrative that carries the intentional scope and explanatory power to interpret the complexity of the world in its entirety under one single narrative. Heidegger rejects transcendental thinking as sheer subjectivism and the product of a flawed tradition fallen into metaphysics, yet somewhat ironically, the question of technology indirectly propels humanity back onto center stage through the universal range and impact of the age of technology. Granted, this happens in a much different way and only in the shape of Heidegger's thinking of historicity and hermeneutics – but nonetheless, the centrality of the human reemerges. Heidegger's later thinking is preoccupied with the consequences of positionality in terms of human freedom and what it means for the way we live and experience the world. For Heidegger, the impact is far-reaching in that it involves the very way we think and conduct ourselves in the world. This holds implication for how we sense and experience the world, but it also concretely raises concerns of global proportion. Heidegger's later thinking can indeed be read as a precursor to the same planetary concerns associated with the era of the Anthropocene. His preoccupation with the implications of technology in a nuclear age, and the relatively newly acquired technological powers of destruction, is indicative of this overlap. It would seem we live in an age with a growing conscience that we are no longer able to dismiss: that man-made actions and consequences pose a global threat to the world itself and humans as a species. It is this insight – the realization of the impact of humans upon the ecosphere of the planet and, consequently, the ethical implications and responsibilities thereof – that has sometimes been referred

[103] The idea of the Anthropocene is originally a geological term and there is some ambiguity as to when the era of the Anthropocene starts. It is often set to begin by the earlier date of the industrial revolution in the 18th century (Crutzen, Paul. 2002. "Geology of Mankind," *Nature*, No. 415, 23). The term commonly refers to the era of the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch characterized by the centrality and influence of the human over nature and the ecosphere of the planet. In this age, humanity has become a planetary force in that our actions as a species have a global and potentially destructive environmental impact on the biosphere of the planet as a whole. Heidegger's notion of attunement [*Befindlichkeit*] can also be read in terms of a "planetary attunement" implied in the thinking of the Anthropocene, i.e. the fact that the planet itself is thrown into the facticity of the Anthropocene (Wentzer, 2020, "We Humans. Epochal Consciousness and Responsibility in the 'Anthropocene'"). Furthermore, the ongoing environmental crisis could be viewed as the effects of the Anthropocene in which case the current period can be labeled post-Anthropocentric. This is the position argued by Rosi Braidotti's posthumanism in a feminist reinterpretation of the Anthropocene.

to as "the shock of the Anthropocene."[104] Unlike the Greek worldview, this is a linear, technologically mediated outlook on the world that gives rise to a sense of urgency in the face of a potentially cataclysmic global environmental catastrophe of today. Reading Heidegger's thinking of technology into this contemporary context underlines the sense of urgency of the current state of affairs. The climate crisis in particular is, if anything, an alarming crescendo of the premonitions of the 20th century.[105]

Heidegger is obviously concerned with the way we live technologically and what it does to the way we interact with the world. The challenging revealing of modern technology changes our relation to the world in that everything becomes mere resources in the replaceability of the standing reserve through the leveling drive of positionality. But as already hinted, something is lost in the challenging revealing of technology. What is lost is our ability to relate to the world in any authentic way. When everything is reduced to resource in the circulation of positionality, we lose our sensitivity toward the particular. In our runaway consumerism, things become commodities that are being used, used up, and easily replaced by the vast selection of goods at hand for our convenience and consumption. The price of positionality is that we run the risk of losing touch with anything authentic. The leveling drive of circulation comes with a numbness and disaffection. When things are produced into the endless circulation of the standing reserve, always at hand in a logic of commodification and quantification, they enter a leveling drive of positionality and become mere resources. The consequence of this universal logic of delivery is that we risk losing touch with the particular. Instead, the drive of positionality and circulation is a logic of calculation and optimization. It is the instrumentalist paradigm of modern technology. For Heidegger, the age of technology therefore presents a radical rupture, and it is in light of this insight – the threat [*Gefahr*] of positionality – that he looks for another mode of sensitivity or way of being-in-the-world.

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[104] Lemmens, Pieter and Hui, Yuk. *"Apocalypse, Now! Peter Sloterdijk and Bernard Stiegler on the Anthropocene."* boundary2, 2017, doi: https://www.boundary2.org/2017/01/pieter-lemmens-and-yuk-hui-apocalypse-now-peter-sloterdijk-and-bernard-stiegler-on-the-anthropocene/

[105] Heidegger's analysis of technology is not a refusal of rational thinking or technological means as such. The world reveals itself through technology, a conditioning that cannot simply be undone in any simple way or manner. What Heidegger shows in his analysis of technology is that being as challenging revealing is the guise of the world. Only by developing an awareness thereof can we regain an authentic way of being in the world as opposed to the current exploration of the world. But this is not the same as to resign and give up on the world as it worlds. Considering the current climate crisis, for instance, practical problems caused by human hand call for action and practical solutions, not resignation.

Dwelling in the Age of Technology

Heidegger's response to the ubiquitous rule of positionality is to point to an altogether different way of thinking. The essay on technology ends by introducing the concept of "poetic thinking" in association with dwelling. Just like the Greek pre-modern notion of technology was found to include both *techne* and *poesis*, what is called for is a similar linkage of the two in the current age of technology. The essay ends with an open, suggesting gesture toward the poetic that reads like a precursor to Heidegger's later writings and, in particular, his reflections on art and sculpture addressed in the following chapters. It also reads well with one particular concept that was briefly mentioned during the exposition of the composite term of dwelling, namely, the concept of *Gelassenheit*, in English, releasement.

In a 1955 memorial address presented at a hometown celebration in Messkirch,[106] Heidegger sums up the implications of our relationship with technology. It is a sobering valuation of "the ramifications of positionality" upon modern life, as referred to in *Sojourns* and throughout his later writings. The account is informed by the analysis of technology, and Heidegger ascertains that we are "in flight of thinking" [*auf der Flucht vor dem Denken*].[107] This is because the way we think and live today is so ingrained with the function of positionality that we have lost sight of its influence. The flight of thinking is indicative of the homelessness and lack of dwelling that he takes to characterize humanity in the age of modern technology. We have lost touch with how we are in the world, searching in a state of alienation and existential restlessness. Informed by this insight, Heidegger differentiates between two kinds of thinking:

> There are then, two kinds of thinking, each justified and needed in its own way: calculative thinking and meditative thinking [*besinnliche Nachdenken*].[108]

[106] In 1955, Heidegger delivers the memorial address at the celebration of the 175th anniversary of the composer and the fellow-townsman of Messkirch, Conradin Kreutzer.
[107] GA16, p. 519. *Discourse on Thinking*, p. 45.
[108] GA16, p. 520. Ibid, 46.

On one side of the distinction is the universal drive of positionality, developed and described in the above, and here characterized as "calculative thinking." It represents the instrumentalist paradigm portrayed as a desolate time of alienation and rootlessness, leaving no place for dwelling. Instead, Heidegger keenly observes the feature of acceleration in a world marked by development as "technological advance will move faster and faster and can never be stopped."[109] This widespread feeling of alienation and lack of dwelling connects to the run-away consumerism and commodification in the circulation of the standing reserve. The centerless drive of positionality is a demand for universality (and control), leaving behind no place nor time to dwell. Heidegger laments what he sees as a loss of nearness and authenticity. In his view, the dystopian crescendo of technology takes on catastrophic proportion. The age of technology reveals an atomic age of nuclear energy where destruction looms. The ultimate expression of mastery culminates with the objectification of the world itself. In Heidegger's account, "the world now appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist. Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry."[110] In the instrumentalist paradigm, everything is reduced to resource and a means for our own undertaking. The world itself becomes a disposable object in the logic of the standing reserve. We have already discussed these planetary concerns as an anticipation of the Anthropocene and the current climate crisis, but what comes under "attack," is also the very way we are in the world characterized by reflection and dwelling. Underneath these planetary implications is the question of philosophical anthropology, that is, the question of what it means to be human and how we are in the world. For Heidegger, what emerges out of this context of desolation is a critical distinction between two radically different ways of thinking and being. Because calculative thinking is unable to restrain its inherent impulse of dominion, it leaves no place for dwelling and reflection. It is the excessive nature of calculative thinking – the leveling drive toward universality and indifference – that makes it a "threat" to a thinking of dwelling and any orientation toward the authentic and the particular. Critically, Heidegger argues, the leveling drive of positionality is fueled by "forces of technology:"

[109] GA16, p. 524. Ibid, 51.
[110] GA16, p. 523. Ibid, 50.

> These forces, which everywhere and every minute claim, enchain, drag along, press and impose upon man under the form of some technical contrivance or other—these forces, since man has not made them, have moved long since beyond his will and have outgrown his capacity for decision.[111]

In Heidegger's view, positionality is the big sellout of humanity. It undermines our very freedom and the ability, even, to detect and adequately address the function and implications imposed on us by technology. As an undisclosed means of oppression, it goes beyond our free will and undermines our capacity to reflect and react.

There is another way of thinking, Heidegger stresses. We are in flight of thinking exactly because we have succumbed to calculative thinking as our predominant way of being in the world. But Heidegger wants us to change the way we think and interact by calling attention to another mode and he explicitly call for a *besinnliche Nachdenken*. This has been translated into English as "meditative thinking," though not in the sense of spirituality or guidance, but rather, in the sense of contemplation and critical reflection. In other words, what is needed is a sense of critical thinking in contrast to the leveling modus operandi of calculative thinking. [112] What is called for is an authentic mode of reflection and being in the world, characterized not by the conditioning indifference of an instrumentalist paradigm, but by the opening gesture of reflection. Needed is a different way of being in the world, an attunement tied to the idea of releasement.

Releasement

Heidegger raises the question of technology out of a concern for human freedom and the role of technology in human life. To answer this challenge, he introduces the notion of *Gelassenheit*, which generally translates into English as "releasement" – as followed here. *Gelassenheit* is the perfect particle of the root, *lassen*, which means "*to let or allow*," relating to both "let in" [*einlassen*] and "let go" [*loslassen*], and it literally has to do with a "freeing" or "releasing. It also

[111] GA16, p. 524. Ibid, p. 51.

[112] In her reading of Heidegger, Dorthe Jørgensen argues for a "defense of thought understood as "meditative thinking"" and calls for a metaphysics of experience in a sense of aesthetic thinking.
Jørgensen, Dorthe. *Poetic Inclinations.* Aarhus University Press, 2021, p. 34.

shares a familiarity with the German *gelassen*, indicating a sense of looseness or even a laid-back attitude. *Gelassenheit* can be translated as composure and calmness, and Heidegger introduces the term in opposition to the pace and purpose of technology and calculative thinking in a paradigm of instrumental rationality. Our lives and thinking are permeated by the conditioning of positionality, and Heidegger wants to break with this imagined control and leveling in search for another, deeper sensitivity that expresses our attachment to the particular while breaking free from the bounds of positionality. When seen in this way, the concept of releasement represents a form of emancipation, a suggestive alteration in attitude toward the world that runs counter to the restraints of calculative thinking in the instrumentalist paradigm. Heidegger borrows the term *Gelassenheit* from the religious mysticism of Meister Eckhart, but he does so without the implied sense of piety and deliverance to a divine will. In the process, Heidegger oversimplifies Eckhart's rather complex reflections on *Gelassenheit* in relation to the will of god, as pointed out by Davis and Caputo,[113] but what emerges is Heidegger's own thinking on *Gelassenheit*. For Eckhart, *Gelassenheit* indicates a relation to god in which the soul is fully divested of its own will and given over to the will of god. It is a state of detachment from the world and a pious devotion to a divine will described as "without why." Caputo shows how Eckhart's version of *Gelassenheit* implies a life of detachment guided not by self-interest, but by an "uncalculating love" for no other thing than "God Himself:"[114] "God lives without why. The soul too in *Gelassenheit* takes on this same quality of life without why."[115] For Heidegger, however, the term is indefinite. It does not assume a willing god – or even the existence of a transcendent god. In this important way, Heidegger leaves behind Eckhart's mystical doctrine. In our modern destitution, the gods have fled and we are ourselves "in flight of thinking," having lost all otherworldly underpinnings. Heidegger's idea of releasement refers to a particular way of being in this world and involves no addressee from beyond. In this respect, he opposes theism as much as atheism. In contrast to Eckhart's detachment from the world in an abandonment of free will, Heidegger stresses involvement with the world, alluding to a pre-reflective tuning and authentic mode of being in this world. As argued by Davis, *Gelassenheit* "names nothing less than the fundamental

[113] Caputo, John. *Meister Eckhart and the Later Heidegger: The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*. Fordham University Press. 1990.
Bret W. Davis. "Will and Gelassenheit" in *Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts.* Routledge, 2014.
[114] *Meister Eckhart and the Later Heidegger*, pp. 492-493.
[115] Ibid, p. 492.

attunement [*Grundstimmung*] with which he says human beings are to authentically relate to other beings and to being itself."[116] Releasement thus implies a freeing from what Heidegger calls "the domain of the will" to a domain in contrast to the will. In Davis' words, releasement marks "a leap into the region of non-willing letting be that is otherwise than both will-full activity and will-les passivity."[117] In other words, releasement is a form of non-willing authenticity and, in this capacity, it counters the will-bending forces that drives the world. It is in this context that Heidegger qualifies the term releasement. He takes it to include two distinctive but apparently related features:

> Releasement toward things and openness to the mystery belong together. They grant us the possibility of dwelling [*Wohnen*] in the world in a totally different way.[118]

Heidegger is not exactly using clear language here and the quoted text takes some unpacking. When he talks about an "openness to the mystery" [*Offenheit für das Geheimnis*], we can understand this out of the distinction between the two kinds of thinking or being in the world. To be "open to the mystery" can be understood as a genuine openness and indetermination, a receptive attitude that allows us to identify and oppose the conditioning power of positionality. The terminology of "openness" and the open [*das Offende*] is a reoccurring theme in Heidegger's authorship, taking on various meanings. Already in *Being and Time*, Heidegger is interested in the transcendental constitution and open character of *Dasein* constituted as a being-in-the-world. What this means is that *Dasein* is both a being [*ein Seiendes*] in the world in the ontic sense, but it is

[116] *Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts*, p. 168.
Grundstimmung is a term used only once in *Being and Time* – in §62 (Sein und Zeit, p. 310) – in reference to anxiety and is translated "basic moods" (Macquarrie/Robinson) or "fundamental moods" (Stambaugh). Nonetheless, the term may be understood as interchangeably in connection to mood [*Stimmung*] which is the term most often used by Heidegger in the distinction between moods and attunement [*Befindlichkeit*] in *Being and Time*. Interestingly, Heidegger goes on to use the same term [*Grundstimmung*] when describing the rapture or ecstasy in the Greek sense of awe and wonder in the commentary on Hölderin's *Germania* (GA39, p. 140). Here, Heidegger uses the terms *Grundstimmung* and *Stimmung* somewhat interchangeably, describing the pendulating opening character of the ambiguous mood of wonder "*die Stimmung als entrückend-eintrückende*."
[117] Ibid, p. 168.
[118] GA16, 528. *Discourse on Thinking*, p. 55.

also ontological in the sense that we as *Daseins* are open to being [*Sein*] as such. As *Daseins*, human beings have the dual capacity of simply being in the world, but also to reflect on and question being as such. In the "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger declares that the human "stands out into the openness of being" which is where we meet the world:

> Man is, and is man, insofar as he is the ek-sisting one. He stands out into the openness of Being. Being itself… is as openness. Thrown in such a fashion, man stands "in" the openness of Being. "World" is the clearing of Being into which mand stands out.[119]

Implied here is our relation with the world marked by existential measurement. It is this dimensionality and the awareness thereof that makes us stand out among beings. We are "thrown" into the facticity of the world. In the letter, Heidegger refers to humans in the singular as "*der Eksistierende,*" thus underscoring his point linguistically in reference to the affinity of "standing out" [*ek-sistere*] and existence [*Eksistenz*], as underscored by the use of hyphen. In parenthesis, we could add that Heidegger's idea of the fourfold is defined by the same existentially charged field of reference. In Heidegger's later thinking, humans are no longer *Daseins*, but "mortals" living in anticipation of the divinities in the scope of human finitude. Yet central to this passage is also the role of the open and the openness of being. The open is where we meet the world. As we shall see, it reads well with Heidegger's thoughts on releasement as a disclosive mode of openness and being in the world. In terms of how to understand this relation to "the open" and Heidegger's idea thereof prior to his later writing, Vallega-Neu, in her reading of Heidegger, notes that "in its pre-reflective understanding of being, Dasein 'stands out (ek-sists) in the open horizon of being'," thus emphasizing the pre-reflective element. According to Vallega-Neu, what changes in Heidegger later writings is a shift in temporality.[120] The later term of releasement is

[119] GA9, p. 350; *Basic Writings*, p. 172.

[120] In *Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*, Daniela Vallega-Neu describes the Heidegger's developments from *Being and time* to *Contributions*, preluding his later thinking. She argues that Heidegger's move following the transcendental constitution of *Dasein* in *Being and Time* is a shift in temporality. In this process, she indirectly calls attention to the pre-reflective character of the openness in the dimension of our worldhood and our pre-reflective attunement to a mood. In Heidegger's later writings this emphasis changes, but we may note the pre-reflective connection to receptivity and releasement.

exactly defined as in opposition to the calculative thinking of technology and as a pre-reflective openness and fundamental attunement [*Grundstimmung*] as argued by Bret Davis (and Reginald Lilly.) Releasement therefore reads well the idea of *Befindlichkeit* [attunement] and worldhood in *Being and Time* as an authentic non-willing and an alternative mode of being in the world that opposes the conditioning drive of technology.

In the following chapters, this study examines the element of receptivity as an expression of precisely the openness and sensitivity relating to dwelling. In Heidegger's later writings, the idea of the open takes center stage as expressing the disclosure of being, alongside Heidegger's thinking of the event [*Ereignis*] as in the metaphor for the clearing. In the central text on releasement, *Country Path Conversations*, Heidegger echoes the thinking of *Being and Time* and speaks of the "resolve" or "resoluteness" [*Entschlossenheit*] involved in "a self-opening for the open."[121] In the memorial address, Caputo already points out that "releasement means not only to be 'loosened from things', but also to be 'open to Being' […] so in Heidegger Being discloses itself in its truth, free from all metaphysical disguises, to the thinking which is released."[122] But here, in the essay on the country path conversations, the resoluteness of releasement involves undertaking an act of Dasein's self-opening *for* the open. Understood in this way, releasement involves not simply a passive act of non-willing, but rather "the authentic sense of *Gelassenheit*" in a self-reflective movement of Dasein in the receptive encounter with the openness of being. It is testimony not only of the lasting interest in this theme in Heidegger, but of the close relation of releasement and resoluteness, an existential category of authenticity in Heidegger's earlier thinking. Being is itself questionable and indefinite. Instead of taking for granted and seeking comfort in any one particular way of life, resoluteness means to be open and prepared to question being in the openness. Being in the open is indefinite and requires a self-opening, and act of self-reflection. Standing in the openness of being takes resoluteness. In the authentic sense of "standing in the openness of being,"[123] the term of releasement can thus be read as the existential mode of pre-reflective attunement or being in the world in which we as humans stand out [*ek-sistere*] in a

[121] GA77, pp. 143-144.
"Conversation on a Country Path," in *Discourse on Thinking*, p. 81.
Davis W. Bret, *Country Path Conversations*. Indiana University Press, p. 91. In a footnote, Davis notes that Heidegger's original 1959 reference to *Being and Time* that was later omitted.
[122] *Meister Eckhart and the Later Heidegger*, p. 66.
[123] GA9, p. 350. "Letter on Humanism" in *Basic Writings*, p. 172.

receptive openness to being. It implies an open and opening attitude of receptivity and existential awareness sensitive to the world. In a topological reading of Heidegger, Malpas – and with him Dahlstrom – argues that the open is the place of being.[124] For Heidegger, the open is also connected to the notion of the region [*Gegend*],[125] which then adds a dynamic of place and region that Heidegger further examines in his thinking of sculpture, as discussed in chapter 5. Here, in the context of releasement, the region is both "the free expanse" [*die freie Weite*] and "the abiding-while" [*die Weile*] – two parallel features or aspects of the region that are then combined in Heidegger's term of "the abiding expanse" [*die verweilende Weite*], which is how he refers to the opening region. What this means is that the notion of the opening region is both a gathering and an opening. Heidegger notes this doubled movement: "The open-region is the abiding expanse which, gathering all, opens itself so that in it the open is held and halted, letting each thing arise in its resting."[126] In this condensed context of topology, temporality, and dwelling, Heidegger thus ties releasement and region to the notion of *Ereignis* understood as clearing or event of appropriation.[127]

In the above quote, Heidegger is also making a subtle play on his notion of the "mystery" or "secret of being" which is also known as the "ontological difference" and relates to "the forgetting of being" [*Seinsvergessenheit*]. Heidegger's own vocabulary is rather obscure on this point, but "the ontological difference" refers to the categorical difference between "being" in the sense of the transcendental conditions of appearance, i.e., the field of reference or "world" that allows for anything to appear – as opposed to "beings" understood as any and all the concrete beings or entities that appear in a world. In the earlier language of *Being and Time*, this is the difference between the ontological and the ontic as noted in the above. Accordingly, "the forgetting of being" is the failure to distinguish between the two. In Heidegger's thinking, the forgetfulness of being constitutes the flawed history of Western metaphysics and it is this oblivion that

[124] *Heidegger's Topology*, p. 248.
The Heidegger Dictionary, p. 149.
[125] GA77, p. 113. *Country Path Conversations*, p. 73 ff.
[126] GA77, p. 114. *Country Path Conversations*, p. 74.
[127] Introduced in *Contributions to Philosophy* and defining his later thinking as well, Heidegger rethinks being in terms of an event [*Ereignis*]. The event of being is the event of appropriation or and it refers to the unfolding of being and the truth-character or sense-making of being as appropriation. In her introduction to Heidegger's work, *Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction*, Vallega-Neu offers a discussion of the development and various meanings of the term in Heidegger's thinking.

prompts Heidegger to ask the question of being and the examination of the ontological structures of existence in *Being and Time.*[128] The forgetting of being is thus a constant focus throughout Heidegger's thinking, reemerging here in the convoluted language of the later writings. Basically, what Heidegger calls for is an open, authentic relation to the world, that is, a way of thinking and being in the world that does not forget the depth of existence, open and receptive to being in its all its richness and particularity, because the question of being implies an existential awareness of being in the world. The problem is that our antennas are tuned into the worldly frequencies of technology as challenging revealing, that we are so engulfed in the paradigm of instrumental thinking and control which permeates and conditions our lives that we fail to recognized the richness of authentic being. Heidegger is concerned that our relation to the world has become inauthentic by the leveling indifference and neutrality caused by our relation to technology and positionality. Only by detaching ourselves from the drive of positionality by standing in the openness and temporality of releasement, do we preserve a receptive attitude that allows for a different way of thinking and being.

Heidegger uses the German idiom of the "releasement toward things" [*Gelassenheit zu den Dingen*][129] to indicate a way to break from the dominance of calculative thinking – not in the sense of an abandonment of will and world, but as disinterested reflection on the transformative powers of technology today and an openness toward things. The "freeing" of releasement is not an attitude of passivity and resignation, as Heidegger already indicates in "On the Essence of Truth": "to let beings be" – does not refer to neglect or indifference [*Gleichgültigkeit*], but rather the opposite. To let be is to engage oneself with beings [*Sein-lassen ist das Sicheinlassen auf das Seiende*]."[130] Hinted here is a responsiveness and engagement with the world as an alternative mode of being in the world cognate with dwelling examined in the chapters to come in the treatment of *weilen* and the activity of the *Aufenthalt*.

In *Conversation on a Country Path*, Heidegger asserts his understanding of the concept of releasement in accordance with the memorial address, while positioning himself against the

[128] While it goes beyond the boundaries of this study to adequately present Heidegger's thinking on the question of being, it is the difference between being (Being) and beings. The term is sometimes capitalized to reflect Being as the transcendental category or field of interpretation.
[129] GA16, p. 527. *Discourse on Thinking*, p. 54.
[130] GA9, p. 188. "On the Essence of Truth" in Heidegger, Martin. *Pathmarks*. Edited by William McNeill. Cambridge, 1998, p. 144 ff

thinking of Meister Eckhart. In doing so, Heidegger adds the interesting observation that releasement is also a mode of authentic waiting. The text makes clears that this is not waiting *for* anything definite in any transitive sense of the word, and that the waiting does not imply for what or whom it awaits. But Heidegger's waiting game has nothing to do with the absurdity or meaninglessness on display in Beckett's play. Rather, the point is to expose the receptive feature of authentic waiting in releasement. Because the wait is indefinite, it also implies a shift in temporality in the form of a *suspension* in the form of lived time that evades and disrupts our standard notion of time as a linear, conventional measure of calculation by which we live and organize our lives through clockwork. Or put differently, the self-opening element of standing in the openness of being involves a suspension of conventional sense of time into an elemental, authentic sense of time. It is a *weilen* in the form of suspended, or endured, time, and this *Aufenthalt* breaks down the conventional categories of temporality. To wait indefinitely is to lose a sense of time. Again, the concept of releasement implies a temporality of dwelling as *weilen* and *aufhalten*.

Releasement has to do with dwelling as in the temporal aspect of *weilen* and reads well with the broad label of "poetic thinking" that Heidegger heralds as the antidote to technology at the end of his essay on technology. It is introduced as a reaction to the entanglement of positionality that Heidegger finds has subsumed our current way of thinking and experiencing into an inauthentic impulse of calculation and objectification in an accelerating, instrumentalist paradigm. To counter the accelerating peril of humanity in the technological world, the idea of releasement is cast as a means of rectification toward an authentic mode of being in the world.[131] We are in flight of thinking and this homelessness calls for dwelling. We have already hinted at the linkage of releasement and dwelling in the sense of *weilen* and *sich aufhalten*. It is the temporal aspect of releasement that makes it central to dwelling. In a similar fashion, releasement expresses the temporal dimension of experience and reflection. It is the same shift in temporality that we found in dwelling as *verweilen* and of *sich aufhalten*.

Already Bergson took notice of this other sense of temporality in his reflections on our perception of time as "pure duration." Bergson rejects the conventional thinking of time as quantifiable, measured clockwork time as being "superficial" and argues instead for a *lived* sense of

[131] *Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts,* p. 168.

time, i.e., the experience of time as pure duration, as something lived and endured. In his analysis of listening to a piece of music, Bergson identifies "the so-called intensive magnitudes"[132] in our experience of the depth and color of the music. I read this in connection with Bachelard's thinking of daydreaming and poetic sensitivity. For Bachelard, the mode of being in the world as daydreaming is also a receptive mode of being that has to do with the reading of poetry and "looking for "miniature and immensity" as in "the dialectics of large and small offered for a poetics of space."[133] In the introduction to *The Poetics of Space*, Bachelard informs us that dwelling causes "the impression of immensity in us,"[134] thereby alluding to the affective character of experience. It is this affective character of experience causing "impressions of immensity" that Bachelard ties to the act of day-dreaming. Bachelard's "the impression of immensity in us" shares the same qualities as Bergson's "the so-called intensive magnitudes." What emerges here is a lived sense of pure duration that somehow escapes measuring. These "intensive magnitudes," however, are "not a quantity," Bergson argues, but rather, they present "a continuous or qualitative multiplicity with no resemblance to number."[135] In this way, Bergson identifies a form of experiential temporality which anticipates the works of Heidegger and Bachelard and points to the same sense of poetic sensitivity. Heidegger's thinking of dwelling and releasement implies a corresponding shift in temporality and a notion of lived time as elemental and integral to the open gesture of receptivity toward being. What this means is that in order for the proper sense of temporality to be available, the following prerequisites are required: that conventional time categories are bracketed, so that elemental time can emerge, so, in turn, that the connection can become clear between lived time and the state of receptivity toward being. The act of *aufhalten* reflects the intermediate space of a reflective pausing in the midst of things, a lingering "for a while" [*Weilen*] that implies a state of composure and reflection or, in German, *Besinnung*, which is how Heidegger refers to the essence of releasement and the freeing openness of genuine contemplative thinking. Heidegger is talking about this in terms that defy the dichotomy of active and passive. One way of think of releasement, as suggested here, is to understand it in a broad sense

[132] Bergson, Henri. *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*. Routledge, 2013, p. 106; and 103-107 ff.
[133] *The Poetics of Space*, p. xxxviii
[134] Ibid, xxxix.
[135] *Time and Free Will*, p. 105.

as a form of freeing the mind in regards to "the openness" to the mystery of being and "the releasement toward things." Dwelling also relates to the world and our involvement with things. In this way, the call for nearness and a sense of distance – heralded in the opening "*Hinweis*" of the Bremen lectures as opposed to the alienation and leveling "ramifications of positionality" lamented in *Sojourns* and throughout the later writings – resonates well with both a deeper sensitivity toward the world and an impulse to perceive the particular in its particularity.

In fact, technology's very workings presuppose the existence of distance and nearness that opposes it. As Figal reminds us, the universality of technology does not hold sway up against "the independence of things."[136] It is exactly this insight that Heidegger calls attention to through the "releasement toward things." It implies an awareness in the form of a sensitivity or a freeing of the mind through reflection and genuine contemplative thinking that flout the boundaries of our otherwise conditioned way of thinking and reasoning in terms of causality and purpose. In this sense, the concept of releasement overlaps with the motif of *aufhalten* and the *Aufenthalt* that we found in the concept of dwelling. Against the universal scope of technology that supposedly subsumes the modern era, these crucial aspects of dwelling point to a sense of the particular that in fact holds all the potential. The freeing impulse of "letting be" implied in the term "releasement" presents an alternative to the totalizing dominance of technology threatening to engulf us. Releasement can be said to present an alternative attitude or way of being in the world that allows us to regain an authentic relation with the things as more than disposable resources. Nothing could be more relevant for our lives today than a rethinking of the concept of releasement in terms of a sensitivity towards the particular in its particularity, especially in the context of technology and our modern lives. In this regard, *Gelassenheit* as releasement justifies the attention given here, as it is central not only to the question of technology, but also to the contemporary investigation of the concept of dwelling in this study as a particular way of being in and relating to the world. This is the same basic pursuit and impulse to (re)discover the spectacle of the singular that defines and lies beneath Heidegger's thinking of the event, of the thing as a poetic undertow and a longing for a form of sensitivity toward being that has long been lost. For Heidegger, we moderns no longer possess the Greek sense of the exuberance of being, yet the notion of releasement presents a contemporary avenue of authenticity that also reflects some

[136] Figal, Günter. "The Universality of Technology and the Independence of Things." Research in Phenomenology. No. 45, 2015, pp. 358-368.

of the same features we found to overlap with the concept of dwelling, namely the proximity and temporality of *aufhalten* and *weilen*. As we shall see, this resonates well with the later thinking of place as developed in chapter 3 and 4 and with the sensitivity assessed in the accompanying discussion of the exemplary Greek sensitivity. Adding to this context of releasement as a mode of being in the world, Heidegger also uses the German term *Besinnung* in a call for moderation and reflection. This implies shifting gears, a deceleration indicating a different sense of temporality. It is in this sense – as a contemplative way of being towards experience and toward the world– that releasement is to be understood.

The concept of releasement brings together the temporal aspect of *weilen* and the dimension (this approach to time) of rupture and reflection that we found in the notion of the *Aufenthalt*. This is where aufenhalt and weilen come together. When Heidegger coins the phrase "releasement to the things," he indirectly raises the lifeworld perspective of worldhood in the "staying with things" – as entailed in the term *sich aufhalten*, and discussed in the chapter on sculpture. Malpas reads the phrase as the disruptive potential in our relation to technology. Understood in this way, releasement then "signifies a way of being in relation to technology that does not allow technology to dominate us, but leaves us, and so also things, free in relation to it." According to Malpas, "the mode of revealing that is at issue here is surely that of "poetic dwelling" that is attuned to the Event as such, and so to the gathering of the fourfold, and thereby allows for the "letting be" even of technology and its devices."[137] In this way, the concept of releasement can be said to involve our relation to things as in the notion of the fourfold, while at the same time adding to the aspect of dwelling as a composite term. Overlapping here are the elements of *aufhalten* and *weilen* that we established as part of the concept of dwelling as a composite term. Once again, we are reminded that dwelling involves a poetic dimension, a poetic sensitivity similar to the poetic thinking called for in conclusion in the essay on technology.

We are now in a position to define the concept of releasement based on the examination above. Following Davis' reading of releasement as a basic mood, [*Grundstimmung*],[138] I take releasement to mean a contemplative mode of being in the world that reflects a *sensitivity* and attunement to the world (and the particular in its particularity) opened up through the temporality

[137] *Heidegger's Topology*, p. 301.
[138] Davis, Bret W. *Heidegger and the Will*: On the Way to Gelassenheit. Northwestern University Press, 2007, p. 6-7 and 307-308.

of dwelling. As a form of authentic non-willing, releasement upends the flow of inauthentic indifference and presents us with "the possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally different way." Implied in the language of *sich aufhalten* is the rupture of the *Aufenthalt* that is a shift in temporality towards the elemental time of the pause. It is this temporal shift in the *Aufenthalt* that allows for a breaking away from the universal drive of positionality. The fast-paced powers of acceleration and speed – recognized also in the thinking of Hartmut Rosa – are disrupted by the rupture and dwelling of releasement. The open gesture of releasement in the midst of things presents a temporally different way of being and thinking in the world. Thus, releasement is a mode of dwelling and a conceptualized alternative to the conditioning of positionality. It is this potential – the temporality and receptive sensitivity of the *Aufenthalt* – that emerges as the positive project in *Sojourns.* A sense of place comes to the fore in a heightened sensitivity toward the world through an intensified experience of dwelling.

The present study argues that this interpretation of the *Aufenthalt* – the sojourn – is key to understanding the composite concept of dwelling. As a microcosmos, the emblematic term of *Aufenthalt* itself reflects the full range of dwelling –reflecting existential, historical, and experiential aspects of dwelling as it unfolds in Heidegger's later thinking. Indeed, the activity of the *Aufenthalt* involves both temporal and spatial elements of dwelling, and it suggests an attentive, reflective attitude or way of being in the world that counters the leveling of positionality. Releasement understood in this way can be seen to underscore the experiential aspect of the composite term of dwelling.

In keeping with the assertion of "the flight of thinking" and Heidegger's subsequent distinction made between "calculative thinking" and "meditative thinking," we should be careful to remember that Heidegger does not simply dismiss the calculative thinking of positionality. Being is necessarily revealed to us through technology as a way of revealing and as such, it cannot simply be undone in any simple way. In fact, Aristotelian thinking comes with great benefits and is still essential to great developments and technological achievements that we today take for granted. To do justice both to Aristotle and to Heidegger's reading of Aristotle, Aristotelian thinking is actually at the root of *both* the poetic, meditative mindset and the calculative mindset. Rather, Heidegger's critique of "the flight of thinking" has to do with the fact that for Heidegger, ancient Greek thinking expresses an authentic way of relating to the world, whereas the flawed Western tradition upon which we stand, is a product of the process of Hellenization and the

translation from the original Greek language into Latin and Latinized conceptuality and metaphysics. In this respect, the distinction between two ways of thinking is not about whether to be an Aristotelian or not. Rather, the distinction is ultimately a modern distinction. It is a distinction in what Heidegger identifies as the challenging element in what he calls challenging revealing in the essence of technology. The enemy for Heidegger is an insensitive approach to that in which we are – our world – unable to receive the world as a collection of objects that stands against us and challenge us (as in the original sense of *Gegenstand* as something that opposes us). This is exactly why the encounter with the Parthenon at the Acropolis is of such significance: because it stands out and confronts Heidegger with its own presencing. It is a challenging that stems from the particular in its particularity – from the uniqueness of the thing. But differentiation and abundance of the world in its particularity falls pray to the leveling of the modern mindset. Instead, the challenging is transformed into a one-way street whereby we challenge the world in a thinking of resource and commodification. For Heidegger, the leveling drive of technology leads to indifference and insensitivity in the sense of a lack of dwelling. This entanglement is blocking our way and access to the world. We have becomes so submerged into our modern existence in the age of technology that we have forgotten how to dwell and live authentically. This is the paradoxical nature of the situation we are facing. Therefore, any alternate way of encountering the world through the composite term of dwelling and "poetic thinking" comes not with the total upheaval of the existing order of rationality, but rather as a supplementary and neglected mode of being in the world that allows for an authentic sense of being, otherwise lost in the universal leveling of positionality. What Heidegger means is not the total undoing of rationality and technology as such. Indeed, each mode of thinking is "justified and needed in its own way." Rather, something is missing in the way we are in the world. This other mode of being presents a radical rupture, but one that takes place within this world, intertwined with the epoch of technology as an alternative or supplementing aspect to the predominant tradition of calculative thinking.

Years later, in the 1966 interview with *Der Spiegel*, "Only a God can Save Us," Heidegger argues that the transformation of the Western tradition can only be done through a rethinking and reappropriation of the European tradition, and not "by taking over Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world."[139] That is not to say that releasement as a mode of being

[139] GA16, p. 379.

in the world is to be dismissed. Rather, we are to understand releasement as a supplement aspect of dwelling on the terms of Heidegger's own tradition, insofar as it is a releasement from the flaws of metaphysics and technology. Yet it is a "conversion" [*Umkehr*] from within, in the Hegelian sense of being "sublated" [*aufgehoben*], in that we are always already situated within this tradition and age of technology.

Heidegger Today

Having completed the examination of technology, the study thus arrives at a critical point. Rather than blindly accepting Heidegger's words on technology and modernity, I want to call attention to some important reservations to be directed against Heidegger's own thinking. In the process of establishing a Heideggerian idea of dwelling around the reflections on technology, it is crucial to assess Heidegger's own message from a contemporary perspective. The question is whether Heidegger's question of technology is really still relevant today. And if so, how are we to understand these findings in a contemporary setting? What follows are some brief remarks on the relevance and contemporaneity in Heidegger's thinking on dwelling and technology in and beyond *Sojourns*.

The quote from *Sojourns* that opens this chapter demonstrates the challenge that faces Heidegger's text today. What is on the line here is the question of contemporaneity. As he sails toward the Greek mainland, Heidegger coins the phrase "we, the people of today." But who are the "we" in "we, the people of today," and how are we to make sense of Heidegger's thinking on technology in the 21st century? Heidegger's thinking on technology is indeed tainted – and to a certain extend flawed – by its own bias and situatedness, but what is also asserted here – and what Heidegger takes aim at – is the *essence* of technology, which has universal value. Thus, while Heidegger's formulations are deeply stuck in his own time, they also live on exactly because they are able to say something that remain relevant to us today. They point out the general character of technology as revealing and, as such, they say something about the structuring nature of how we think and live today. In this sense, the epochal premise asserted in Heidegger's

Spiegel, Der. "Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel's Interview with Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, vol. 20, no. 4, 1976, pp. 267-284, doi:10.5840/philtoday197620422.

thinking is not broken and the reflections on technology provides a still meaningful context in which to explore and interpret the way technology works today. This is why the inclusive pronoun of the "we" is still able to put a demand of contemporaneity on its present-day reader and why Heidegger's thinking of technology remains relevant. Not just as a timely reminder of our planetary responsibility to the biosphere that we inhabit and impact in the age of the Anthropocene, but in a very concrete sense as well, suggesting a sensitivity and a caring responsibility toward the near and concrete phenomena of the everyday.

I want to also raise some serious reservations about Heidegger's writings on technology. Heidegger's account of technology reads as a cultural critique and applies the most general notion of technology possible in the form of "being as challenging revealing." In this macroscope, Heidegger leaves no room for differentiating between different forms of technology. Positionality and "the forces of technology" encompass anything from heavy machinery and industrial plants to quantum physics and scientific reasoning – not to mention the internalization and implications pertaining to the relational and personal sphere of the lifeworld. Heidegger's all-encompassing notion of technology thus defies differentiation. It is nonetheless rooted in modern industrial society. One of the most striking features is the style and language in which Heidegger describes technological change and development. Underneath the growing sense of destitution and alarm running through his later writings lies a deep-felt longing and sense of loss and nostalgia. It reflects a predominant pastness in the way Heidegger sees and portrays the world. For all the relevance in his thinking, Heidegger never fails to position himself in opposition to the new. Inside his descriptions of technology speaks a voice of old, lamenting the high-paced technological changes in a run-away world already wearing thin. Heidegger's own choice of examples seems almost deliberately dated, carefully selected to echo a rural, pre-industrial era. The jug, the bridge, the well at the hut in the country side – all of them far removed from the roaring world of modern technology. This is in part due to the nature of Heidegger's phenomenological orientation, which takes the form of an ontology of nearness in which we understand and experience the world through our interest and use of the things in and by their proximity. But it also illustrates a strong preference for the past in Heidegger' thinking. The perceived nostalgia exposes a striking conservatism. Ironically, it is the same sense of withdraw and world-withering that Heidegger would himself report on in "The Origin of the Work of Art," yet his own writings on technology are subject to a similar sense of decline. There is a sense of removal in Heidegger's reflections

on technology – a distance and detachment by which Heidegger tends to always describe "the powers of technology" in the general and from afar. In the hometown address in Messkirch, Heidegger speaks of "the turmoil of the big cities" and the modern "wastelands of industrial districts." Topologically speaking, this marks a move away from the modern world of technology and the pace and alienation of the city, and a preference for the rural and the local. Understood in this way, Heidegger's later thinking is metaphorically and linguistically placed in the provincial setting of the countryside[140] – in indirect reference to the topology of the countryside hut at Todtnauberg in the Black Forest mountains of southern Germany. It is in this conceptual setting that Heidegger's later thinking explores themes of nearness and particularity in opposition to the abstract powers of positionality. It is also a rural romanticism at a safe distance from the buzzing city. In this respect, Heidegger's thinking of technology unfolds in an old world. The topological landscape is draped in metaphors of the forest – complete with forest paths and clearings. Scholars have rightly objected to Heidegger's romanticism, pointing to a notion of rural nostalgia and provincialism.[141] In a critique of Heidegger's writings on science and technology specifically, Ihde calls for a "deromanticizing" of Heidegger.[142] And indeed, a more adequate analysis of the function of technology today would benefit from leaving behind the nostalgia and romanticism of the countryside in favor of a more nuanced, "multistable" sense of technology.[143]

Heidegger's preoccupation with the world of the Greeks is a story of its own. His use and reference of the ancient Greek worldview presents nostalgic longing for something lost or fading. It can be read as the idealization of a once golden era no longer available to us, and yet Heidegger's thinking of technology is built on these pillars of origin and truth. As such, his thinking itself becomes vulnerable to the challenge of (doing) metaphysics. It is at the same time

[140] Sharr, Adam. *Heidegger's Hut*. MIT Press, 2006, xx-xvi.
On the connection between Heidegger's philosophical project and the hut in Todtnauberg, see Andrew Benjamin's "Prologue" in *Heidegger's Hut*. In keeping with Sharr, Benjamin finds that "there is an important link" in that "philosophy and place orient each other" (xx). In arguing for "the hut's emblematic presence," Benjamin makes the following observation: "The urban as condition, for Heidegger, stands at an important distance from the hut. The hut is both a place and an emblem for a type of philosophical practice" (xvi).
[141] Malpas, Jeff. *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place: Explorations in the Topology of Being*. MIT Press, 2012, p. 7.
[142] Ihde, D. *Heidegger's Technologies: Postphenomenological Perspectives*, p. 74.
[143] I take the concept of *multistability* from Ihde's reflections on technology. Ihde argues for a more nuanced and multifaceted relation between humans and technology, or technological artifacts (Ihde's term), as they inhabit and influence our lifeworld. In the same way, Donna Haraway advances a feminist critique of science and technology. Her work promotes the idea of *situated knowledge* and addresses questions of bias, race, body, and gender – all of which are missing in Heidegger account.

its greatest assets and greatest limitation. By adapting this world of reference, Heidegger establishes an authority by which to understand and interpret the world of today in normative terms – a corrective in which to examine its shortcomings as a process of disenchantment. In Heidegger's thinking, the pre-Socratic world of Greece shines on, granting a source and claim of authority and authenticity. One can dismiss this line of argumentation as otherworldly nonsense – as a case of nostalgic romanticism and naïve idealization. There is definitely some ground for this objection, considering the way Heidegger's idealization of "Greece" at times takes on almost unchallenged authority. Yet it is the same ancient outlook the provides Heidegger with the conceptual breadth and residue to fully engage with a critique of our modern situation. For if nothing else, "Greece" lays bare the very possibility of an alternative way of being in the world. In these important ways, the world of ancient Greece informs the kind of poetic thinking that Heidegger is seeking. One can certainly speculate whether the authority that Heidegger ascribes to the Greek sojourn is indeed necessary in order to develop and establish a contemporary thinking of dwelling – and in a way the detachment from Heidegger's original context and reappropriation of dwelling into a contemporary discussion as offered in this study can be seen as an indication of exactly that. But despite the ambiguity of Heidegger's thinking and the heroization of Greece, the theme of dwelling does constitute a deeply original thinking that may still claim relevance today as examined here. Heidegger's dependence on Greece as an exemplary world of reference is not without problems, but it offers substantial inspiration for a thinking of experience and a critical potential to reflect upon the present situation while thinking along different lines, and thus offers important reflections on our situation today. It is in this respect this study should be seen, as a constructive attempt to unravel and understand a Heideggerian idea of dwelling in dialogue with contemporary times.

But for all its flaws, Heidegger's thinking of technology is also incredibly appealing. The reason for this endurance lies in the applicability and recognizability of some of the key features emerging in the study. As pointed out, it would be naive to uncritically adapt Heidegger's take on technology as presented in his own writings without some major reservations, but the concept of positionality remains pertinent and still worth thinking with as a condensation of modernity and a means to interpret and understand our own time and situation in regards of dwelling. In a contemporary view, the notion of positionality is still strikingly relevant, I argue, for when we peel off the robe of romanticism and nostalgia in Heidegger's writings, what we find at the heart

of Heidegger's critique of modern technology is an arresting – and anxious – analysis of the roaring forces of consumerism and instrumental thinking that are, as it happens, *still* defining elements in the way we live our lives in the 21st century. In this way, the ideas that drive Heidegger's argument remain perceptive today. The explanatory power nested in the concept of positionality becomes clear when we consider a number of contemporary perspectives on Heidegger's contribution.

According to Heidegger, calculative thinking is the driver and modus operandi of the modern technological age. The analysis of technology is obviously far removed from us today in terms of time and context, but the crux of calculative thinking is still very much a part of modern life, I argue, only it has taken on new forms far beyond Heidegger's grasp. One way to think of this is to consider our digital culture and the notion of datafication. It is the rise of information technologies and digitalization that have pervaded our everyday lives. In the algorithmic era, technology permeates and shapes our lives in a form and fashion that no one could ever have imagined at the time of Heidegger. And yet, it is essentially the same principle of calculative thinking that informs our way of living: it reflects the instrumental rationality that drives and directs the way we live, plan, build, commute, and communicate. When we go to the gym, the way we workout is guided by a drive toward optimization and control. It is the internalization of calculative thinking. What this means is that even the sphere of the body has come under the dominion of the instrumentalist paradigm. Through devices and technology, digitalization has entered the lifeworld as an integral part of our everyday lives that we depend on and take for granted to the extent that we are no longer aware of the influence it has on our lives. We sometimes refer to the generations born after the invention of the internet as "digital natives" – a term that highlights the intuitive way and degree to which we have come to live by and with technology. So much so that scholars have come to talk about "the computational turn."[144]

In addition to this internal dimension of optimization and calculation reverberating in our innermost lives, calculative thinking can also be argued in its external form. From the search machines to the chatrooms of social platforms, calculative thinking and online data analysis is the hidden backdrop that feeds and fuels the economic interests of consumer trends and markets in the 21st century. Through tracking and design, we, the users, have become online clients and

[144] Hui, Yuk. "The Computational Turn, or, a New Weltbild." *Junctures*. No. 13, 2010, p. 41.

consumers – human resources in a sense – whose online lives and preferences are transformed into valuable information and commodity in a liberal market of information, surveillance, prediction – and calculation. Shoshana Zuboff identifies this process as surveillance capitalism.[145] It is the monetization of our data in the digital age and, in this time of datafication and surveillance capitalism, we become the product as the predictability of datafication opens up an avenue of profit. Referring to this process as a system of "info-politics," Colin Koopman describes the extent to which we are exposed to datafication in the digital age: "From one information system to the next, and across each, we are inscribed, processed, and reproduced as subjects of data…The extent to which we informational persons are so widely formatted into our data suggests the high states of our datafication and its concomitant politics of information."[146] Our online habits and preferences come with the promise of profit in a worldwide market driven by data and information. Datafication is big business. It turns out that in the age of surveillance capitalism, our choices and habits – how we live our lives – fall under a grand scale calculus of big data, reducing the particularity of our lives and preferences to patterns of information in the instrumentalist paradigm of calculative thinking. What Heidegger identified as the challenging revealing of technology in the leveling drive of positionality can thus be seen as a continuous trend of integration and permeation, that is, the symbiosis of technology and lifeworld in which calculative reasoning becomes integral to everyday life.

In Heidegger scholarship, commentators such as Malpas interprets Heidegger's essence of technology in the context of economy. In this reading, positionality is the leveling of everything and the same can be said for the indifference of monetary systems and calculation. What Heidegger saw as an emerging force of universal conformity thus becomes a precursor for late capitalism. Echoing Simmel's analysis of quantification and measurement, the interchangeability of currency and the transaction of money hold a global grip in line with the essence of technology. In Mitchell's reading, positionality exposes the decentered, transactional circulation that characterizes the run-away consumerism of today. But while Heidegger's remarks on commodification may echo a Marxist critique, Mitchell argues there is another layer underneath this think-

[145] S. Zuboff, Shoshana. "Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization." *Journal of information technology*, vol. 30, no. 1, 2015, pp. 75-89, doi: 10.1057/jit.2015.5.
[146] Koopman, Colin. *How We Became Our Data*. University of Chicago Press, 2019, p. 4.

ing in which Heidegger pushes the radical replaceability of the standing reserve over the traditional idea of the commodification of things. According to this view, things are strictly speaking not objects or commodities but rather things-to-be-replaced. The fundamental way of being-in-the-world in the circulation of the standing reserve is not one by commodification but by replaceability [*Ersatzsein*].[147] As a result, Mitchell reads the leveling impulse of consumerism in late modern societies as a token of the standing reserve, though an expression of capitalism and the controlling logic of economic rationality.

Hartmut Rosa's thinking of resonance shares many of the same features and influences evident in Heidegger's reflections on technology, fast-forwarded and ascribed to our present situation. To Rosa, the disenchantment of the world is real. As humans, we have a fundamental longing for experiences of resonance, that is, for connecting to the world through meaningful relations and attunement, but according to Rosa, we have lost this connection and become detached from the world. This is the modern predicament. As moderns, we are torn between a drive for control and forces of alienation as we are confronted with "the uncontrollability of the world."[148] The sociologist describes our present modus operandi as "the systemic need to grow, to accelerate and to increase innovation"[149] resulting in "an all-encompassing process of acceleration" that he associates with capitalism and neoliberalism. Yet, crucially, Rosa's analysis goes one step further than the emerging consensus discussed above as a technologically mediated society of runaway consumerism and commodification in a high-paced world running out of breath. Rosa critically moves beyond this analysis as he identifies the burgeoning concours a "post-growth or degrowth society" in a radical questioning of the rationality of growth. What emerges is the promise of new forms of social practice. Rosa's own contribution to a post-growth [*Postwachstum*] society is the concept of resonance. With it comes an inclination for change and the call for nothing less than "a new definition of the quality of life"[150] in contrast to "the global burnt-out crisis." As such, the resonance theory is a continuation and reflection of the long tradition of critical theory and phenomenology. But Rosa's call for change can also be heard as echoing some of the

[147] GA15, p. 369.
[148] Rosa's German term is *Unverfügbarkeit*.
[149] Dörre, K.; Rosa, H.; Lessenich, S. *Sociology, Capitalism, Critique*, Verso, 2015, p. 286 ff.
Rosa argues these general observations in *Resonance: A Sociology of our Relationship to the World* and *Alienation and Acceleration: Toward a Critical Theory of late-modern temporality*.
[150] Ibid, p. 298.

same insights identified by Heidegger: the lack of resonance and attunement is the lack of dwelling.

The inspiration from Heidegger's reflections on technology is also evident in the works of Peter Sloterdijk and Bernard Stiegler. Both thinkers find themselves confronted with what has sometimes been referred to as the "shock of the Anthropocene,"[151] which reads as "the consequence of neoliberal globalization of technology and capital,"[152] and both of them draw in part on Heidegger's thinking on modernity and technology in trying to answer this challenge.

Stiegler explicitly interprets the current state of the 21st century in Weberian terms of disenchantment and a loss of spirit. Thinking under the scope of the Anthropocene, he detects the dystopian course of humanity and the biosphere as he registers "the continuous drop in the value of spirit that has become the very principle of capitalism which rests upon the limitless increase—blind and suicidal—of consumption."[153] Stiegler identifies the economic reasoning of calculative thinking and its leveling drive as the cause for our modern predicament: "In the hyperindustrial political economy, value must be completely calculable; *which is to say, it is condemned to become valueless*."[154] Heidegger makes no Marxist by all means – a deeply conservative tone resides in Heidegger's writings. Yet the idea of the essence of technology as an alienating, over-individual force of consumption and objectification does resonate, not only with a similar sentiment within the broad range of sociologist, philosophers, cultural analysists, and intellectuals in Heidegger's own time – from Weber's disenchantment and Simmel's "objective culture" to Adorno's and Lukacs' "reification" – but in fact also today in the thinking of Stiegler. No doubt, it is safe to say the process of commodification has by no means reversed or decreased over the course of the half the century since Heidegger died. Like Heidegger, and Weber before him, Stiegler laments the destitution of modernity and calls for a "re-enchantment of the world." For Stiegler, this influence – in part from Heidegger – leads to reflections on temporality and technology, and, ultimately, inspires an activist, political agenda.[155]

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[151] Bonneuil, Christophe and Fressoz J.-B. *The Shock of the Anthropocene: The Earth, History and Us*. Verso, 2016.
[152] Lemmens, Paul; Hui, Yuk. "Apocalypse, Now!" in *Boundary*, 2, 2017, p. 4.
[153] Stiegler, Bernard. *The Re-Enchantment of the World*. Bloomsbury, 2014, p. 4.
[154] Stiegler, Bernard. "The Disinfected Individual in the Process of Psychic and Collective Disindividuation." Translated by Patrick Crogan and Daniel Ross. *Ars Industrialis*, 2006.
[155] In creating the political and cultural association, Ars Industrialis, Stiegler calls for a process of individuation and a re-enchantment of the world through "an increase in the value of spirit… as a resurgence of desire against the

Sloterdijk likewise presents a current thinking inspired by Heidegger's reflections on technology. In anticipation of the thinking of the Anthropocene, Sloterdijk specifically calls attention to the Heideggerian notion of releasement, *Gelassenheit*.[156] While borrowing a term from Ernst Jünger, Sloterdijk ties the idea of releasement to a notion of *infinite mobilization*,[157] Sloterdijk's modern equivalent of Heidegger's positionality. Echoing Heidegger, he identifies the demanding drive of infinite mobility as the essential feature of modernity. Sloterdijk wants to counter what he sees as a modern imperative of mobility and circulation, which he takes to characterize Western civilization – in reference to the corresponding "Eastern" tradition which includes a projection of "Taoism."[158] In a philosophical balancing act, much in tune with Heidegger, Sloterdijk leverages the accelerating drive of technological circulation and mobility. He finds himself in the same "industrial wasteland" as in Heidegger's reflections on modernity and of technology, but Sloterdijk draws a far less dystopic and more hopeful conclusion. Following Ernst Bloch and in opposition to Heidegger's pessimism, Sloterdijk posits a hopeful gesture for any future critical theory in the open potential of the not-yet structure. In order to counter and balance the inherent, modern demand of pace and mobilization, he accentuates the need for the reflective gesture of pause in a move toward releasement and "letting be" – hence the somewhat confusing fusion of "Europe" and "Taoism" into the neology of *Eurotaismus*. Basically, what Sloterdijk calls for is an ecological ethos of co-existence and a new cosmopolitan attitude toward life and the planet that counters and balances the relentless drive and leveling of positionality engrained in the modern age of technology. It is this impulse of "letting be" and its freeing potential that he finds in the notion of *Gelassenheit*.

I take these contemporary thoughts on positionality and the specific call for releasement by Sloterdijk as an expression of a continued relevance in Heidegger's reflections on dwelling and technology. In relation to these contemporary perspectives on Heidegger, dwelling can be understood in terms of human freedom as a project of re-enchantment and emancipation from the internalization of the instrumentalist paradigm of technology and its perceived neutrality that

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drive-based organization of capitalism." In reference to Deleuze, Stiegler wows "to find the new philosophical weapons necessary for this political battle, and to invent the political actions that they will allow us to pursue" (*The Re-Enchantment of the World*, pp. 6-7.)

[156] Sloterdijk, Peter. *Eurotaoismus: Zur Kritik der politischen Kinetik*, Suhrkamp, 2016, pp. 343-344.

[157]The English edition of *Eurotaoismus* is translated *Infinite Mobilization*, Polity Press, 2020.

[158] Elden, Stuart and Mendieta, Eduardo. "Being-with as making-worlds: The 'second coming' of Peter Sloterdijk," *Environment and Planning: Society and Space*, 27 (1), 2009, p. 7.

permeates and shapes modern life. Sloterdijk polemically likes to refer to a new rhetorical genre, "the coach discourse"[159] in which we tend to think of our drive toward self-discipline or coach guided living. This language of optimization is characteristic of the impulse of control and transformation that Heidegger forebodes as the essence of technology as the calculative thinking. Against this drive, dwelling, understood in the full range of the composite term, suggests an alternative way of thinking and being in the world as caring and nurturing – an openness to being that negates or evades the imposing structures of positionality. It is this sense of cultivation and belonging that relates to experience and sense of place and that comes to the fore in *Sojourns* (posing an alternative).

Based on the foregoing examination of Heidegger's thinking of technology, we have now established the conditioning power and implications of positionality. It adds substance to what we described as *the negative project of Sojourns* and as such, positionality emerges as a clear opposite of the concept of dwelling as it unfolds in *Sojourns*. It is exactly this tension in Heidegger's later thinking – the contrast between positionality and dwelling – that outlines the following chapters. It sets up the necessary context for critically pursuing *the positive project of Sojourns* that we described. The study of this tension takes the form of a closer reading of *Sojourns* and call attention to the role of dwelling and sense of place. Having established an awareness of "the force and artificiality of the ramifications of the positionality,"[160] it is now time to address the positive potential of Heidegger's opening question and the possibility for genuine experience to take place.

The Visit to the Acropolis

The notion of positionality reverberates throughout *Sojourns* and Heidegger's encounters as an ever-present backdrop for the particular visits and Heidegger's reflections. Yet on one occasion in particular, the tension of ancient and modern Greece comes to the foreground: Heidegger's visit to the Acropolis.

[159] Sloterdijk, Peter. *You Must Change Your Life*. Polity Press, 2013, p. 28.
[160] GA75, p. 219. *Sojourns*, p. 10.

In a Heideggerian sense, the visit to the Acropolis would seem the perfect place by his own account. Much like the role ascribed to the Heidelberg bridge in *Building Dwelling Thinking*, the "elevated city" of the Acropolis is emblematic in that it holds the double function of gathering and opening up. This is one of the great insights about place developed in Heidegger's later writings, which I examine further in chapter 3 on his "sense of place." Just like the bridge in that example "allows for a site for the fourfold,"[161] the visit to the Acropolis would seem to hold the promise of existential measure. From its elevated plane, the ancient Acropolis hovers over the city of Athens as it has for centuries. The sanctuaries of the Acropolis display the epic story of Poseidon and Athena fighting for the favor of the Athenians. The iconic temple of the Parthenon worships the goddess Athena as the city patron. In this way, the temple of Athena and the towering Acropolis hill cast a narrative of religion and divine guardianship over the city and its citizens from above. But the fifth century BC site is more than a distant reminder of primordial worship. As an architectural landmark, the Acropolis defines the physical cityscape of Athens. The arresting location of the elevated sanctuaries hovering above the city translates into a material omnipresence and ever-present point of reference. Wherever you go in the streets of downtown Athens, the Acropolis is always in sight as a point of orientation. Many years before taking the trip to Greece, in "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger reflects on the existential centrality of places of worship across history – from the Greek temple to the medieval cathedrals. The Acropolis, too, sets up a world. As both an architectural landmark and a religious signpost, the Acropolis is exemplary in this way. It opens up a plane of religious narrative and it gathers the surrounding city as a structuring icon and a material point of reference. For all these reasons, the visit to the Acropolis would seem promising to Heidegger as a destination of philosophical interest. And yet, the experience turns out to be a somewhat ambiguous encounter for Heidegger, clouded in part by the interference of tourists.

Arriving by boat to Piraeus, the port of Athens, Heidegger is well aware of the overflow of visitors normally crowding the site of the Acropolis. He makes sure to arrive in the early morning hours to avoid the rush of tourists and, for a brief time, the select company find themselves alone at the Acropolis to take in the full experience without distraction. "Besides a few workers, no one was to be seen there," Heidegger remarks. Enjoying the unhindered access to the

[161] GA7, p. 157. Poetry, Language, Thought, 152. The original German reads: "*Diese Dinge sind Orte, die dem Geviert eine Stätte verstatten, welche Stätte jeweils einen Raum einräumt.*"

iconic place of worship, the Parthenon makes for a gripping encounter, but as he approaches, Heidegger initially struggles to find a focal point to take in the full experience of the temple:

> From the outside and even in the temple everything denied a mere view. No proper standpoint could be found from which we could have a rapport with it. An enriching sojourn [*Aufenthalt*] seemed not to have been given. The stone-work of the temple lost its materiality. The fragmented disappeared. The spatial distances and measures became condensed into one singular place [*Ort*]. The collectiveness of the temple was at play [*begann zu spielen*]. Through an inconceivable shine the entire building began to float, as, at the same time, it assumed a firmly defined presence, akin to that of the supporting rock. This presence was fulfilled by the abandonment of the holy. In this abandonment the absence of the flown goddess draws invisibly near.[162]

There are many ways to interpret what goes on in Heidegger's account of the encounter, which is why a closer review of the passage is in order. Heidegger's experience of the Parthenon undergoes a remarkable development. At first, the encounter fails to give rise to any deeper impressions. It seems "no sojourn has been given," Heidegger laconically remarks. But then something happens. A shift occurs and, by Heidegger's own account, the temple seems to come together – not the physical structure of the temple per se, but rather, "the collectiveness of the temple was at play." In the original German, this reads: "*Sein Versammelndes begann zu spielen*." Exactly what Heidegger means here is unclear, but the German could be read as implying the beginning of an activity or an event. This aspect is however not captured in the passive voice of the English translation which favors the subject "the collectiveness of the temple" over the activity. If we instead translate "*begann zu spielen*" as simply "started working" or "began to work," the eventual character of the encounter would stand out more clearly. Taken together, it seems to me there are two ways to understand this passage – two different ways of revealing can be read into Heidegger's account. In one version, the floating immateriality of the temple condensed into a singular place can be taken to emphasize the illusionary element of the experience. What comes together, in this reading – that which denies Heidegger the enriching sojourn of having a rapport

[162] GA75, p. 236. *Sojourns*, p. 40-41.

with it – is the cliché of the temple. It is the preconceived notion of the Parthenon that interrupts any chance of a genuine sense of place and experience in Heidegger's encounter. Read in this way, the shine of the temple is merely the illusionary shimmer of a presupposed idea of the Acropolis. It is the preestablished image of the iconic temple reproduced over and over again in the technological drive of consumption. In this communal sense, "the force and artificiality of the ramifications of the positionality" gets in the way of a real encounter. The accord of the temple merely refers to the conventional understanding of the Acropolis and as such it can be read to reinforce Heidegger's earlier remark that no sojourn has been given – exactly because of the effects of positionality.

But there is another way of reading this. In this other reading, "the collectiveness of the temple" is not the mark of illusionary experience shaped and reproduced in the age of technology. On the contrary, the sentence can be read to indicate a bourgeoning, genuine experience. Something speaks to Heidegger, described as the shine of the temple. It is exactly not the *schein* of illusion. It is the glimmering radiance of something that once was. The original German reads "*ein unfaßliches Glänzen*,"[163] which warrants the reading that what Heidegger registers is not the illusion of semblance or hallucination, but rather the concreteness of the experience taking place in its material exposure. If we pursue this thought, "the collectiveness of the temple" now takes on a different meaning at odds with the previous interpretation. What gathers in the unity of the temple and thereby comes into play – to work – is something like the manifestation of the ethos that Heidegger years earlier referred to in "The Origin of the Work of Art" as "their outlook" [*den Menschen erst die Aussicht auf sich selbt*][164] in the analysis of the Greek temple. That said, an important distinction must be made here in that the two texts are in fact fundamentally different. While *Sojourns* journals Heidegger's reflections and impressions on the actual encounter with the landscape and temples of Greece, the analysis of the Greek temple in "The Origin of the Work of Art" is a theoretical work rendered nearly 30 years earlier and not rooted in on-site experience. In this respect, Heidegger's essay is an a priori investigation and it offers a theoretical and not a practical analysis of experience. "The Origin of the Work of Art" is really a philosophy of art in that the focus is on the general character of art and the work of art. Heidegger is concerned with the *essence* of the work of art and not with its particularity – as this particular piece

[163] GA75, p. 236. *Sojourns*, p. 40.
[164] GA5, p. 29. *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 42.

at this particular place. Now, however, Heidegger finds himself standing at the site of the Acropolis, facing the Parthenon, which brings another dimension to his reflections and observations and the description of the encounter concludes with the remarkable account of something taking place.

According to Heidegger, the uninterrupted encounter results in "a firmly defined presence" emerging and the paragraph concludes in the following way: "The presence was fulfilled by the abandonment of the holy. In this abandonment the absence of the flown goddess draws invisibly near." What Heidegger states here is a presence of absence. The formulation brings about the existential dimensionality of the fourfold and opens up a field of divinities and mortals. The trace of the goddess seems to establish for Heidegger a rapport with that which is no longer there. In other words, it seems that Heidegger's experience at the Acropolis is much more than simply an expression of the cliché idea of antiquity. Rather, the encounter with the Parthenon reflects the glimpse of burgeoning experience of something like a sense of Greek spirituality that finds its culmination later in Sojourns with the visit to Delos. I explore this idea in accordance with Heidegger's own thinking and in accordance with the newly developed insights on the concept for dwelling as a composite term. When understood in this way, the passage presents an interesting new perspective of dwelling. It has to do with the notion of *Aufenthalt* and the fourfold. As established in chapter 1, the notion of *sich aufhalten* and the *Aufenthalt* as situational opens up an experiential dimension that supplements the notion of dwelling as *wohnen*. This perspective comes to the fore in the following chapters in a focus on the sense of place gesturing the contours to a contemporary thinking of dwelling, referred to here as the art of dwelling. In this reading, in the encounter at the Acropolis, what is hinted at is the importance of the experiential dimension of dwelling and the situational *Aufenthalt* as a tarrying with or staying with things as critical for our receiving the world in any meaningful way. Understood in this way, the activity of the *Aufenthalt* is an articulation of the art of dwelling.

Something interesting happens in Heidegger's encounter with the Parthenon that goes beyond Heidegger's own plans and preparations, something that instead puts him on the receiving end. In preparing for the visit, Heidegger makes all the arrangements to arrive early so to avoid the crowds soon flocking the Acropolis. In doing so, Heidegger already acknowledges the conditioning of our modern technological age. In other words, there is a limitation to the way

Heidegger himself is able to tune in and accommodate the encounter and this limitation has to do with the way we tend to experience and navigate the world. It seems, Heidegger goes through all these preparatory steps in order to alleviate or limit these influences to make for the best possible conditions for the visit. And yet this balancing act is of course out of his hands and – as we shall see – the encounter with the temple of Athene is ultimately interrupted by the flocking tourists, leaving Heidegger unsatisfied and disgruntled. But before the encounter is broken up, something happens. By Heidegger's own account, the temple assumes "a firmly defined presence" as an opposing unity that is very much outside of his own reach and measure of control, but that nonetheless confronts and affects his experience. In other words, not only is Heidegger placing himself in front of the temple, but rather *the temple itself is showing itself to him*. In Heidegger's text, the encounter is characterized by an atmospheric shimmer as the shining temple presences as a place of worship imbued with meaning, but what is important is that it seems to be a two-way encounter. The temple confronts Heidegger as an opposing thing – a *Gegenstand* – with its own presence. It is this shining of the temple that makes for the experience that is then ultimately interrupted. But if we take into account Heidegger's own thinking of the fourfold along with the notion of dwelling established here, what makes the encounter possible is not just the preparations of setting an alarm clock and arriving at the Acropolis in the early morning to dodge and alleviate the effects of the technologically conditioned modernity. Rather, the unveiling that leads to the encounter is the coalescence of the oneness of the fourfold [*der Einfalt der Vier*][165] that leads to the unity of the temple when we tarry with it. The centrality of our staying with things and its importance for the fourfold is made clear in Building Dwelling Thinking where the "staying with things [*der Aufenthalt bei den Dingen*] is the only way in which the fourfold stay within the fourfold is accomplished at any time in simple unity."[166] In somewhat convoluted terms, what Heidegger says here is that the activity of the *Aufenthalt* is critical for the unity of fourfold to take place. Continuing this line of thinking, it is the activity of the Aufenthalt that opens up the possibility of the encounter, but for Heidegger, this is only possible by the worlding of the fourfold in the unity of the thing. This "thinging" is what is opened up when we tarry and stay with things (*aufhalten*), as it opens up the possibility of experience as mortals. In other words, the activity of the *Aufenthalt* – as the ability to dwell and to stay with things – is a crucial

[165] GA79, p. 16. *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, p. 16.
[166] GA7, 153. *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 149.

antidote to the sickness, so to speak, that Heidegger detects in the conditioning of technological modernity, and that we identified as the negative project of *Sojourns*. What this shows is that the two-way interplay of experience and world – *Aufenthalt* and fourfold – is not a given. It is an undertaking in which we must concern ourselves with the things at hand in order to dwell. Yet we are so engrained and subsumed with the drive of consumption and the trivia of everyday life that we run the risk of not being attuned to this mode of being in the world. According to Wrathall, dwelling requires effort for it is only when we put ourselves in a position in which demands can be made on us that dwelling becomes possible. With *Sojourns* in mind, another way of saying this is that the dialectic of calling and hearing implies an element of *receptivity* in order for *listening* to take place. It is this receptivity that comes into play in the notion of the *Aufenthalt* in the expanded notion of dwelling and that informs the art of dwelling presented in this study. The experiential dimension of dwelling and sense of place are further explored in the chapters to come in which I also return to the notion of receptivity. These explorations also address the affectivity and atmosphere of place. But for now, it is sufficient to note that Heidegger's visit to the Acropolis is the story of a bourgeoning experience of something emerging. Heidegger senses something, if only briefly, taking place during the visit to the temple. At work here is the interplay of the *Aufenthalt* and the fourfold in the staying with the "thinging" of the temple. According to Heidegger, this presencing is interrupted, but Heidegger himself asserts that something larger is at play as the goddess "draws invisibly near." In significant ways, the visit to the Acropolis emblematically reflects the centrality of the notion of *Aufenthalt* for a contemporary sensitivity of dwelling. In order for something to matter and be meaningful, that is, in order for something like a genuine experience to be possible in spite of the leveling influence of the conditioning of technological modernity in our everyday lives, one needs to be attuned to the world. As such, dwelling offers a crucial antidote to the attitude of insensitivity. What Heidegger is getting at is the hidden dynamics of sensitivity. As we touch the world, the world touches us.

On an architectural note, the construction work at the Parthenon currently ongoing in Athens is projected to result in a complete reconstruction of the original temple of Athene. In the process, the temple roof originally covering the statue of Athene – whom Heidegger references in his account of the visit – is being reconstructed using marble from the original quarry presumably used in ancient times. The reconstructed temple will reestablish a somewhat subtle feature

of the Parthenon often overlooked: the marble tiles of the original temple were in fact translucent. As a result, the marble created a shimmering sense of radiance that would color the interior of the temple in a greenish, eerie glow. Interestingly, the tiles would create exactly the sense of radiance and shine that Heidegger seems to describe. The discovery of the translucent marble used for the Parthenon was, however, not available to Heidegger at the time, and the radiance described by Heidegger is therefore not a direct reference to this particular architectural feature of the original temple. Albeit, the element of translucent maple tiles adds to a further understanding of the atmospheric qualities involved in visiting the temple of Athene. As it happened, the nearness of the goddess was in fact bathed in a shimmer of green radiance.

In terms of Heidegger's account of his visit to the Parthenon temple of Athene at the Acropolis, the serenity of the moment does not last long and the sojourn is broken up. As the morning draws on, the small company finds themselves engulfed in the overflowing sea of visitors much to the dismay of Heidegger:

> Meanwhile—as the first morning hours passed away unawares—the crowd of visitors became larger. Hardly was the obtained sojourn to be substituted by sightseeing arrangements. These, in their turn, were replaced with the functioning of cameras and film recorders.

Heidegger's visit is interrupted by the arrival of tourists. What starts out as an intense and overwhelming experience, ends up unfulfilled and incomplete. In Heidegger's own words, "a sojourn has been us denied." The visit thus turns out to be a somewhat ambiguous experience, clouded by the arrival of the other groups. Heidegger makes the following observation:

> The annoyance with the crowds was not that they blocked the ways and obstructed access to different places. What was much more bothersome was their tourist's zeal, their toing and froing, in which one was, without being aware, included, as it threatened to degrade what was just now the element of our experience into an object ready-at-hand for the viewer.[167]

[167] GA75, p 237. *Sojourns*, p. 42.

In no uncertain terms, Heidegger openly calls attention to the objectification of positionality. He is explicitly worried that the experience is lessened – or degraded even – by the tourist's zeal which he refers to as a threat. In other words, Heidegger does not shy away from calling out what he sees as the effects and shallowness of modern tourism. To him, the tourist gaze is a symptom of positionality: An all too human triviality or insensitivity conditioned by a technological age that thrives from the operationalization of modern technology.

The Objectification of Experience

What emerges from the examination of the visit to Acropolis is the critical role of experience. Reading Heidegger's reaction to the tourists and his thoughts on the degradation of experience itself "into an object ready-at-hand for the viewer," Susan Sontag's reflections on photography comes to mind. Stirred by some of the same sentiments as Heidegger, Sontag's classic work, *On Photography*, examines the dominance of photography and the widespread influence of imagery on our lives and culture. Sontag is critical of the authority of photography and argues that it involves an objectification of our notion of reality. With the popularization of the media itself and the proliferation of photographed images, our relation to things changes into objects for our own consumption. "To photograph is to appropriate the thing photographed,"[168] Sontag writes. It is the same reduction of reality that Heidegger sees taking place in the tourists' zeal and their use of cameras at the expense of experience. For Heidegger, the increasingly technologized world of today comes with the objectification and reduction of reality, and he detects this reduction in the form of the internalizing grasp of the camera and the cultural consumption of imagery. Trying to capture the moment in time, what is lost, ironically, is the breadth and depths of the very same experience. Understood in this way the camera represents reduction of the particular in its particularity in the age of technology.

Implied here is also a qualitative differentiation in experience itself. The distinction is not reflected in the English language, but emerges in the German distinction between *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis*. Both terms denote forms of experience, but they also imply a qualitative difference and

[168] Sontag, Susan, *On Photography*. Penguin Books, 1977, p. 4.

in this respect the distinction reflects the degradation of experience referred to in the above. The term *Erlebnis* can be said to describe the more one-dimensional or trivial experiences that may not stick with us for much longer than the moment in which they take place. Like the binge-watching of online streaming or the fifth cup of coffee working long hours. It has the thrill of the moment but also the fleeting character of passing sensations. As a way of experiencing the world, we may group this *Erlebnis*-character of experience with the inauthenticity of "*das Man*" in *Being and Time* or Heidegger's dismay with "the art industry" in "The Origin of the Work of Art." The shallowness of experience as *Erlebnis* is represented paradigmatically by the encounter with "the tourist zeal" at the Acropolis. In contrast to this, experience understood as *Erfahrung* implies change and sparks reflection. Unlike *Erlebnis*, experience as *Erfahrung* implies a deeper impact of potentially defining character or at least an experience of some substantial significance unlike the fleeting sensations of *Erlebnis*. In English, this conceptual differentiation is not immediately available, but one can differentiate between experience that can be had and experience that can be gained. When experience is *gained*, it is woven into the memory of a person as a lasting experience in the sense of *Erfahrung*. Whereas experiences that you have *had* imply the sense of *Erlebnis* described here and by no means entail the mark of transformative experience. As we have seen, Heidegger's analysis of technology can be said to presupposes this differentiation in the juxtaposition of leveling understood as the product of positionality, as opposed to the experience of a deeper connection and sense of meaningfulness associated with dwelling. Hiding in all these distinctions is Heidegger's idea of authenticity. As an undercurrent, the idea of authenticity streams through Heidegger's authorship and is evidently also at work in his later writings. In this way, the idea of authenticity is presupposed in Heidegger's thinking on dwelling. Here, before the Parthenon, Heidegger faces the question of authenticity and the role of experience. There lingers the larger question of how to relate to the world. This brings to mind what I identified as the negative project of Sojourns and reflections on our own conditionality: Are we are in fact able to *not* be tourists – to opt out? Or do we not find ourselves inevitably dragged into the "tourist's zeal," as Heidegger hints with the words "one was, without being aware, included"? Are we so ingrained in our technological age that we can longer break the conditioning of our own disposition? Does unveiling mean breaking off the camera session and ending the pilgrimage? Or is there another way of travelling that does not entail mass tourism and the crowded slopes on the Acropolis? All of these questions are on the line here for Heidegger – and for the

reader – in the clash between ancient and modern Greece. As it turns out, the question of experience is the question of experience in the age of technology.

Sontag's reflections on the authority of the image in modern culture and on the objectification of photography and its implications for our notion of reality resonate well with Heidegger's reflections on the tourist encounter at the Acropolis. But what happens to experience in the age of technology? The following passage from Sontag examines exactly this question as experience itself becomes an object of consumption:

> A way of certifying experience, taking photographs is also a way of refusing it—by limiting experience to a search for the photogenic, by converting experience into an image, a souvenir. Travel becomes a strategy for accumulating photographs[...] Most tourists feel compelled to put the camera between themselves and whatever is remarkable that they encounter. Unsure of other responses, they take a picture. This gives shape to an experience: stop, take a photograph, and move on. [169]

Sontag identifies a central problem in modern culture: the devaluation of experience. In a time of image consumption and proliferation, no genuine experience can be obtained. Dwelling has no place in the rush of mass tourism, as the picture, ironically, becomes the certifying experience itself. The means becomes the end. Travel becomes a mere strategy and the camera becomes a hindrance itself as it comes between the tourist and the encounter only to further obstruct the experience. The camera as technology is far from neutral. It is the leveling of positionality. In Sontag's analysis, presence and nearness is disregarded and written off. Heidegger, too, bemoans the lack of presence at the expense of experience. Following Heidegger and Sontag, there is no room for dwelling in modern mass tourism. In the drive of positionality, consumption takes the place of experience.

Sontag's cultural analysis is apt and compelling. Since the publication of *On Photography*, the proliferation and consumption of imagery in our lives have grown exponentially with the digitalization of media and the introduction of smartphones. The popularization and internalized fetish of pictures has accelerated to a degree where most smartphone owners have thousands

[169] *On Photography*, p. 9-10.

of digital pictures stored on cloud services. In this way, the digital photograph is a perfect expression of positionality at work. It involves the leveling reduction of experience and of the circulation, repeatability, storage, and consumption of the digital age. When it comes to digital imagery, the aura of the work of art is long gone. Photos are reproduced and synchronized in cloud services in stock [*Bestand*] for our access and use at our convenience. They are always available. This is the perfect example of the circulation of replaceability and consumption. In this respect, Heidegger's analysis of the essence of technology as positionality is still strikingly relevant. The cloud services bear the mark of the standing reserve in the age of digital photography. The iconophilia of modern life and the hunt for the photogenic is a technological crescendo with no apparent end in sight. It seems appropriate to address this blasé of cultural consumption and the numbness of experience. In this respect, Heidegger and Sontag are prophetic in calling attention to the use of image technology in relation to mass movements like the tourist industry. They object to what they see as culturally driven forces of objectification and representation. Critically, the objectification of experience has implications for how we are in the world. For Heidegger, this is the indifference and leveling that he finds in the drive toward consumption and the reduction of everything into resource in the standing reserve. It implies a numbness or degradation of experience and the result is a lack of dwelling and an inauthentic way of being in the world.

As mentioned, the discussion of experience presupposes the idea of authenticity. The use of the camera takes away from the authenticity of the moment. It reduces the experience to something less authentic. Indeed, the experience runs the risk of "thinning out" and "missing the moment." The camera gets in the way and reduces the sense of immediacy and presence that makes the experience. Here it may be useful to reapply the differentiation between *Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung* as two qualitatively different forms of experience. As for Heidegger, he is less concerned with the tourist zeal as with the overall project of confirmation at stake in *Sojourns*. The long sought for moments of experiencing something like proper Greece may yet materialize, but if nothing else the sense of disappointment is noticeably real in face of the tourists crowding the Acropolis.

I have, however, some reservations in regard to Heidegger's observations as well. Like Sontag, Heidegger's reflections in *Sojourns* presuppose the distinction between *the tourist* and *the traveler*. In this line of thinking, Heidegger sees himself as belonging to the latter category –

the enlightened, self-proclaimed, autonomous traveler in contrast to the other visitors whom he encounters. They are merely tourists, subscribing to a prearranged package of travel arrangements and destinations guaranteed to entertain and marvel. In keeping with this distinction, the tourist is merely superficially interested in the sites visited. It is a conviction that Heidegger promotes himself and he is clearly annoyed by the use of cameras, as the crowds of tourists flocking the Acropolis seem more interested in the next photograph, in order to document having been at a place. Heidegger's comments also imply a normativity and resentment. For Heidegger – and with him Sontag – to critique "the tourist zeal" and for "converting experience into an image, a souvenir" is to point to the reduction of experience. Yet when it comes to the normativity of traveling as implied in the distinction of tourist and traveler, Heidegger stands behind as something like a hypocrite. The great irony here is of course that of his own travel arrangements. While Heidegger may resent and dismiss the role of the tourist – be it his fellow travelers onboard the cruise ship or the crowds of tourists flocking the Acropolis – he is himself very much part of this description. In a certain regard, reading *Sojourns* is like observing an environmentalist boarding a plane. The Heideggers very much appear like bourgeois tourists themselves as they enjoy the comforts of the cruise ship, such as when Heidegger engages in dinner conversations with his fellow travelers in the ship restaurant alongside his wife, Elfriede, laying plain the double standard of Heidegger's own remarks. When it comes to tourism, none of us are in a position to cast the first stone, Luce Lippard once pointed out remarked – yet Heidegger seems to think he can. That said, Heidegger is struggling with being part of the company of the group and he remains ambiguous about the entire travel arrangement of the cruise. As mentioned, on more than one occasion he decides to stay onboard when the ship docks, to avoid the stigma of tourism. Similarly, the Heideggers at one point venture out on their own, leaving behind the cruise as they travel by car around Athens, enabling them to also take in the Acropolis museum next to the hill of the sanctuaries, after having spent the day at the Southern tip of Attica visiting Cape Sounion. Perhaps Heidegger is simply reluctant to admit to partaking in the clichés of tourism, while also perhaps suspecting himself of being in the midst of it: "one was, without being aware, included." This ambivalence, however, hardly justifies Heidegger's resentment towards his fellow travelers as tourists.

Moreover, the distinction between tourist and traveler is a false distinction. What may have made sense as a way of cataloging our ways traveling during the time of the Grand Tour

over the past centuries, as opposed to the emerging mass tourism of the 20th century, no longer seems to hold sway. Whoever travels with a company have probably had the experience of shifting in and out of the role of the traveler and the tourist. And so, while the distinction may make sense as a directive, it is no longer viable a way of understanding mass travelling and the tourism industry. It seems, our own way of travelling no longer falls into either one of the two, but rather they overlap. As such, the normativity implied in the distinction is no longer to be understood in absolute terms.[170] According to MacCannell, this ambiguity is due to the fact that tourism has become "a quest for authentic experiences, perceptions and insights," As a result, mass tourism has led to a "staged authenticity" and production of experience in a prearranged logic if the tourist industry: "Tourists make brave sorties out from their hotels, hoping, perhaps, for an authentic experience, but their paths can be traced in advance over small increments of what is for them increasingly *apparent* authenticity proffered by touristed settings."[171] It is exactly this inauthentic search for authenticity that Heidegger loathes in tourism. He seems to think he is on a different path, albeit, sitting in the irony of tourist comfort, onboard a cruise ship in the Greek archipelago.

But while there are obviously things to be said about Heidegger descriptions of his fellow travelers, and the distinction between tourist and traveler, the focus in *Sojourns* on the clash between ancient and modern Greece and the implications of positionality and mass culture upon experience remains a pertinent question. It resonates with his later thinking as it goes to the heart of the question of dwelling. Heidegger's comments during the visit to the Acropolis about the "degradation" of experience through the objectification of experience reflects a preoccupation with technology and its implications for humanity and our conception of the world. He formulates this idea in a 1938 talk entitled *The Age of the World Picture*. Preemptively, he voices the concern that science and technology are themselves products of a drive that he years later identifies as the instrumentalist paradigm of the essence of technology. What this means is that science is ingrained in this more fundamental sense of technology that Heidegger identifies as positionality. It implies a drive toward replaceability and objectification at the cost of experience. In *The Age of the World Picture*, the sense of experience and being in the world is inflated and devalu-

[170] MacCannell, Dean. *The Tourist*. University of California Press, p. 104.
[171] Ibid, pp. 104-105.

ated by means of visualization and representation. As a result, being is objectified and understood as something represented, something ready-at-hand and available for us to use and control. This is the hegemony of positionality. The technological character of being that Heidegger detects in our modern age is thus essentially tied to metaphors of imagery and representation. The lesson from the essay on technology is that technology is in its essence itself a form of revealing. It is the form in which being presents itself in the instrumentalist paradigm of positionality: Always at hand and available for our convenience. Understood in this way, there is no exit. Technology is the way being reveals itself to us and, as such, the world is necessarily bound to the paradigm of positionality. This is the melancholy backdrop upon which Heidegger writes in *Sojourns* and it is the drama that builds up in the encounter of ancient and modern Greece.

All of this makes Heidegger reflect on the exhausted nature of our current situation. Days later, as he once again passes through Athens after a trip to Cape Sounion by car, he calls attention to the destitute times that he takes to be our current situation and epochal sojourn – in a reference to the title of the travel book itself. He now recalls the visit to Acropolis as ultimately positive, despite the hindrances of modern tourism. Nevertheless, the dark sky of positionality still constitutes the unavoidable backdrop, as the sun sets on the Greek landscape and Heidegger catches a second glimpse of the sanctuaries of the Acropolis:

> It seems as if we of the present-day have been expelled from such a sojourn [*Aufenthalt*], trapped in the chains of calculatory planning. Even the serene and quiet village, which we slowly crossed in our return through a back way towards Athens, could not dispel completely the dark thoughts that impose themselves on whomever admits the increasing desolation of modern Dasein.[172]

The reference to the positionality and our technological age is clear. Heidegger's language in this passage is loaded with nostalgia and biblical reference. Having been "expelled" from a Greek sojourn, Heidegger does not shy away from the Garden-of-Eden terminology elsewhere referred to

[172] GA75, p. 238. *Sojourns*, p. 44

as "the fall" in reference to the Latinization of Hellenism.[173] Just like the Garden of Eden, the Greek sojourn fundamentally escapes us. As a result, we are left in "the increasing desolation of modern Dasein."

One of Heidegger's points in relation to technology and the history of being is that being necessarily has to take on its current form. The guise of positionality and the technological age cannot in any simple way be left behind, for it is the essential form in which the world presents itself to us in this particular age in the history of being. "The world worlds," Heidegger states, and only through the guise of technology as a way in which being reveals itself does the world make sense to us. But despite this a priori, technology is not without ambiguity. On the one hand, science and technology have created opportunities and progress so consequential and advantageous that modern life would be unthinkable without it. And indeed, this is part of the reason why being necessarily comes in the guise of technology in modernity. It would make little sense to talk about unmodern modernity without the benefits upon which our modern lives have becomes so dependent, nor would there be any apparent reason to try to "unthink" this technological thinking. Heidegger's reflections are obviously marked by a disdain for the city and a romantic longing for the past. Still, Heidegger is also aiming at another point. The analysis of the essence of technology points to an ambiguity within modernity itself. With the great advantages of technology to our modern living come also great risks, and Heidegger wants to point to the inherent problems of the essence of technology and instrumental, calculative thinking shaping our current age. Despite its many advantages, the downside of this line of thinking is for Heidegger domination and reduction. It is the commodification of modern consumerism and the triviality and reduction that has the mark of inauthenticity. These are the ailments of modernity, and they pose the very opposite of the emphasis on dwelling that comes to form his later thinking on place and experience.

[173] Implied here is Heidegger's critique of Western metaphysics and the oblivion of being through the loss of Greek language and thinking in the translation from ancient Greek to Latin. As a result, Heidegger's own thinking is philosophically nested in the German language in the intent to fully articulate a thinking that accentuates the verbalization and the performativity of language in reference to ancient Greek thought.

In *The Age of the World Picture*, Heidegger calls attention to the need of careful reflection [*Besinnung*],[174] a reemerging theme in his thinking of releasement. In pointing to this general state of destitution, he foreshadows a theme in his later thinking. Following Heidegger, being and beings are reduced into resources – objects of consumption and domination. Through machine technology, the world itself becomes the object of a camera, pinpointing the objectification and reduction of positionality. In the interview with *Der Spiegel*, "Only a God can Save Us,"[175] Heidegger is asks about the picture of the earth taken from the viewpoint of the moon next to the Apollo spacecraft. In the picture, the earth is seen rising from the surface of the moon. Not only was the image of the earthrise taken from the perspective of the moon newsworthy and itself a spectacle at the time, but, technologically speaking, the picture was also a milestone event in the history of photography. For Heidegger, the image of the earthrise first and foremost marks the disturbing significance of positionality. It presents to him the essence of the representational character of technology. The world itself has been objectified, captured by camera technology and made into an object. Seen in this way, it is the ultimate expression of technological domination. For Heidegger, the world and our experience of it are degraded to a mere image through the use of technology. The same unease with representational objectification lies behind Heidegger's comments at the Acropolis about the danger of reducing the world "into an object ready-at-hand for the viewer." This is much like the force of photography detected by Sontag as "the appropriation the thing photographed." The very fact that the world becomes an object itself is for Heidegger the ultimate consequence of positionality and human domination. It is fair to supplement this assessment with a thinking of the Anthropocene which not only points to the planetary influence of humanity, but also puts the finger on the relation between human and nature, raising questions of environmental concerns and responsibility as hinted in the foregoing discussion on dwelling and guardianship. Planet earth is not just an object to us, it is also our home, the spheric surface that we inhabit. At the center of these ricocheting questions is our relation to place. The significance of place and how we relate to it is key to understanding our own situation in terms of dwelling. As we move to examine the sense of place, Heidegger's thinking on place and

[174] GA5, p. 75. Heidegger, Martin. Off the Beaten Track. Translated and edited by Julian Young and Kenneth Hayens. Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 57.
[175] Spiegel, Der. "Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel's Interview with Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, vol. 20, no. 4, 1976, pp. 267-284.

dwelling sets up the contours of a tentative answer to the challenges raised by the question of technology.

CHAPTER THREE: A SENSE OF PLACE

The atmosphere in which we live weighs upon every one with a 20,000-pound force, but do you feel it?

Karl Marx

The Study of Place

In order to fully understand Heidegger's thinking about the ontological significance of place, an examination of the concept of place is needed. As evident in the current political debate on expropriation versus environmental and cultural protection, the discourse also implies a thinking on place and belonging. This brings us to the study of place. It is safe to say that Heidegger's thinking on place has triggered interdisciplinary discussion as a notion of widespread interest. The discussion of place reaches into various areas of study and cultural analysis. The study of place owes a great deal to Heidegger's thinking. It has been driven in part by the work of human and cultural geographers such as Tian, Relph, Seamon, Buttimer, Entrikin, Cresswell, and others, while the contributions of Casey and Malpas have brought philosophical thought to the conception of place and experience in the reception of Heidegger.[176] Coming from the field of human geography, Relph has cast the discussion of home and homelessness in terms of "place and placelessness" whereas Marc Augé, in his anthropological critique of modernity, has introduced the postmodern term of "the non-place." The term has come under attack from Dylan Trigg and others as too stylized and abstract. As Trigg points out, even post-modern icons like the airport

[176] Casey, Edward. S. *Getting Back into Place*, Indiana University Press, 2009, p. xv.
In a somewhat biased comment, Casey refers to the field of human geographers as "frankly topophiliac in character," but also "ecologically minded geographers who attempted to reinstate place as a central category within their own discipline." Casey's own aim, however, is as no less ambitious: the call for a "*philosophical* treatment of place in all its amplitude and complexity."

transit area, are in fact not featureless non-places. Unlike Augé, Relph and Trigg are more prone to Heidegger's thinking of place and the emphasis on home and the familiar which is also a theme in Bachelard's poetic thinking. Home is where we live and where life takes place. Dwelling as *wohnen* is tied to the sense of "being home." Harries explores Heidegger's thinking on place in relation to art and architecture, and before him, the architect Norberg-Schulz has presented valuable insights on the notion of dwelling through his reading of Heidegger, arguing that the particular place can be said to have a residing spirit, a *genius loci*, unique to the place. Taking a different path, Trigg focusses on the aspect of the memory of place, while adding reflections on the question of embodiment drawing on the work of Merleau-Ponty.

In sum, all these contributions to the study of place can be seen as part of a larger tendency within the humanities and social sciences commonly referred to as "the spatial turn." For our purposes, these contributions to the study of place provide the conceptual backdrop and contextualization for the thematic reading of dwelling and place in Heidegger's later writings presented in this study. Most significantly, Casey's work on place points out the role of the body and embodiment, which he finds missing in Heidegger's account of place. I take this aspect of the phenomenal role of the body to present a critical objection to Heidegger's thinking on place that comes to inform what is presented in this study. Casey comes up short in his commitment to place, in that he never fully recognizes the affective character of the atmosphere of place, nor does he entirely capture the relation of body and place (that I identify in the following as *the phenomenal sphere*), but what I want to take onboard from Casey is exactly the Merleau-Pontian perspective of the role of the body and the notion of embodiment as a corrective to Heidegger's later thinking on place. In doing so, I move the discussion of place and dwelling into a contemporary context in the chapters to come.

What follows is a reading of Heidegger's notion of place in his later writings in dialogue with the works of Malpas, Mitchell, Trigg, Casey, and Heidegger's own thinking on dwelling. This chapter will argue that an adequate account of place and spatiality will need to include a more comprehensive notion of place that includes the perspective of embodiment experience, as well as the affectivity and atmosphere of place. In effect, the expanded notion of place argued here to complement Heidegger's notion of place matches the teasing apart of the notion of dwelling established in chapter 1. It goes to demonstrate the interdependence of place and dwelling in

the thinking of Heidegger and beyond. This attention to place is exactly what hovers in the background of *Sojourns* and what is at stake in what follows as we tune in on the experiential sense of place. We begin with the question: What do we mean by place?

The Primacy of Place

Place is in many ways an elusive term. Our notions of place vary indefinitely, such that it has no solid essence or form. And yet there are things to say about place that go beyond our subjective notions of place. As argued by Heidegger – and later accentuated in the work of Casey and Malpas, respectively – place holds philosophical significance in that it is fundamental to the way we are in the world. This position is upheld in this study. Place is constitutive for how we are in the world such that we are always already placed and we experience the world through place. Place is an organizing center through which we encounter the world. This is the argument for the primacy of place, and it is reflected in Heidegger's preoccupation with place.

Heidegger arrives at his thinking of place, in part, by way of Aristotle as a defining point of reference. In book 4 of *Physics*, Aristotle describes the notion of place [*τόπος*] as a container: "the place of x is the first motionless boundary of the thing that contains x."[177] Or put differently, "place is the first immobile limit of what surrounds something."[178] In plain words, place is the boundary of the body that serves as a container such as a bucket or a vase. In keeping with Aristotle's thinking, place is, strictly speaking, neither form nor matter, nor does it make sense to think of place as an interval or space between two extremes. Instead, place is something in its own right that cannot be reduced.[179] As the boundary of the surrounding or containing body, it serves as a container and in this sense, Aristotle can refer to place as logically "prior to all

[177] Aristotle, *Physics*, IV 4, 212a20-21,
[178] Morison, Benjamin. *On Location: Aristotle's Concept of Place*. Clarendon Press, 2002, p. 133, fn 2.
[179] Macauley, David. *Elemental Philosophy*. SUNY, 2010, pp. 192-193.
Macauley provides a detailed account of this argument. At least two additional perspectives need mentioning here: First, Aristotle's word for containing is *to periechon* [περιέχειν], meaning "that which surrounds" or "that which embraces." Aristotle's definition thus implies the inside-outside dichotomy of 'the body that surrounds' or 'a surrounding space'. Relevant here is also the Greek notion of limit as *peras* [πέρας] translates in English as "boundary" and in German as *Grenze*. In Greek thinking, the limit is not an end, but rather, a beginning; it is a point that Heidegger adopts and that recurs in both the addendum to "The Origin of The Work of Art" and in *Art and Space*. Is taken up in more detail in chapter 5. Given the Greek notion of boundary as *peras*, place also opens up the notion of a region beyond place, as a gathering or cluster of places. This thinking of region in relation to place is advanced by Heidegger in *Art and Space* and emerged in the discussion of releasement in chapter 2.

things"[180] (just as the sensorium is prior to all things, according to Newton). These observations, taken together, come to inform and influence the emphasis on place in Heidegger's thinking and the later philosophical study of place following Heidegger.

Echoing Aristotle's understanding of the boundary as *peras*, that is, as an open beginning rather than an end, Heidegger's thinking on place also implies a "beyond," which is reflected in his notion of the region [*Gegend*] as the gathering of places.[181] We already encountered the notion of region and it is further expanded in our treatment of Heidegger's essay "Art and Space." Following Malpas' reading of the term, we may think of region not as the opposite of place in terms of space, but rather as holding the same qualities of place as clusters of places, by which Heidegger names the environing space that surrounds place, but without falling into pre-modern notions of boundless and infinite space – incompatible with dwelling.

In the thinking of Aristotle, place is a container. What this means is that a thing appears in and through place in that the thing is contained in and by the boundary of place. In his reading of Aristotle's *Physics*, Heidegger seizes on the centrality of place as the site where something takes place. It is place that places the thing. That is, the thing that Aristotle referred to appears in and through place. It is this line of thinking that leads Heidegger to claim the kinship of place and truth in the phenomenological sense, as place is the clearing in which something takes place. We shall return to Heidegger's own deliberations on place shortly, but what is important here is that place, as Heidegger sees it, is a co-constituent of the thing that appears. Indeed, this is also the view held by Malpas in his reading of Heidegger:

> [b]eing and place are inextricably bound together in a way that does not allow one to be seen merely as an "effect" of the other, rather being emerges only in and through place. The question of being must be understood in this light, such that the question of being itself unfolds into the question of place.[182]

[180] Aristotle, *Physics*, IV 4, 208b.
[181] This aspect in Heidegger's thinking resonates with the complex notion of *chora,* i.e., Plato's term for place. Still, classical Greek does not distinguish sharply between place and space and *chora* remains an ambiguous term that also translates as "space" and "field." It can relate to a notion of place as a region in the sense of the heterogeneous assemblage or interconnected set of places as explored in "Art and Space," discussed in chapter 5.
[182] Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology*, p. 6.

Argued here is the primacy of place. The argument for the primacy of place indicates a way of thinking of place as non-derivative. We often think of place in relation to space, or we think of it as subordinate to the spatiotemporal dimensionality of time and space. While this is, of course, still true in the sense that place unfolds in the spatiotemporality of space and time,[183] the preeminence of place implies that it cannot be reduced to merely a factor of either one. Place is to be understood as something in and of its own right. According to Malpas, place and being are co-constituent for us in our experience. In this view, place is ontologically primary to how we are in the world. Without place, there would be no world. That is to say, we perceive the world through place, and, without place, the world would no longer make sense to us as anything meaningful and intelligible, that is, as world. Casey takes a somewhat similar view on the preeminence of place, except he suggests that we think of place in terms of a place-world.[184] But that does not mean the character of this dyad is merely a philosophical construct or conceptualization. Rather, place, understood in terms of place-world, refers to how we are in the world and how we come into the world. It refers to the situated character of our being in the world. We have previously discussed the importance of dwelling in relation to the history of being to show that, in our technological epoch, we cannot dwell authentically. This also implies a difference between authenticity and inauthenticity – between dwelling and not dwelling. Yet in his reading Heidegger, Malpas sometimes casts the discussion of dwelling and place in more transcendental terms: "dwelling is the mode of human being, so human being is essentially a being in place, just as it is also a being in the world."[185] What Malpas promotes here is the thinking that we "dwell" in the sense of being in a place as being human. This view finds its most Kantian formulation in his earlier work in reflections on his own contribution: "the task undertaken here has a certain 'transcendental' character – it is a matter of undertaking an analysis of the structure in which the very possibility of subjectivity and of objectivity, of experience and self, are grounded."[186] In comparison, Casey's work emphasizes the situated character of being in the world in the particularity of place. While he ends up drawing the same conclusion of the primacy of place as Malpas, Casey's

[183] One modification to this is the disputed status of place when it comes to memory and recollection. How our memories of place present themselves to the mind in terms of time and space may be an entirely different matter.
[184] Getting Back into Place, pp. 280; 294.
[185] Malpas, *Heidegger's Thinking of Place*, p. 63.
[186] Malpas, *Place and Experience*, p. 45 n47.

thinking on place is more open to the perspective of the lifeworld. But before we explore this path, let us first turn to Heidegger's own thinking on place.

In his later writings, the notion of place emerges as a central theme accompanying the thinking on dwelling, but already before this, Heidegger points to the notion of place through our basic situatedness as human beings. It is no coincidence that Heidegger's early term for human is, as mentioned, *Da-sein*, literally, "being-there." The "there" – "*Da*" – in *Dasein* points to the situatedness and placed character of the human condition, as reflected existentially and ontologically throughout his thinking. The "there" is where we meet the world. The facticity of our "thrownness" into this world is reflected in this indication of place, as is our situatedness.

Placing the Bridge

In the essay "Building Dwelling Thinking" that we consulted in the exposition of the concept of dwelling, Heidegger expands on his thinking of the fourfold introduced earlier in the Bremen lectures series. The concept of the fourfold was developed in relation to the essay on "The Thing" and constitutes Heidegger's account of 'world' in his later thinking.[187] According to Casey, the concept of the fourfold inevitably leads to a thinking of place: "Heidegger is led back to *place*. For the members of the fourfold reside not just anywhere in the world in which they exist but *somewhere in particular*. This 'somewhere' is their place or 'seat', their *Stätte*, in a thing. But a thing in turn has its own 'location', its *Ort*."[188] Heidegger's prime example of place in "Building Dwelling Thinking" is the example of a bridge. He writes the following:

> The bridge swings over the stream "with ease and power." It does not just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge expressly causes them to lie across from each other. One side is set off against the other by the bridge. Nor do the banks stretch along the stream as indifferent border strips of the dry land. With the banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the other expanse of the landscape lying behind them. It brings stream and bank and land into each other's neighborhood. The bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the stream.[189]

[187] Young, J. *Heidegger's Later Philosophy*, p. 93.
[188] *The Fate of Place*, p. 274.
[189] GA7, p. 154; "Building Dwelling Thinking" in *Basic Writings*, p. 248.

According to Heidegger, the bridge gathers the surrounding landscape and brings it together. This is the work of the bridge as a thing. It arranges the landscape in proximity and, in doing so, it also imbues meaning to the surrounding elements by *placing* them in the landscape. This is the double character of the thing: it gathers the elements and opens up the world in terms of the fourfold. In the lines that follow, Heidegger draws out "the earth as landscape around the stream," and notes that "the bridge is ready for the sky's weather." He then reflects on "the mortals" who in their daily passage of the bridge are reminded of "the haleness of the divinities" as they walk nearby "the figure of the saint of the bridge."[190] Heidegger concludes:

> The bridge gathers to itself in its own way earth and sky, divinities and mortals.[191]

Heidegger's example of the bridge serves to illustrate the double movement of gathering and opening that takes place in the constitution of place. In a later paragraph, Heidegger reflects on the relation between the bridge and the landscape, adding more perspective:

> To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its *own* kind; for it gathers the fourfold in such a way that it allows for a *site* [*Stätte*] for it. But only something *that is itself a place* [*Ort*] can make space for a site. The place is not already there before the bridge is […] rather, a place comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge. The bridge is a thing; it gathers the fourfold, but in such a way that it allows for a site for the fourfold. By this site are determined the locations and paths by which a space [*Raum*] is provided for.
> Only things that are places in this manner allow for spaces. What the word for space, *Raum*, designates is said by its ancient meaning. *Raum* [Space] means a place that is freed for settlement and lodging. A space is something that has been made room for, something that is cleared and free, namely, within a boundary [*Grenze*], Greek *peras*. […] That for which room is always granted and hence is joined, that is, gathered, by virtue of a place, that is, by such a thing as a bridge. *Accordingly, spaces* [*die Räume*] *receive their essential being* [*ihr Wesen*] *from places* [*aus Orten*] *and not from "space"* [*dem Raum*].[192]

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[190] The bridge is left unidentified in the text, yet it may well be referencing the old bridge in Heidelberg. *Alte Brücke* is an arch bridge made of sandstone. It connects the banks of the old city to the new district across the Neckar River. On the top of the bridge are placed figures of saints like the ones mentioned by Heidegger.
[191] Ibid, p. 155; Ibid, p. 249.
[192] GA7, p. 156. My translation. I follow Malpas' lead by translating *Ort* as "place" and *Platz* as "location." Hofstädter presents the exact reverse translation of the two terms which seems misleading. Frell's word for *Ort* in

This passage introduces the basic idea behind Heidegger's notion of place: the place [*Ort*] gathers and opens by way of the thing. They share the same essential double movement of gathering and opening as the thing takes place. It is the thing that allows for the place (to take place), and only because of the thing does place come into existence. In this way, place and thing are co-constitutive and co-existing. In Heidegger's account, thing and place merge into one. They open up the surrounding space [*Raum*] by making room for it [*räumen*]. It is the space into which the elements of the landscape come together and are arranged. All this takes place in the nearness created by the thing taking place. The passage also clarifies the relation of space and place. Space only happens by virtue of the place and the thing. In this respect, space is derivative of place as the nearness of the landscape constituted by the placing of the bridge. The notion of space presented here is not a boundless space of endless indifference, but rather it is space that is directed towards or given through place. Only as the bridge is placed in the landscape is the surrounding space opened up through place. Heidegger's example of the bridge is thus an illustration of the primacy of place. Anticipated here is also Heidegger's notion of *räumen* and, with that, the concept of receptivity and a thinking of the boundary in relation to space and place, which Heidegger engages more thoroughly in his later reflections on sculpture. I will discuss these aspects in more detail in the following chapter on the visit to Olympia.

In Heidegger's thinking of place, something *takes place*. What this means is that the double movement referred to of gathering and opening implies a presencing. This reads well with Heidegger's notion of truth as a clearing in keeping with the Greek notion of *aletheia*. Following this line of thinking, the event [*Ereignis*] takes place [*ereignet sich*] in the spacing of things. In other words, space is opened up through the happening of place. According to Heidegger, things themselves can be considered places, but, if that is true, then place emerges in the presencing of the thing. In the essay on the thing, Heidegger refers to the "thinging of the thing" in reference to the gathering of the fourfold. What this means is that the presencing of the thing sets up a field of

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Basic Writings, is "locale" which also does not hold the same range as "place." See also *Heidegger's Topology*, p. 250 and footnote 77. The italics are from the original text.

On a general note in regards to Heidegger's rich vocabulary on place and place-related terms, I follow the translation practice of Malpas throughout this study. It follows from Casey's quote on the fourfold listed above that he does not follow the exact same practice but join Hofstädter by also applying "location" when translating from the German. As a consequence, Casey's practice of translation differs somewhat from the one used here (based on Malpas). But by and large, Casey and Malpas are on the same frequency and Casey also generally refers to Heidegger's *"Ort"* by the term "place" or "place-world."

referentiality in which it takes place, and it is this imbuing of meaning and referentiality that Heidegger refers to as the appropriation of the event and the gathering of the fourfold. In the words of Mitchell, "'to take place' draws attention to the spacing of the event of appropriation itself. What takes place is the thinging of the thing and the worlding of the world. What takes place is the belonging together of the human and being."[193] For this reading of place to make sense, it is important to keep in mind the element of self-referentiality implied in the term *sich ereignen*: hidden in the German is the reference to self as "own" (*eigen*) which implies that we as human beings are ourselves on the line in the presencing through the worlding of the world, standing in a relation (of "ownership," literally) to that which presences or takes place because we share the meaning and referentiality of the world we live in. Malpas defines the event as "the disclosive happening of belonging,"[194] seemingly indicating just that: the inscription into a larger context of dwelling as *wohnen* and the dynamics of longing and belonging on the basis of our relation to being as human beings. In Malpas' reading, this has implications for how we are to think temporality in relation to the event as it transcends space-time temporality.[195] This echoes Heidegger's own reflections on time and temporality in relation to the concept of releasement and our discussion of dwelling as *weilen*. However, this also raises a crucial phenomenological point implied in Heidegger's notion of the clearing as an event, namely that the event of appropriation implies an element of rupture and discontinuity. This perspective opens up a discussion of the experiential and performative nature of the event, one that inevitably leads to place – and the sense of place involved in presencing. As such, the presencing and particularity of the event points toward the performativity and experience of place – albeit presented here in the form of theory and philosophical argument. In parenthesis, we should add that one of the reasons *Sojourns* is so intriguing as a work is its apparent departure from this tradition in its direct confrontation with the more often theoretical tension between actual experience and the conceptualization of the same. But the perspective of presencing and the event is also a reflection of what Heidegger refers to as the open or openness of being. In this sense, it is exactly the notion of the clearing and the dynamics of a presencing or revealing on the backdrop of concealedness or forgetfulness of being. We already recognized Heidegger's bourgeoning thinking of the event in

[193] Heidegger, M. Trans. Mitchell, A. *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, p. xiii.
[194] *Heidegger's Topology*, p. 242.
[195] Malpas' particular reflections for the rupture of temporality in the event are cast in terms place, i.e., the primacy of place.

"The Origin of the Work of Art" culminating in *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, anticipating his later writings.[196]

The Ecstasy of Place

One important development in Heidegger's later thinking of place demands our attention. It seems that a shift occurs in Heidegger's writing pertaining to the ontological status of things and consequently involving our own relation to place and the world. As already hinted, what emerges from the analysis of the fundamental ontology in *Being and Time* is the centrality of *Dasein*. Uncontested is the focus on the existence of Dasein as the ecstatic center of orientation and worldhood. But here in Heidegger's later writings, starting with the Bremen lecture on "The Thing," it seems we are no longer alone in the world of *Daseins* only. Rather, Heidegger examines the status of the thing through the lens of place and the fourfold, and, as a result, things are ascribed a sense of ecstasy as ecstatic beings, standing out in the particularity of place in the elemental encounter of the fourfold. The focus of the centrality of *Dasein* emerging in the formal analysis of *Being and Time* thus shifts to the relationality of a concomitant dwelling with things, precisely because they stand out in the appropriation of place. Andrew Benjamin, in his reading of Aristotle, argues that "the condition of relationality" is equiprimordial with our being in the world as a coinciding facet of our *being-in-place*: "relationality as an original condition whose location and thus a sense of location as an already present setting, is identified by the term *being-in-place*."[197] While Benjamin addresses this aspect in terms of commonality, a notion of relationality can also be found in Heidegger's understanding of things. Heidegger time and again emphasizes the ecstatic character of things in relation to our staying with things and amidst things. Mitchell, in his reading of Heidegger's Bremen lecture series, ties this shift of focus to a development in Heidegger's understanding of the status of things, which is also discussed in the following chapter on sculpture. Reflecting the outstanding nature of the thing and the existential depth and dimension of the fourfold unfolded in the mediation of things, place reads as the disclosure of the relationality of the world. Place takes place, so to speak, by opening up the relationality of

[196] See Vallega-Neu, Daniela: *Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy: An Introduction*.
[197] Benjamin, Andrew. *Place, Commonality and Judgment: Continental Philosophy and the Ancient Greeks. Bloomsbury, 2012*, pp. 4-5.

things. What we mean by relationality is the ecstatic concomitance between us and things that is opened up in the disclosure of place. As it turns out, not just *Daseins* but the thing has a claim to disclosure as ecstatic being. This is the consequence of the shift in focus and the ecstatic character of things, as noted by Mitchell.[198] Along the same lines, Malpas refers to place as "the disclosive happening of belonging,"[199] thus indicating the relationality understood as our attachment to things and place. We encounter the world in our staying with things through the relationality inscribed in place. Note here that place – as emphasized by Malpas – is included in the ecstatic character of things and that the decentering of *Dasein* is thus recast in terms of place. In this sense, place, as it is presented in Heidegger's later thinking – can be said to overtake the formal crux of *Dasein* in *Being and Time*. What emerges is the centrality of place and experience as concomitant factors for where and how we are in the world. As we touch the world the world touches us in the sensitivity and relationality of place. Heidegger casts this relationality of things and humans in terms of the fourfold – as mortals on the existential backdrop of human finitude. Yet, as argued here, the sensitivity and relationality of place entails not only the bearings of the fourfold, but also, critically, a sensitivity and receptivity to the world that hinges on a sense of place and attunement. Exploring this sense of place in terms of atmosphere, Gernot Böhme also makes note of the ecstasy of things in his theory of atmosphere to which we shall return. Böhme wants to move beyond the narrow dichotomy of subject-object, and instead introduces a notion of quasi-objectivity in which a thing, much like an atmosphere, "makes its presence perceptible."[200] For Böhme, a block of marble, for instance, radiates in the spatial in between of the atmosphere:

> I use the Greek word *ecstasies* to indicate the way things are radiating into space and thus contributing to the formation of an atmosphere. *Ecstatics* is the way things make a certain impression on us and thus modifying our mood, the way we feel ourselves.[201]

[198] *The Fourfold*, p. 14.
[199] *Heidegger's Topology*, p. 242.
[200] Böhme, Gernot. *The Aesthetics of Atmospheres*. Edited by Jean-Paul Thibaud. Routledge, 2017, p. 18.
[201]. Ibid, p. 5.

Introduced here is a relation of materiality, affectivity, and atmosphere that I will bring into a thinking of place as we return to this topic shortly. For now, what is on display here is the full range of dwelling as a composite term. As we shall see, this includes the aspect of *aufhalten* as a staying with things and a sensitivity towards place and how we encounter the world.

Placing the River

In a parallel example to that of the bridge, Mitchell analyzes Heidegger's commentary of Hölderlin's hymn, "The Ister." Mitchell notices that unlike the bridge, the river is not a fixed place, yet it exhibits "a kind of openness and invitation to what lies around it."[202] In regard to place, Mitchell reiterates Heidegger's reading of the poem that the river is "the clearing event of appropriation,"[203] thus stressing the character of the event. But Mitchell also emphasizes the presencing of relationality in his reading of Heidegger. The river is a display of human finitude and dwelling as *wohnen* because it also evokes the relationality of past and future lines in the founding of the fourfold. What this means here is that human beings as mortals come into relation with our own existence. It happens in the nearness and the appropriation of relationality entailed in the founding of the fourfold. In other words, for us mortals, the passing of the river stream presents both the pastness of its source and the future of what lies ahead as the river continues beyond us toward the sea. Mitchell identifies here an openness in temporality that presents itself in the appropriating realm of the event through which place is "is no longer considered contained, but understood relationally."[204] I read this as another way of expressing what Malpas referred to as "the disclosive happening of the happening of belonging." However, Mitchell's focus remains on the fourfold and the thing as integral to place. Towards the end of his investigation of the fourfold – and with it, the thing – Mitchell makes a convincing case for the connection between the thing and the abiding essence of *verweilen*. In the essay on the thing, Heidegger proclaims that "the essence of the jug is in a while [*Weile*]."[205] Mitchell elaborates on the intimacy of *weilen* and the thing: The thing abides. Yet as integral to place, this explication of the abiding thing also holds consequences for the concept of place from the perspective of this study. It reads well with the

[202] *The Fourfold*, p. 94.
[203] GA 53: 203-204: McNeill W., Davis, J.; *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister."* p. 166 (Heidegger's brackets).
[204] *The Fourfold*, p. 95.
[205] GA79, p. 13; *The Thing*, p. 12.

analysis of dwelling and the aspects of *weilen* and *aufthalten* discussed in chapter 1. In a full exposition of the linkage of experience and existence in terms of the appropriation of the fourfold in the thinging of the thing that takes place, Mitchell states the following:

> Abiding has another name: thing. Abiding implicates a beyond by instantiating itself liminally in a medium, through a material exposure, we might say. And mortals, too, are similarly thinglike… What is thinglike of mortals is their residing (*aufhalten*). Mortals abide in residing, in dwelling. In more than one sense, then, all these things abide for a while.[206]

Mitchell points to how the thing appears through the material exposure in the instantiating of place and, in doing so, shares the same exposure and finitude as that of mortals in the temporality of the *Aufenthalt*. It is this thing-like abiding of *weilen* that takes place in the lingering of the *Aufenthalt* and it is the finitude of dwelling that characterizes human beings as mortals.

Placing the Body

So far we have come to understand place in philosophical terms through a conceptual reading of Heidegger. We have explored the concept of place as presented in "Building Dwelling Thinking" and in relating texts on place and dwelling. We have explored the conceptual reasoning of the event in relation to the thinking of the fourfold and the thing, and we have drawn out the lines of tension in *Sojourns* regarding the sense and experience of place implied and how it is used by Heidegger to emphasize and enhance a thinking of place already anticipated in "The Origin of the Work of Art." Yet we are haunted by the feeling that something is still missing from a comprehensive understanding of place; that we are somehow still missing the full picture of place. What is missing, is the question of embodiment and the experiential dimension to place. Therefore, we are to engage with the notion of place from the perspective of the lifeworld and, as we shall see, this is exactly what we gain from consulting Casey's thinking on place. The notion of lifeworld [*Lebenswelt*] was coined by Husserl to describe the pre-reflective, immediate character

[206] *The Fourfold*, p. 297.

of our experience of the world as it appears in the subjectivity of everyday life. In the study of place, the notion has been defined by David Seamon as "a person or group's day-to-day world of taken-for-grantedness normally unnoticed and, therefore, concealed as a phenomenon."[207]

What I take from Casey is the Merleau-Pontian perspective of the role of the body applied to a thinking of place. Casey's most significant contribution is perhaps the insistence on the hidden role of the body that he finds to be missing in Heidegger's account of place.[208] Casey argues for the primacy of place in philosophical terms, and like Malpas after him, Casey also reflects on Heidegger's thinking and the intertwining of the thing and the fourfold in the nexus of place. But in order to get to a notion of place as philosophically central, Casey travels a somewhat different route in that he does not see Heidegger as the beginning and the end of the conversation on place. Whereas Malpas devotes the full attention of his works to the thinking of Heidegger, Casey's approach to the discussion of place is not unequivocally defined by a reading of Heidegger.[209] What this means is that in addition to Heidegger's now familiar conceptual thinking examined in the above, as reflected in Malpas' topological path to place and Mitchell's reading of the venue of the fourfold, the road travelled by Casey also passes through a non-conceptual territory that remains strangely absent in Heidegger's writings, namely, the perspective of the body and the implications of embodied experience for the notion of place. Fair to say, this critical element is not rejected in Malpas' careful and conscientious reading of Heidegger, but the problem lies elsewhere, namely with Heidegger's own writing. For it seems, the perspective of embodied experience is apparently missing in Heidegger's account of place. The conventional reading of Heidegger scholarship has left little room for and account of the tenor of the text in *Sojourns*. With this in mind, in what follows, we shall proceed by expanding the notion of place into exploring the accompanying experience of embodiment. What emerges is a more comprehensive and commonsensical notion of place, a sense of place that still includes the credo of the

[207] David Seamon. *Life Takes Place*, p. 12.

[208] However, this criticism has also been challenged by Kevin Aho who wants to nuance the conventional understanding of Heidegger's account of the body. Our discussion of Heidegger's later notion of the "lived body" in his thinking on sculpture, addressed in chapter 5, can be viewed along those same lines of modification.
Aho, Kevin. *Heidegger's Neglect of the Body*. SUNY Press, 2009.

[209] To clarify, Mitchell's reading of Heidegger is not directed at the study of place as such, but at the role of the thing and the fourfold. Malpas, however, is more in keeping with this characterization in that Malpas' authorship is defined by Heidegger's thinking of place.

primacy of place, but also reflects the sense of place of the lifeworld through the perspective of embodied experience.

For the record, Malpas by no means disapproves of the perspective of experience nor does he find it to be fundamentally different from the conceptual understanding of place that emerges from his own reading of Heidegger. Indeed, one could also follow Malpas' lead to pursue an account of the sense of place based more firmly on a reading of Heidegger. Yet, true to his discipline, Malpas offers a hierarchical interpretation of the relation between a conceptual understanding of place and the domain of human experience – with philosophy being the basis of any such differentiation. For Malpas, the question of place is first and foremost an ontological question, which is why his own work goes to reflect "the fundamental *ontological* structure"[210] of place as a way of providing the philosophical underpinnings of a study of place and hereunder the domain of human experience. This Heideggerian inclination may also go to explain why Casey and Malpas arrive at the idea of place from two seemingly separate routes. This is not to say that Malpas fails to account for the element of embodied experience. In Malpas' reading of Heidegger, he, too, traces a phenomenological notion of the body in Heidegger's own writings in an attempt to extract the same notion of lived experience in Heidegger's thinking, but he does so only from a distance, so to speak. A conscientious reader of Heidegger, Malpas does not take a first-person perspective on embodied experience; rather, he observes the crossing lines of the authorship in hindsight to report on the passages where one can rightfully argue such a perspective is indeed at work. Malpas specifically calls attention to Heidegger's remarks in the *Zollikon Seminars*, in which Heidegger reflects on the experiential and phenomenal perspectives of place and space, and he finds additional justification for this view in Heidegger's lecture at the Le Thor seminar. This careful treatment of Heidegger's writings is valuable as it adds to an understanding of the complexity of his later thinking. Malpas is right in pointing toward this aspect in Heidegger's thinking, and, when followed through, there is indeed more to gain from this perspective.[211] Malpas' interest lies with the basic ontological structures of place, but Casey follows through on the particularization of place to explore an elaborate thinking on place and the body less bound by Heidegger's own words. This study will follow Casey's lead in a thinking of the

[210] *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place,* p. 4.

[211] Aho, Kevin. "The Missing Dialogue between Heiedgger and Merleau.Ponty: On the Importance of the Zollikon Seminars." *Body & Society*. Vol 11 (2), Sage, 2005, pp. 1-23.

experiential role of the body as it adds to a comprehensive notion of place, but keeping with Malpas, I will point out that the element of the lived body does in fact surface in Heidegger's thinking on sculpture. That said, the task of rehabilitating an ample notion of the phenomenological body based solely on the writings of Heidegger strikes me as a daring project of restoration that can only be bound for incompletion. Instead, it is preferable for the moment to leave Heidegger's phenomenal aspirations behind and follow through on Casey's critique of Heidegger. In order to arriving at a comprehensive notion of place that adequately reflects the experiential dimension of place, and what is referred to here as the phenomenal sphere of body and place, we are thus bound to pursue the path laid out by Casey's phenomenology of place.

Casey's argument for the primacy of place and his reading of Heidegger's is informed by German and French phenomenology. It combines the attention to the history and situatedness of our being in the world with a lifeworld perspective. A student of Mikel Dufrenne, Casey's work includes reflections on aesthetic experience, but he also accentuates the topic of memory in relation to place and dwelling in keeping with a general focus on the role of memory in continental thinking.[212] It is the emphasis on lifeworld experience in relation to place that is of interest to this study. Casey arrives at a thinking of place that calls attention to the perspective of the lived body. In this respect, his work resonates with the thinking of Merleau-Ponty on embodiment and the role of the body, but Casey's thinking on place also reflects the imprint of Husserlian phenomenology on French philosophy. He picks up on Husserl's distinction between *Leib* and *Körper*. It is the central phenomenological differentiation between the notion of an experiential, lived body versus the notion of the body as a physical object.[213] As a result, Casey's take on place comes to reflect not only the fundamental situatedness of our being in the world as embedded in history and in the spatiality of place, but also, critically, a thinking of place that includes the phenomenal realm of bodily experience to reflect the notion of embodiment and experience.

[212] The topic of memory reflects a general tendency in continental thinking, as reflected, for instance, in the works of Paul Ricoeur on memory and recollection, or "fleshed out" in Merleau-Ponty's notion of the re-membering of the body. Casey's reflections on place and memory are however also informed by the study of Freud. In relation to a study of place, the contribution of French historian Pierre Nora in his *Les Lieux de Mémoire*, deserves special mentioning. A later work echoing this emphasis of memory and place is Trigg's *The Memory of Place*.

[213] Husserl's distinction highlights the phenomenological distinction between being a body and having a body. In terms of place, the distinction implies the differentiation between an experiential account of place as opposed a conceptual study of place. It also echoes Bergson's emphasis of elemental time.

In what follows, it is exactly this perspective on the study of place that I take from Casey. Rather than exploring a topological reading of Heidegger's concept of place as undertaken by Malpas, Casey is less inclined to conceptualize the theoretical foundation of Heidegger's concept of place, as he insists that we take onboard recognition of the hidden role of body. It is this important accentuation of bodily sensation and lived experience that is advanced in this study to pursue a comprehensive and commonsensical notion of place to supplement Heidegger's own thinking. As indicated, the role of the body presents a critique of Heidegger that rings throughout this study, and comes to inform the teasing apart of Heidegger's notion of place into a comprehensive understanding of place that more directly reflects the dimension of experience and sense of place. The same argument spills into the discussion on sculpture in the following chapter and resonates in what I refer to as the art of dwelling in the final chapter, in which the present examination of a Heideggerian notion of dwelling is brought into conversation with a contemporary context of art and literature.

As mentioned above, Casey and Malpas both argue that place is prior to space and they both find a basis for this claim in their reading of Heidegger and the emphasis on Aristotle. Whereas Malpas hinges his claim for place on a comprehensive reading of Heidegger's "topological thinking," Casey presents two ways in which he argues for this same emphasis on place. First, is a historical argument in the form of a philosophical investigation in which he tracks the tension of space and place in the history of philosophy.[214] Casey bombastically wants "to thrust the very idea of place, so deeply dormant in modern Western thinking, once more into the daylight of philosophical discourse."[215] Prescribed here is the shifting story of the early emphasis on place in ancient Greek thinking, manifested by Aristotle's idea of place in his *Physics*, to a preoccupation with the notion of space in early modern Western thinking, emblematically captured in the Cartesian notion of extended space or the idea of absolute space in Newtonian physics. The investigation establishes the notion of space as the prevailing model of thought in the early modern theories of place and space – represented paradigmatically by the thinking of Kant[216] –

[214] Casey presents the crux of this argument in "How to Get from Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time," but most elaborate argument is offered in *The Fate of Place*.
[215] *The Fate of Place*, xi.
[216] Immanuel Kant is a main reference when it comes to the thinking of space in early modern thinking. In *Critique of Pure* from 1781, Kant refers to this part of his thinking as the "Transcendental Aesthetic" where the "aesthetic" refers to sense experience and the "transcendental aesthetic" is the inquiry into the conditions to the possibilities of sense experience. In it, Kant identifies space and time as transcendentally ideal forms of intuition by which he

only to end by declaring a shift back to the primacy of place.[217] Through a reading of Bachelard and Heidegger, amongst others, Casey salutes the reemergence of place over space. Still, we might add that apart from calling explicit attention to the philosophical tension of place and space, there is little new in this outline. To quite some degree, the overall points of the investigation reflect those of Heidegger who – for obvious reasons – arrives at the same basic conclusion: the preeminence of place. In this respect, the survey simply reiterates a historical argument for place already presupposed in Heidegger. In Heidegger's own view, he stands at the end of a great arch starting with Aristotle's preoccupation with place and concluding with his own notion of place as presented in his later thinking. This is the pretext for "Building Dwelling Thinking," and it finds a later formulation in "Art and Space" in which the notion for place is understood as "the special character of space." We shall revisit this argument in the discussion of sculpture in the next chapter, but let us now turn to Casey's other route to place and the sense of place.

As hinted, Casey also offers another trajectory of "getting back into place."[218] This other path is all the more interesting, as it does not presuppose or construe place as a binary relation to space, but rather on its own terms, so to speak, by putting an experiential lens on the world. Central to this way of thinking of place is the concept *implacement*. Casey coins the term to reflect the primacy of place, but he defines implacement as our *immediate placement.* What this means is that place is the way in which we encounter and experience the world because we are always already in place. "*To be is to be in place*."[219] In this way, place or placement still characterizes our fundamental being in ontological terms and "implacement" is a reminder of what is already available to us through the thinking of Heidegger, namely the question of being and the insistence on the "*Da*" in Heidegger's term *Dasein*. According to the analysis of the basic ontological structures of existence in *Being and Time*, we are as humans always already placed in the world

dismisses both the Newtonian absolutist and Leibnizian relativist conceptions of space and time as speculative. Instead, Kant places the categories of space and time squarely in "the subjective constitution of our mind" (A23/B37-38) in accordance with his transcendental idealism. For Kant, space and time are preinstalled, primordial forms of intuition [*Anschauung*] and, as such, they are transcendentally ideal. As a result, Kant can argue for the predominance of space as a condition for the possibility of assembling the manifold of sense experience into a continuous episode that allows us to make sense of our impressions and, thus, of the world.

[217] The project of getting "From Space to Place" is also an indirect reference to Kant's transcendental aesthetics. For Kant, the condition of experience is derived as the primordial forms of intuition, that is, as categories of space and time.

[218] *Getting Back Into Place*, p. 317.

[219] Ibid, p. 214.

– through the thrownness of facticity and existence. But according to Casey there is more to place in that it also defines the way we live and experience. This opens up a trajectory of embodied, situated sensory experience. Place – or immediate placement – is how we are in the world. It seems that in addition to the ontological point of the "that" (*that* we are in the world), place and implacement also implies the experiential dimension of the "how" (*how* we are in the world). Casey explains that "the *im-* of *implacement* stresses the action of getting in or into, and it carries connotations to *im*manence that are appropriate to the inhabitation of place."[220] For Casey, the term carries the aspect of becoming. As it turns out, place is integral to experience and the way we are in the world as human beings, just as experience as sense of place is a fundamental part of being in place. As a result, an adequate concept of place will also need to also take into account the lifeworld perspective of place and experience. This is the central criticism to be raised against Heidegger's notion of place. In the words of Casey:

> Indebted as I am to Heidegger's pioneering writings on place and region, I find that nowhere does he account for the active agency of the human body in issues of implacement.[221]

It is this "active agency" that Casey calls for through his use of the term "implacement," and it is this dimension of the term implacement that we need to explicate in order to fully comprehend the notion of place and the tension of place and experience that Heidegger raises in *Sojourns*. Casey is right in addressing the lack of perspective in Heidegger's thinking on place and, as we shall see, this has consequences for the notion of place as presented here. I do however want to nuance this criticism by calling attention to Heidegger's later thinking on sculpture where he does in fact raise the perspective of the lived body as discussed in chapter 5. But this is nowhere to be found in Heidegger's canonical texts on place and it is indeed appropriate to raise the criticism of active agency and embodied experience in regard to Heidegger's notion of place. In what follows, I pursue this criticism in regard to place and I argue that what is missing in Heidegger's

[220] *Getting Back into Place*, p. 367, footnote 9.
[221] *Getting Back into Place*, p. 411, footnote 45.

account on place will be ascertained through the perspective of embodied experience and a thinking of atmospheres as presented in this study.

Elaborating on the perspective of "active agency," and thus outlining a new route to place, Casey invokes Husserl's distinction of the lived body [*Lieb*] and the physical body [*Körper*], i.e., the distinction between having a body and being a body. He remarks that as opposed to the idea of the body as a physical object, "our own body is not merely one thing among others, simply and indifferently disposed in spatio-temporal situations (in the manner of any natural or technological things). As a "lived" entity, a *Leib*, the body is not only situated, but situating."[222] By invoking the perspective of the lived body, Casey opens up the experiential dimension of place and the perspective of embodied experience. To be in place is not merely a question of theoretical analysis outlining the conditions of how we think of the world in spatiotemporal terms; rather, it also implies a non-conceptual, pre-reflective sense of place and how we live intuitively in and through place. Just as Heidegger emphasizes the role of the thing in regard to place, in Casey's view, the body co-constitutes place. "Bodies build places," he argues, because "a dwelling place presupposes the presence and activity of the inhabitant's lived body."[223] Casey in this way brings together the Husserlian notion on *Leib* as lived body and a Merleau-Pontian sentiment of bodily experience in his thinking of implacement.[224] He emphasizes the active agency of the lived body and the a priory of place: "For the lived body… is always already *implaced.*"[225]

Adding the perspective of the body to a reading of Heidegger allows for an expanded notion of place reflecting the active agency of lifeworld in relation to place. What this means is that in addition to the disembodied notion of place presented in "Building Dwelling Thinking," we are now in a position to say more about place, following Casey. As it turns out, place is integral

[222] *Getting Back into Place*, p. 116.
[223] Ibid, p. 116
[224] The term "lived body" is a direct reference to the Husserlian notion of *Leib* in contract to the body as object whereas the related notion of "felt body" reflects the aspect of bodily sensation and affectivity. In what follows I argue that the "lived body" is in fact a "felt body" in that we are always already affected and attuned. However, when taken together, the "lived body" and the "felt body" can both be said to present the broader perspective of embodiment and the phenomenal sphere argued here. We might add that the phenomenal role of the body and the emphasis on embodiment and bodily experience finds its most prominent expression in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology.
[225] Ibid, p. 104.

to experience and the way we are in the world. In line with this thinking, and in reference to Heidegger, Casey defines place the following way:

> To be in the world, to be situated at all, is to be in place. Place is the phenomenal particularization of "being-in-the-world."[226]

It is this sense of place in the "phenomenal particularization of being in the world" that allows for a richer, deeper understanding of place and, with it, the significance of *Sojourns* and the emphasis put on the Heideggerian notion of dwelling as a composite term, argued here. The "phenomenal particularization" of the way we are in the world implies the "active agency" of place needed to adequately account for place and dwelling. What emerges here is a notion of embodied experience as situated, enacted, sensory experience that corresponds to the experiential dimension of dwelling understood in its broadest sense. This opens up for an expanded notion of place that more adequately reflects the full range of dwelling. We want to think through the perspective of embodied experience as we move forward in order to reflect the lifeworld implications of dwelling and to adequately reflect the perspective of the lived body that Casey refers to as "the phenomenal particularization of 'being-in-the-world'" .[227]

In a shift from Heidegger's preoccupation with the thing and the fourfold, Casey draws on the work of Merleau-Ponty and the idea of "corporal intentionality." In doing so, he emphasizes the phenomenal role of the body through lifeworld perspectives. As a consequence, the notion of place opens up an affective dimension in terms of a corporal awareness and the affectivity of felt body inhabiting the lifeworld: "Places are not so much the direct objects of sight or thought or recollection as what we feel *with* and *around*, *under* and *above*, *before* and *behind* our lived bodies."[228] Yet, Casey stops short of fusing the notions of place and body. Instead, he inter-

[226] Ibid, p. xv.
[227] Ibid, p. xv.
[228] *Getting Back into Place*, p. 313.

jects the perspective of movement and advances a relational understanding of the two. As a result, he distinguishes between three basic ways[229] in which we, as living-sensing-acting bodies, relate to place:

1) *We can stay in a place.* In this way of relating to place, we remain in the same place, be it the living room, on a bench in the park, or the backyard of a house.
2) *We can move within a place*. In this way of relating to place, we move within a circumscribed area. Casey's examples are the walls of a room or the prescribed area of the temple as a place of worship.
3) *We can move between places*. We can go from one place to another, which also includes the mode of travel or transportation. It is the intermediate mode of being underway and in between places.

Adding to this, Casey emphasizes that we are always in a concrete place by way of our concrete body. In his own words, "my body continually *takes me into place.*"[230] The formulation is a paraphrasing of Merleau-Ponty, but it also makes for a crucial addition to Heidegger's thinking. Casey's categories read well with a commonsensical understanding of place. It seems that with Casey, places may themselves be fleeing, elusive, or simply moving. We relate to place as lived bodies in that we are always in a particular place (1). When reading, watching, listening, resting, working – we are in a place, in the midst of things. For instance, we may give ourselves over to the particular and sink into the place as we dwell, or we may find ourselves confined in the burlap cubicle annoyed with the noise of the colleagues. This way of relation to place is not unlike the dwelling of *aufhalten* in the lingering of the *Aufenthalt* – for a while, in a place. The aspect of dwelling is also evident in Casey's two other categories. We relate to the place through our body and our bodily awareness of place as we walk around in a room, moving within place (2) or traveling between places (3). To illustrate this point, imagine sitting in the window seat of a passenger train as it makes its way through the passing landscape. The sense of movement and the confinement of the train cabin prompts for the mood and mode of reflection associated with travelling and dwelling. Or think of the comfort of the dining hall onboard the cruise ship as the

[229] Ibid, p. 326.
[230] Ibid, p. 48.

Heideggers make their way through the Aegean Sea in *Sojourns*. Both examples illustrate aspects of dwelling taking place while on the move. One consequence of Casey's thinking is that place is no longer to be regarded as always stationary and motionless. For with the inclusion of the perspective of the lived body comes also the possibility of mobility, that is, the idea of the movement of place itself. Granted, this is a minor point in regard to a comprehensive notion of place, but what emerges is something missing entirely in Heidegger's account: a moving place. Still, Casey's work calls attention to the role of the body in relation to place as an element missing in Heidegger's account of place. The addition of the perspective of the lived body not only opens up new avenues in thinking about place, but also calls for a recalibration of the notion of place itself.

In his second category of place (2), Casey mentions the temple and our relation to places of worship. This aspect calls attention to the prescription inscribed in rituals and sacred places. This is highly relevant for the discussion of place in *Sojourns* culminating with Heidegger's visit to Olympia and the reference to the notion of consecration. What we should add here is the supplementing perspective of *inside-outside* as a defining characteristic of place. We have already established this distinction as fundamental to the notion of place in reference to the works of Relph and Seamon and in the discussion of Trigg, but the distinction of inside-outside also opens up the demarcation of worship and religious life as pointed out by Mircea Eliade.[231] This is taken up by Belden Lane in his reapplication of Casey's thinking of place in a reading of the sacred landscape of North America. In his encounters with the landscape and places imbued with the myth and meaning of religious life and worship from native Americans, Lane extracts a list of "leading traits" in a phenomenological approach to place based on Casey to describe "the "emotional tonality" or "mood" of a place and to clarify "the various ways by which a place comes to impose itself on our consciousness."[232] Belden reads place along the lines of Eliade's demarcation of religious place, but he adopts Casey's thinking to illustrate our attachment to and sense of place. We will revisit this discussion during Heidegger's visits in *Sojourns*.

Having established Casey's three ways of relating to place, it is helpful to illustrate place claims by providing a "negative" example, that is, by demonstrating the sense of *not* being in a

[231] Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*. Harcourt, 1987.
[232] Belden C. Lane, *Landscapes of the Sacred: Geography and Narrative in American Spirituality*, Johns Hopkins Univresity Press, 2002. p. 56.

place, *not* feeling at home. What I mean by this becomes clear when we try to image a situation when we cannot connect to place and do not have a clear sense of place.

In Pascal Mercier's novel *Night Train to Lisbon,* the protagonist of the story, Gregorius, is compelled to leave behind his home and familiar surroundings in Bern in Switzerland and go to Lisbon on a matter of some importance as he stumbles upon a book by a mysterious author written in Lisbon. The old man finds himself drawn to the Portuguese city and is soon consumed in an existential quest, tracing the life of the author of the book. Gregorius becomes obsessed with the task and with Lisbon itself, and he only reluctantly travels back to Switzerland for a short while, destined as he is to return to Lisbon with a sense of existential coda. During this visit back in Bern, Gregorius tries to find his bearings.

> An hour later, when he stood in the square, he had the feeling he couldn't touch it any more. Yes, even though it sounded strange, that was the right word: he couldn't touch Bubenbergplatz any more. He had already walked around the square three times, had waited at the traffic lights and looked in all directions: towards the cinema, the post office, the war memorial, the Spanish bookshop where he had come upon Prado's book, straight ahead at the tram stop, at Heiliggeistkirche and the Loeb department store. He had stood still, closed his eyes and concentrated on the pressure his heavy body exerted on the pavement. The soles of his feet had become warm, the street seemed to come towards him, but the feeling persisted: he no longer succeeded in touching the square. The streets and building, the lights and sounds, of the square with its decades of familiarity no longer managed to reach him, to bridge this final gap and present themselves to his memory as something he not only *knew*, know by heart, but as something he *was*, had always been. Only now did it dawn on him that he was no longer the same person.[233]

The text offers a clear illustration of the categorical notions of place outlined in the above. Nonetheless, the tone of the text is a disturbing one. Gregorius has lost touch with the city of Bern and is unable to establish any solid sense of place. It seems that the square of Bubenbergplatz, once so familiar to Gregorius, has somehow faded away and lost its qualities. Gregorius no longer holds any sense of belonging and attachment. He can walk around the square and move up and

[233] *Night Train to Lisbon,* p. 235.

down the city streets, but he can no longer dwell there. And yet, Gregorius seemingly undertakes all the prescriptions to place as noted above. First of all, he travels to Bern from Lisbon. It is a homecoming, a *nostos*, to the familiar streets of the city where he grew old. What he expects to find in Bern and at Bubenbergplatz, in particular, is just that – the sense of home and familiarity as to seamlessly reunite with the places of old. But the feeling escapes him. And yet Gregorius also tries to delineate the place, to move within the square, to walk through it and walk around the edges – and still it escapes him. In a final attempt of connecting to the place, he tries to sink into the place, to absorb and suffuse the place by way of the body, in order to once again become part of the lived sensation of Bubenbergplatz. But Gregorius fails to retrace and relive the sense of home and familiarity. Strangely alienated from the once familiar, he finds himself "out of touch." And in a way, Gregorius was bound to fail – despite the diligent attempt to really feel Bubenbergplatz. For what becomes clear to the reader, explicated in the final sentence of the passage, is that it is he, Gregorius, and not Bubenbergplatz that has changed. This realization can also be phrased in Heideggerian terms of relatedness. Gregorius used to be inscribed in a world of familiarity and meaning, but he now finds himself no longer belonging – no longer at home, no longer in place. As in the example of the hammer, the Heideggerian event of failure becomes an illustration of the ordinary relatedness that Gregorius has taken for granted but that he can no longer establish or immerse himself into.

What the heightened awareness of sense of place in this passage on Gregorius points to is not just the atmosphere of place, but also the subjective character of experience itself. For all his attempts to relate to place and reconnect to a sense of meaning and belonging – involving all three levels of place relation listed above – Gregorius fails miserably. But in a way, the story of Gregorius illustrates the positive through the negative. It reflects all the usual ways in which we normally relate to place as experiencing, "felt" bodies. When Gregorius continuously fails to "touch" and relate to the city/place to which he returns, it is not because he is not trying out all the right things, if we are to grant Casey the perspective of the living, sensing, feeling body in relation to place. But it also goes to prove Heidegger's point that place and belonging also play into the existential territory of being (in the world) and the uncanny feeling of being out of place – out of touch with who (and where) we are existentially. It seems that dwelling and sense of place are not an act of the will, but rather a question of being.

Casey explicitly draws on this notion in his categorization of our bodily interaction with place in terms of perception according to three distinct lifeworld perspectives as listed above. However, he stops short of coalescing place and body and instead refers to the body as "the material condition of possibility for the place-world." However, as argued here, this is not sufficient, and Casey neglects to consider the implications of that categorization and what it reveals. I want to suggest a different way of addressing this issue. While Casey enumerates a variety of possible lifeworld perspectives grounded in different configurations of body and place, I am interested in how these possibilities come together in what I will refer to as *the phenomenal sphere*, that is, the co-existing, co-constitutive sphere of place and body.[234] By this I understand a set of configurations that itself has a structure that I point to by using the word sphere. As will become clear, this phenomenal sphere is where embodied experience meets the concreteness of place. As pointed out, Casey stops short of merging the notions of place and body, and instead points to an externalist account of place and body in which it is the motion relation between body and place that come to define the categories mentioned in the section above. I follow Casey in insisting on the perspective of the body as a lived body, which distinguishes this reading of place from Heidegger's. However, while Casey is primarily interested in demonstrating that no sensing is possible without "the material condition of the body," I argue that it is important not to neglect the phenomenal nexus of body and place which is reflected in the synaesthetic nature of perception. Bachelard already refers to "the polyphony of the senses"[235] in recognition of the phenomenal body, and the notion of the sphere reflects the placed character of our being in the world. The perspective of the lived body is exactly always a placed body and so the two come together in the synthesis of perception and place in the phenomenal sphere. The term also indicates the felt sphere of experience and affect, implying a phenomenology of affectivity that I will explore here in reference to the atmosphere of place. What this means is that the "lived body" is in fact a "felt body" in that we are always already affected and attuned. In terms of Casey's discussion of place and body, I argue that what Casey refers to as "the phenomenal particularization of place" and

[234] I refer to the intertwining of place and body as *the phenomenal sphere*. The term is inspired by Merleau-Ponty's notion of a pre-reflective "phenomenal field." However, the shift in accent implied by here is that the phenomenal sphere also reflects the *spheric* qualities of human perception, thus moving the focus towards a thinking of atmosphere and ambience as discussed in the section that follows and later in chapter 6. As such, the phenomenal sphere can be read in connection with both Thibaud's thinking of ambience as well as Sloterdijk's spherology.
[235] Bachelard, *The Poetics of Reverie*, p. 6.

the "material condition of the body"[236] are in fact features of the phenomenal sphere of both place and body, which encompasses the full range of phenomenal experience and sensory impressions. The phenomenal sphere thus implies both the sentiments of the body and the atmosphere of place, elaborated further in what follows. While Heidegger's notion of place can be said to involve the co-existence and co-constitution of place and thing, I want to expand this view by advancing the phenomenal sphere as a way of reflecting the intimacy of body and place. What this means is that place, when understood this way, is more than the conceptualization of place; indeed, it also includes the dimension of experience, that is, the sense of place of the body. With this in mind, we are directed towards the particularity and sensitivity of the sense of place.

The Sense of Place

Following Casey's lead, Trigg explores the aspect of memory through the same emphasis on place, but in a much more direct reference to the thinking of Merleau-Ponty. Trigg argues for *the sense of place* in terms of particularity, difference, and place. In doing so, he echoes Casey's emphasis on the phenomenological impact and centrality of the "phenomenal particularization." Trigg writes the following:

> There is certainly a qualitative difference between types of place, whereby particularity, difference, and bodily receptivity all conspire together to what might be termed a "sense of place."[237]

In his influential work, *Place and Experience*, Malpas in many ways foreshadow his own comprehensive reading of Heidegger's authorship in terms of place and topology, echoing Casey's interest in the philosophical study of place. While Trigg is prone to emphasize the differentiation and quality of the subjective dimension of experience and the memory of place, Malpas promotes a more textual reading of place in keeping with Heidegger's lead, yet he, too, recognizes the experiential element of place. He defines the sense of place in concise terms:

[236] *Getting Back into Place*, p. 327.
[237] *The Memory of Place*, p. 123.

> Sense of place [is] the felt or meaningful character of a place that makes it distinctive as a place.[238]

As a concept, the sense of place remains a notoriously vague term open for several meanings. However, I contend that the conceptual ambiguity also forms a fruitful perspective in that the varying aspects complement each other, prompting the contours of the phenomenal realm of experience and affectivity. This is a domain of some complexity and it could all too easily fall victim of the reduction of analysis, and so a certain caution in conceptualization is preferable. First of all, the sense of place implies the realm of experience – the fact that we sense, register, and experience a place. It therefore refers to the bodily and sensory dimension of place. But implied here is also a notion of permanency in the sense that place constitutes a span or duration of time in which place is and unfolds. When we refer to the sense of a place, we already say something about the place itself. The permanency implied is what grants place its character or its sense and quality, so to speak. This points the temporality of *weilen* already established. Place abides and, as such, the place can be said to present or hold a certain quality. This is why Bubenbergplatz and the city of Bern would hold a sense of place and belonging for Gregorius in the first place. Trigg also points out the differentiation of places. It is a qualitative difference that emerges in the particularity of place and embodiment. This phenomenal particularization of the embodied translates as a sense of duration or immanence in the encounter with place. This temporality of place is implied as a prerequisite for us to be able to talk about a sense of place and allows for Norberg-Schulz to suggest the notion of an enduring spirit of place, *a genius loci*. But far from arguing for a static notion of place, it seems we have to adopt a more open notion of place. As it is, places change over time – in meaning and reference/recollection. Like everything else, they are subject to history and should not be addressed solely in theoretical brackets, as absolutes in the eternal shine of abstraction and theory. This is exactly the difference between (the analysis of) the Greek temple of "The Origin of the Work of Art," as a theoretical work, and Heidegger's visit to the temple of Poseidon as an actual experience. There is no body in "The Origin of the

[238] *Place and Experience*, p. 219.

Work of Art," only a well-thought reflection on the idea of a Greek temple setting up the philosophical argument for *aletheia*. This all changes in *Sojourns*. The text repeats the overall philosophical argument, but underneath Heidegger's philosophical appraisal of language that drapes the descriptions in *Sojourns*, is the lived experience and concrete particularization of place that goes into Heidegger's impressions of the Greek landscape – with the small caveat of Heidegger's own role as narrator. But just as the place is itself subject to the passing of time, so are we. Implied here is the fact that the notion of sense of place entails a subjective dimension. The reason Bubenbergplatz no longer holds the same sense of place and belonging for Gregorius is precisely because of Gregorius. For it is Gregorius and not Bubenbergplatz that has changed. In this sense, differentiation and the element of time is also relative to the one who senses, which is the commonsensical reason that we can relate to the feeling of losing touch with a place. As it turns out, we, too, are subject to change over time and, in this way, the sense of place is also relative to the memory of place, pursued by Trigg. In his account of our sense of place, Trigg emphasizes precisely this subjective element of differentiation and affectivity in the memory of place.

Following this line of thinking, the present study argues for a sense of place that opens up the *reappropriation* of place by incorporating the perspective of experience and embodiment in the phenomenal sphere. Implied here is exactly the sensitivity to place that comes into play in a contemporary discussion of dwelling. We shall continue to explore this line of thought in the following chapter as we connect Heidegger's findings in *Sojourns* with that of contemporary art, but first, let us continue to examine the "phenomenal particularization" in relation to the notion of place and dwelling. What follows is a discussion of the sensitivity involved in the affectivity of place and how it relates to the way we encounter world through place.

The Memory of Place

Karsten Harries once told Malpas that "if one is to make *topos* central to the reading of Heidegger then one must also to be prepared to offer a defense, or perhaps a reappropriation, of the idea of nostalgia."[239] As a result, Malpas spends a good deal of his work formulating an an-

[239] *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*, p. 7.

swer to this question, mindful at the same time not to undermine the project of topological analysis at the heart of his own reading of Heidegger. In his reflections on "Philosophy's Nostalgia" in *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*, Malpas ties nostalgia to memory and place, but he argues for a more nuanced position on nostalgia than the one taken to be "characteristic of Heidegger's thinking in general, and to be indicative of the problematic character of that thinking." Malpas' rehabilitation of the term nostalgia is, by proxy, also an attempt to modify the criticism raised against Heidegger's nostalgia. However, only in part successful, Malpas insists on making a rather subtle differentiation, arguing that Heidegger's relation to the past is to be regarded as form of "mythophilia," defined as "a longing not for what is remembered, but for what is known only through its retelling, through story and myth,"[240] rather than the pejorative term "nostalgia." He seizes on a passage in *Sojourns* to illustrate Heidegger's thinking as "mythophilic," rather than nostalgic:

> An early endowment took place, in response to its call, thinking [*Denken*] was to become recollection [*Andenken*] and as such thanksgiving [*Danken*].[241]

Malpas quotes Heidegger from the visit to Delos and the "gift of confirmation" is noticeable in Heidegger's own words, in a play on the linguistic affinity of *Denken*, *Andenken*, *Danken*. Still, Malpas' argument to this point seems somewhat misplaced. No matter how we label this affection, Heidegger's longing for the past does not change. That said – and regardless of the case of Heidegger – Malpas is right in connecting the longing of nostalgia to place and memory. Based in part on his reading of Heidegger's essay, The Principle of Identity, Malpas argues that the question of belonging is ultimately tied to the question of appropriation, and that in order not to end up being stuck in the reactionary position of looking-backwards, the task is to place ourselves in a critical engagement with modernity, one that is directed towards the future. Malpas' argument is directed against the sense of place that Norberg-Schulz promotes in his reading of Heidegger which is, admittedly, essentially reactionary and benign. But it is also an indirect defense against the challenge of the idea of nostalgia put forth by Harries. As mentioned above, Malpas comes to understand Heidegger's event in terms of the layering affectivity of belonging

[240] *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*, p. 169.
[241] GA75, p. 233. *Sojourns*, p. 35.

defined as "*the disclosive happening of belonging.*"[242] Responding to Harries, Malpas wants to indicate the inscription into a larger context of dwelling as *wohnen* in which we as human beings – and mortals – are placed in a dynamics of longing and belonging thereby reappropriating the notion of nostalgia in terms of place and existence.

Throughout the pages in *Sojourns*, Heidegger laments the loss of something that was once there. Something broken and faded, like the "lost things" in the quote by Patti Smith. For Heidegger, the spirit of "proper Greece" has dissolved into a clash of modern and ancient Greece, and the quest of tracing back what was once there brings a backdrop of melancholy, a lamenting tone of nostalgia that rings throughout *Sojourns* as one of two narratives.[243] In some respect, the journey is of course the mad enterprise of Don Quixote. The homecoming to Greece offers but a broken landscape filled with tourists and hotels and reflected in Heidegger's melancholia. Yet the project of *Sojourns* is fueled not by disillusion only, but by Heidegger's own thinking that emerges in the encounter with the ancient Greek artifacts and architecture. It is the sense of meaning and kinship to something like a Greek sensitivity towards the holy which Heidegger seeks in the particularity of place. Like the Greeks before him, Heidegger longs "to praise what is great and by acknowledging it, to bring themselves in front of the sublime [*das Hohe*], founding, in this way, a world."[244] In other words, what Heidegger so adores is the ability to wonder and to come into a relation with the world imbued with meaning and responsibility as a place of dwelling. This is what is lost in our modern world and what Heidegger traces on the journey to Greece. But by identifying this sensitivity that he finds to be lost today, he also opens up the perspective of longing and belonging. For Heidegger, experiencing the architecture of ancient Greece does indeed offer a sense of homecoming and rootedness, a trace of the sensitivity now broken and washed away in the leveling of experience in modern Greece. Still, Heidegger finds at a sense of meaning through dwelling. At the Acropolis, standing before of the Parthenon, he is stricken by exactly the sense of place and the particular. In his own words, "the flown goddess draws invisibly near" and at the same time he is filled with a feeling of presence "akin to that of the supporting rock." The question is how to understand these lines and what sense to

[242] *Heidegger's Topology*, p. 242.
[243] It is the voice associated with the negative project of *Sojourns* and the conditioning veil of the age of technology.
[244] GA75, p. 238; *Sojourns*, p. 44.

make of this presencing of absence. Is Heidegger driven merely by nostalgic impulse or is there also something else at stake? Heidegger's reaction could indeed be read as relating to the sense of place itself. If so, might his impressions not also be due to the affectivity and layered character of the sense of place at work in the encounter with place? There are no definite answers to these issues, insofar as Heidegger never provides them in direct terms. He does, however, report on the visit and on his own sense of nearness in front of the temple and, in this respect, the tension of longing and belonging that resides with nostalgia and the sense of place remains.

Reflecting on the challenge put to Malpas by Harries, the interesting part of the answer lies in acknowledging the affectivity and power of memory and nostalgia as integral to place. In other words, to recognize the subjective quality of memory as a non-disqualifying affective element of place. In this respect, nostalgia does not need to be reactionary. By acknowledging the dimension of pastness implicit in place one can account for the belonging and rootedness of place without the pitfalls of romanticism. But this does not mean Heidegger gets off the hook – despite Malpas' reaccentuation – and in this respect, the criticism of romanticism put to his later writings still stands. What it does mean, however, is that we have to factor in the undercurrents of the past already present in a thinking of place as a quality of the sense of place as an aspect of the subjective experience, but one that is explicitly tied to the particularity of place.

What is meant here becomes clearer when we consider the following two examples. First, a passage from Patti Smith's book, *Devotion*, taken from her travels in Europe. On her way to England, she revisits the city of Paris that was once her home. Strolling the streets of the city as she prepares to move on, she is suddenly hit by a glimpse of the past:

> I take a last walk up the Rue de Seine, or is it down? I don't know, I just walk. There is the odd familiarity that keeps tugging at me. A long-ago sense of things. Yes, I have been on this same path with my sister. I stop and look at the narrow lane of Rue Visconti. I had so thrilled at my first sight of it that I ran the length and jumped in the air. My sister took a picture and in it I see myself, forever frozen in air full of joy. It seems a small miracle to reconnect with all that adrenaline, all that will.

As in the example of Gregorius, Smith travels to revisit places of old. But in contrast to the fictive protagonist in *Night Train to Lisbon*, Smith is able to reunite with the sentiments and feelings of the past. Unlike Gregorius, the act of recollection and reattachment is spontaneous and unforced. The feeling of familiarity and unity jumps on Smith, as a Benjaminian moment of presence or the instantaneous epiphany of the past in the déjà vu of the present. The place opens up an avenue of personal memory and affectivity. For a moment, she is that young again. Reliving and remembering. Frozen in the frame of a photograph. Yet ironically, the memory of place and the sense of place and affectivity seems to speak to the contrary. Or at least, the photograph can be seen as more of a poetic agent than merely an objectifying media that devaluates or levels the experience – as during the visit to Acropolis and in the writings of Sontag. Still, we may also see this as a testimony of exactly the powers of place and memory. In this respect, Smith's story displays the sense of attachment and meaning that Malpas aims at in his theoretical encircling of nostalgia and the disclosure of belonging in place.

Another artist, Bob Dylan, makes a similar point about the presence of pastness as he chronicles flashes of memory of the town in which he grew up.

> I'd seen and heard trains from my earliest childhood days and the sight and sound of them always made me feel secure. The big boxcars, the iron ore cars, freight cars, passenger trains, Pullman cars. There was no place you could go in my home town without at least some part of the day having to stop at intersections and wait for the long trains to pass. Tracks crossed the rural roads and ran alongside them as well. The sound of trains off in the distance more or less made me feel at home, like nothing was missing, like I was at some level place, never in any significant danger and that everything was fitting together.[245]

Trains and photographs. A "long-ago sense of things" and pastness emerge as moments of nostalgia mediating places of old. They are testimony to the affectivity of memory that we encounter in and through place in our everyday lives. At play here is the longing and belonging of place. In this sense, the phenomenal sphere holds a personal dimension of affectivity. As in Benjamin's

[245] Dylan Bob, *Chronicles*, Vol. One, Pocket Books, 2005. p. 31.

Berlin Childhood Around 1900, the memories carry the aura of childhood with its familiar sounds and sensations. Smith and Dylan are both struck by an affective mood or *Stimmung* of re-living the nearness of what once was. Yet these are conflicting sentiments, the ambiguity of memory emerging through things may hold both the sentiment of melancholy of loss and by-gone, but also feelings of joy and excitement. In Dylan's case, the sound of trains would take him back to "some level place" and a sense of security and home. In this respect, it makes sense to understand this in Heideggerian terms of dwelling and belonging. In line with this thinking, our attachment to the pastness of place and memory can be understood through the field of inter-pretation laid out by Heidegger. We may think of these sentiments and our attachment to place through things and in the existential dimensionality of the fourfold in which we dwell – Heidegger's metaphor for world. In this way, we can understand nostalgia – not as a free ticket to romanticism, but as a personal as well as general, human plane of subjectivity and attachment moored in the affectivity of place.

What follows from this is a thinking of subjectivity inextricably bound to the particularity of place. Subjectivity is embedded in place in the sense that it is not some underlying ground or essence independent of our interactions with the world and other human beings. Rather, it is a reflection of "an interplay of elements organized specifically in relation to the concept of agency," as Malpas argues in answer to the challenge put to him by Harries. In the same way, our sense of identity and memory is inevitably tied to particular places. The "long-ago sense of things" that Smith experiences as a nostalgic déjà vu mediates particular places of her own past. In the words of Malpas: "The binding of memory to place, and so to particular places, can be seen as a function of the way in which subjectivity is necessarily embedded in place – in spatial-ized and embodied activity.[246] All of this hinges, I argue, to our attachment to place, that is, to particular places and the way in which we are moored to place through our own experiences and particular lifeworld. These affective sentiments belong to the phenomenal sphere of place and embodiment and may be understood in Heideggerian terms of mood and attunement.

[246] *Place and Experience*, p. 180.

The Atmosphere of Place

Some of Heidegger's best writing in *Being and Time* has to do with the placed character of the human being and our mode of being in the world reflected in the concepts of attunement [*Befindtlichkeit*] and mood [*Stimmung*]. Still, this important avenue is clearly not the primary interest of either Malpas' topology or Casey's study of place, and, as a result, neither one fully explores the notions of attunement and mood in terms of place. It is, however, a key focus to this study and argued here as central to any future thinking of the art of dwelling in line with the perspectives sketched out here, as this study reflects on our sense of place in relation to a reading of *Sojourns* today. What I argue in this section – in contrast to Casey and Malpas – is that *the atmosphere of place* is a central element in understanding the affectivity involved in the sense of place and dwelling examined in this study. The notion of atmosphere is a focus anticipated in Heidegger's thinking on attunement and mood, but that still lacks the proper tying into a thinking of dwelling suggested here.

The concept of atmosphere was first introduced by Hermann Schmitz and later expanded by Gernot Böhme and Tonino Griffero, respectively. In what Böhme names a new aesthetics, he presents the hybrid notion of the atmosphere to bring together the subjective side of experience and the objective side of materiality in our encounter with place. Atmospheres are spatial, affective forces that are perceived and experienced bodily in our interaction with things and people and yet they are themselves "spheres of the presence of something"[247] as part of the material environment. It is the prototypical "between" phenomenon. The architect Peter Zumthor has explained the concept of atmosphere by the sensation that emerges when entering a room, pointing to the instantaneous, pre-reflective character of the atmosphere as felt experience and giving rise to the realm of affectivity. Böhme emphasizes the meteorological origin of the term from the study of air and climate and implies a shift away from the domain of judgment as a human faculty to that of sensory perception and how something is present to us. Atmospheres involve the apprehension of all the senses and this multisensory aspect reflects the original sense of *aisthésis* in ancient Greek, as "of the senses." Böhme makes the distinction between atmosphere and "the atmospheric" to emphasize the ontological status of atmospheres and fend off the challenge of

[247] Böhme, Gernot. "Atmosphere as the Fundamental Concept of a New Aesthetics."a *Thesis Eleven*. Number 36, 1993 , pp. 121-122.

subjectivism.[248] Accordingly, Böhme can declare that "atmospheres are quasi-objective or something existent intersubjectively."[249]

The concept of atmosphere resonates with the German tradition through the contributions of Schmitz and Böhme, whereas the French equivalent is the concept of ambience. I understand the idea of ambience as more of a background phenomenon whereas atmosphere has to do with an encounter in the form of the placed, spheric character of how we inhabit and relate to the world. Still, I want to combine the tradition of the discourse of atmospheres and the French ambience with Heidegger's notion of mood and attunement by reading these concepts as related and to some extend overlapping. In doing this, I follow the works of Alberto Gómez-Péres and Jean-Paul Thibaud, respectively. Both have independently argued for the synonymity of atmosphere and ambience and both have argued for the continued relevance and heritage of the notion of *Stimmung* – as surveyed by David Wellbury[250] – and the importance of Heidegger's understanding of mood and attunement.

How we are and how we resonate with the world are interrelated with how we sense and make sense of the world. For Heidegger, attunement is the ontological underpinning of our being-in-the-world reflected in the mundane nature of our moods. This is also why moods, for Heidegger, are more than just subjective feelings; rather, they also reflect the sensitivity and receptivity of being "tuned." A mood can be overwhelming because it relates to how we are in the world. Moreover, in Heidegger's view, that which affects and overwhelms us can do so exactly because it matters to us. Heidegger writes: "In attunement lies existentially a disclosive submission to world out of which things that matter to us can be encountered."[251] In other words, for Heidegger mood and attunement has to do what that which matters. Emerging here is the existential dimension of the analysis, linking the sensitivity of mood – unpacked in this study in terms

[248] Böhme, Gernot. *The Aesthetics of Atmospheres*. Edited by Jean-Paul Thibaud. Routledge, 2017, p. 2.
[249] According to the distinction, "the atmospheric" exists independently of our subjective experience of the atmosphere, in contrast to the atmosphere. It is however a somewhat forced distinction. While I agree with Böhme that atmospheres are indeed quasi-objective in that they exist independently of us experience, I find the distinction of "atmospheres" and "the atmospheric" to be somewhat problematic and counterintuitive in that it de facto hijacks the term of "the atmospheric." As a consequence, I do not distinguish between atmospheres and the atmospheric qualities in what follows. For the same reason I also refer to the atmosphere of place in terms of "the atmospheric qualities" of place.
[250] David Wellbury, "Stimmung" in *New Formations*, 2017, p 6.
[251] *Being and Time*, p. 134.

of sense of place and the "disclosive belonging of the event" – with the particularity of this encounter and its reflection on our very existence and worldhood. It seems, the very "*Da*" in *Dasein* is on the line here in the intertwining of attunement and the overwhelming character of a mood: "Attunement is an existential, fundamental way in which *Dasein* is its own "there" [*das Dasein sein Da ist*]."[252] Heidegger's thinking here calls attention to the authenticity and existential dimensionality of our being in the world that resonates with his later thinking on dwelling and place.[253] In this way, Heidegger basically provides the prefiguration to inform any further thinking about being attuned or "touched" by the world. These perspectives on attunement and being tuned also read well with the sense of place and the sensitivity presented here in connection to the findings of the chapters on sculpture and the art of dwelling, reflecting the overall lines of development in the exploration of dwelling presented in this study. I shall return to this aspect in more detail in the final discussion of the role of atmosphere. As we leave behind the formal territory of *Being and Time* and the terminology of "facticity" and "thrownness," the thinking of mood, attunement, and being attuned remain relevant in Heidegger's later thinking as in the present study and the pervading atmosphere of place. Leo Spitzer provided an early indication of the somewhat overlapping terminology here referenced. The concepts of *Stimmung*, ambience, and atmosphere all come together in his essay, "Milieu and Ambiance: An Essay in Historical Semantics."[254]

Atmosphere comes from the Greek roots *atmos* [ἀτμός], meaning steam or vapor, and from *sphaira* [σφαϊρα], meaning sphere or globe. What makes the concept of atmosphere so interesting is that it combines spatiality and affectivity. Atmospheres connect where we are with how we are – how we feel. In doing so, they reflect the place we are by opening up a range of sensitivity. As humans, we are attached to place and to the world through place. We are always in place. Moored. How we are in the world refers to our attunement [*Befindlichkeit*]. Atmospheres can be said to share this linkage between spatiality and affectivity, between where and

[252] Ibid, p. 139.
[253] The connection was established in chapter 1 of the concept of dwelling as *verweilen* in Heidegger's reference to "tranquil lingering" in the same passage (§29).
[254] Spitzer, Leo. "Milieu and Ambience: An Essay in Historical Semantics" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol 3, No. 1, 1942, pp 1-42. Among other things, Spitzer demonstrates the kinship of place and environment (in German *Umwelt*; in Italian *ambiente*; in French *Milieu* – or "(*mi*)*lieu*"). The obvious reference is Aristotle's understanding of space as place, i.e. the idea of place is a container illustrated by the image of the vase – and by association "the skin of a fruit"). Spitzer also accentuates the particularity of place in line with Aristotle.

how. But while the attunement reflects our basic sense of being in the world, mood [*Stimmung*] reflects the feelings that we experience and that overcome us, sometimes instantaneously. In his study of affective atmospheres, Ben Anderson examines the emergent and affective character of atmospheres in that they – like moods – may overwhelm us in sudden epiphany. This emphasis on affectivity echoes Hermann Schmitz' notion of "*affektives Betroffensein*,"[255] i.e., the affective impact of the atmosphere that takes place in the encounter, reflecting the immediacy and direct character of affectivity. In another take on affectivity, Sarah Ahmed has pointed out the dynamics inscribed in such pre-reflective encounters as inseparable from the attuned body. Atmospheres are ephemeral and, like moods, may changes over time and among humans. Atmospheres are spatial in that they are tied to the particularity of place. An illustration of this point is Norberg-Schulz' claim of the residing spirit of place – the *genius loci*. The architect Juhani Pallasmaa writes the following on atmosphere:

> Atmosphere is a kind of a virtual, experiential and multi-sensory place, which usually has shapeless, indefinable and ephemeral boundaries, and experiential qualities. An atmosphere can also have a dynamically changing characteristics and varying durations such as weather, natural illumination, or musical atmospheres. Atmospheres could thus be regarded as limit cases of 'placeness', or as 'quasi-places'[…] Atmosphere defines a specific location or place with distinct experiential qualities and emotive suggestions.[256]

Atmospheres have to do with the concreteness of place. As they reflect where we are and how we are, they also reflect our affectivity and our sensitivity to the world. Atmospheres are, however, not a given, as two people may have completely different experiences of the atmosphere of a place[257]. Yet it is important to emphasize that atmospheres are not simply projections of subjectivity upon reality. Atmospheres are objective in the sense that they are shared and place-bound, in that they reflect the spatiality and materiality of the place we are, and insofar as they

[255] Hermann Schmitz, *Kurze Einführung in die Neue Phänomenologie*, p 30.
[256] Juhani Pallasmaa. "Place and Atmosphere," in *The Intelligence of Place.* Edited by Jeff Malpas, Bloomsbury, 2015, p. 132.
[257] Trigg, 2020, The Role of Atmosphere in shared emotion. Emotion, Space, Society, no. 35. 2020, p. 4.
Trigg, in reference of Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, argues that atmospheres can be both be shared and divisive.

exist independently or "outside" of the person sensing them. According to Böhme, an atmosphere "proceeds from and is created by things, persons or their constellations."[258] And yet atmospheres are also subjective, in that they reflect or affect our subjectivity and affectivity. Following this reasoning, Böhme finds atmospheres to have a quasi-objective status, an assessment echoed by Pallasmaa in the above quote. But atmospheres may also be experienced differently depending on personal situatedness. Acknowledging the bias and complexity of the encounter, Sarah Ahmed has questioned the extent of the shared quality of atmosphere by emphasizing the subjective character of a mood and the particularity of the body.[259] Albeit, atmospheres exist in the spatiality of the world, and yet also relate to the affectivity and emotional realm of subjectivity. Things and places affect us. They have affordance as they affect us through materiality, spatiality, or memory. What I argue is that we are always already in place and within an atmosphere. There are no places without atmosphere and only in the conceptual thinking of place are we able to talk about place without the qualities of a particular place. For better or worse, atmospheres reflect the affective character of our sense of place and being in the world – our thrownness and sensitivity. As humans, we touch the world and the world touches us.

I return to the concept of the atmosphere over the next chapters in the discussion of Heidegger's thinking on sculpture and, again, in the final reflections on the art of dwelling, as I point out the centrality of the concept of atmosphere to a contemporary thinking of dwelling. For now, it is important to note the affordance and affectivity reflected in the atmosphere of place that come together in the phenomenal sphere.[260] The affective dimension of atmosphere also reads well with a sensitivity in the form of a basic mood [*Grundstimmung*] that can be detected emerging in Heidegger's thinking in his commentary on Hölderlin, as well as in various other texts throughout the authorship.[261] I thus come to understand the affective dimension and emo-

[258] "Atmosphere as the Fundamental Concept of a New Aesthetics," p. 122.
[259] Sarah Ahmed, "Killing Joy: Feminism and the History of Happiness," in *Signs*, Vol. 35, 2010, p. 574.
[260] The concept of affordance was first introduced by James Gibson and has become an influential but vague notion often used in architectural theory. In its widest sense, affordance is as a form of exterior conditioning or material influence causing a demand or sense of enactment through the environing space or materiality.
Gibson J. *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*. Boston, 1979.
[261] As pointed out in the discussion of releasement, Bret W. Davis argues for the concept of *Gelassenheit* as exactly a basic mood [*Grundstimmung*]. The same can be argue for the notion of anxiety in *Being and Time* (promoted by Reginald Lilly) and later in the explication of boredom [*Langeweile*] in the *Basic Concepts of Metaphysics* and, not least, as the basic mood [*Grundstimmung*] and sensivity of the ancient Greeks as the awe and wonder [*Staunen*] in

tional attunement of place in terms of atmosphere. In doing so, I follow the lead of Ben Anderson who pursues "a phenomenology attentive to singular affective qualities […] by invoking a material imagination based on the movement and lightness of air."[262] What Heidegger seems to be missing is the role of the lived body and sense of place that come together in a comprehensive sense of place in its particularity. Suggested here is that the intertwining of body and place in the synaesthetic perception of the phenomenal sphere is reflected in the concept of atmosphere. We are reminded by Alberto Pérez-Gómez that atmospheres are given to us as a whole, as one multisensory encounter of place.[263] Again, we will return to this later, but, for now, these preliminary comments on atmosphere call attention to sensitivity and the experiential dimension in a comprehensive notion of place. It is this sense of place that comes to the fore in Heidegger's journey to Greece, to which we will now turn.

relation to the divine, explored by Heidegger in the commentary on Hölderin. In what follows, I take these as pointers for a contemporary thinking of dwelling and sense of place as argued in chapter 6.

[262] Anderson, Ben. "Affective Atmospheres." *Emotion, Space and Society*. No. 2, 2009, p. 77.

[263] Pérez-Gómez, Alberto. *Attunement*. MIT Press, 2016, pp. 17-18.

CHAPTER FOUR: A SENSE OF GREECE

> Athene now appeared, disguised as a young shepherd, with all the delicate beauty that marks the sons of kings. A handsome cloak was folded back across her shoulders, she had sandals on her glistering feet and she carried a javelin in her hand. She was a welcome sight for Odysseus, who came forward at once and spoke winged words.
>
> Homer, *The Odyssey*

> It is not down in any map; true places never are.
>
> Herman Melville, *Moby Dick*

Home and Homelessness

During the course of the journey to Greece, Heidegger visits a number of places, many of them landmarks of Greek history like the Acropolis in Athens. But for the longest time, he finds the visits to be unsuccessful. Heidegger is looking for "a gift of consecration" [*Weihegabe*].[264] The German term *weihen* means to consecrate and indicates the demarcation of a holy place, ritual, or time. We know the word from *Weihnachten*, Christmas, but a temple or a graveyard are also consecrated grounds.[265] It refers to that which is holy and thus inscribes a religious demarcation or field of interpretation. Here, in *Sojourns,* the consecrated is inscribed in the Greek landscape and architecture of the ancient world. When Heidegger sometimes refers to this time in history as a first sojourn it has to do with how the Greeks were able to receive the world as holy – because they could dwell or stay with things in such a way that they would experience certain places as holy, creating a communal sense of belonging and rootedness. This is exactly what Heidegger finds missing in our world, and why he thinks sensing a lost "consecration" is so central to the

[264] GA75, p. 223. *Sojourns*, p. 17.
[265] The German *weihen* has also passed into Danish in the word "vie" (to marry) and "vievand" (holy water).

experience of the particular places he visits. But time again, Heidegger's thoughts give over to increasing doubts: "Where should we look for this proper character? Every visit to every place of its dwelling, work, and feast renders us more perplexed,"[266] Heidegger writes in a voice of drama. What worries him is not the practicalities of traveling, but a hinderance of a different kind, that is, the veil of modernity. Onboard the cruise ship, Heidegger finds himself giving way to his worries:

> Thoughts were given over to the question of whether and how it would be possible for yet another sojourn to be granted to us, a sojourn [*Aufenthalt*] for which the grand and congenial forces of creating and acting out of the unscathed invisible will be preserved. Or, whether the technological world of science and industry would not, quickly and surely, manufacture growing possibilities, which have the consequence that the modern man feels everywhere at home? [*der modernen Mensch sich überall zuhause fühlt*] [267]

Emerging here is the question of home and homelessness and with it, indirectly, the question of place and belonging. The discussion of homelessness in modernity maps onto the loss of the holy as different aspects of the same thing. Underpinning these reflections is the idea that our modern homelessness is due to the fact that we do not know how to receive the holy. The gift of consecration that Heidegger pursues in the traces of the Greek world is precisely what he believes is missing in our current epoch, which means that "only a god can save us." The issue is central to this study and propels us directly into a discussion of dwelling and sense of place in the following chapters. We already noted that dwelling as *wohnen* has to do with being at home in the world, with the way positionality, according to Heidegger, changes the way in which we live and relate to the world today. Heidegger's underlying argument is that home is somehow primary to our attachment to the world. As humans we share a primordial affinity with the world, a sense of home through dwelling as *wohnen*. It is the longing for a *place* of sanctuary and shelter, that is, the longing for a *place* to dwell. Home is where we dwell; and to dwell, in the sense of *wohnen*, is to be at home. Heidegger wants us to understand this in existential terms: not to be at home in

[266] GA75, p. 226. *Sojourns*, p. 22.
[267] GA75, p. 234; *Sojourns*, p. 36-37.

the world is alienating and uncanny, *unheimlich* – literally, that which is not of home or unhomely. Implied here is the void and meaninglessness of not being at home, of not belonging and not being nested in the world. Home becomes a metaphor for the sense of belonging and authenticity in our being in the world. And conversely, the theme of homelessness and rootlessness is a metaphor of not being at home. It is the sense of not belonging, not being rooted, a sense of being uprooted. It is the drifting restlessness of not belonging and the inauthenticity of not dwelling.

For Heidegger, the theme of home and homelessness is tied to a lack of holiness and authenticity in modernity. He casts the tension in terms of the history of being and our epochal removal from the Greek sojourn.[268] Heidegger sometimes refers to this decline in terms of "the fall" – purportedly a fall from a state of grace or authentic immediacy with being. The idea is that – like Adam – we have fallen and now find ourselves – unlike the Greeks – irreversibly removed from this first beginning. This current state of fallenness is for Heidegger implied in the discussion of modern homelessness, and the search for an authentic *Aufenthalt* that we are denied in our technological modernity. For Heidegger, the world of the Greeks constitutes the exemplary first beginning – the first sojourn – precisely because they knew how to dwell. But while they were at home in the world, we are not. This is the modern predicament. We are homeless, longing for "yet another sojourn to be granted us."[269]

The quote above specifically addresses homelessness and the current age of technology. As it is, technology is the reason why we lack the holy and why we are, in this sense, homeless. According to Heidegger, "the technological world of science and industry" creates a life of "growing possibilities, which has the consequence that the modern man feels everywhere at home." This is an illustration of the modern predicament as Heidegger identifies it: we live in a world in which we are no longer at home because we feel at home everywhere. We are driven

[268] Heidegger plays on the etymological affinity of the German words Geschichte (history) and *Geschick* (destiny) in connection to the subtle distinction in German between *Historie* and *Geschichte* where the former refers to historiography and the latter to the history as something destined. This is why Heidegger can say that "*Über der Historie steht die Geschichte. In der Geschichte waltet das Geschick*." (GA75, p. 218) In Manoussakis' translation this reads: "History precedes historiography. It is destiny that rules in history." (*Sojourns*, p. 6).

[269] Heidegger often phases this point in religious language as "a second coming," that is, the awaited restart and reenchantment of the world of which we have so sorely lost touch of in our destitute age. Implied here is the underlying tension of home and homelessness understood existentially as the rootlessness and restlessness of modernity. It is the inauthenticity of not dwelling and to feeling at home, the sense of being out of place.

on, weightless, and homeless. Implied here is a critique of modern life and our superficial sense of home and belonging. How we build, think, live, and relate is characteristic of a fundamental detachment from being, namely the removal from any deeper sense of being. Heidegger sometimes refers to this loss as the oblivion of being [*Seinsvergessenheit*].[270] But how does this homelessness manifest itself in the 21st century? One way to put this into context is to think of the way we live and organize ourselves in the world today. Heidegger already reminds us that not every building is a dwelling, and that there are no guarantees that dwelling will occur. We only need to think of the vast proliferation of western suburbia or the rise of the economic middle class to illustrate this point. "Railway stations and highways, dams and market halls are built, and they are not dwelling places," Heidegger writes.[271] The expansion of strip malls, franchise stores, and drive-thru restaurants all speak to a global convergence in convenience and sameness all around. Late capitalism has reproduced our predominant way of living without end, as suburbia and greater metropolitan areas weave seamlessly together. In that respect, the urban planning that started as a symbol of modernism still haunts us. It is the modern equivalent of the desert-like feeling of not being at home – of being at home everywhere and thus nowhere. If we look to the US, for instance, the mobility and recognizability so engrained in society is testimony of exactly this. Residents can relocate anywhere in the country and feel at home because the strip malls, franchise stores, and drive-thrus are the same. Suburbia is everywhere, extended beyond end, so that wherever we go or settle down, we recognize and demand the same level of comfort and living.

The accessibility of the internet has in some ways changed the way we live and interact. Travelling between countries and continents now comes with an expectation of being online. As a symbol of uniformity and access, the demands and services covered by Amazon has become a global phenomenon. But for all its seeming benefits, a homogeneous world is also at risk of forgetting and neglecting the diversity of the particular, as we forget how to dwell when home is nowhere and everywhere.

[270] "The forgetting of being" is Heidegger's most basic philosophical concern, a diagnosis argued in various forms throughout his thinking – from "the question of being" [*die Frage nach dem Sein*] and the examination of the basic ontological structures of human life in *Being and Time* to the critique of the modern technological age in the writings on technology. The question of being is a defining thread throughout Heidegger's work.
[271] GA7, p. 147. *Poetry, Language, Thought*, pp. 143-144 .

This leveling homogeneity is of course a critique of modernity. As such, it has been raised and rearticulated by a long line of human geographers, architects, literates, and thinkers over the past decades. Representative of this thinking, architect Norberg-Schulz would lament the "loss of place" because "the character of the present-day environment is usually distinguished by monotony." In reference to the alienating deserts of modern urban planning, Norberg-Schulz claims that "modern buildings exist in a "nowhere," echoing the homelessness raised by Heidegger and raising the question of place. Human geographer, Edward Relph raises as similar point in his book, *Place and Placelessness*. With clear reference to Heidegger, Relph is concerned that modern landscapes are becoming increasingly "placeless," in that our existential rootedness fades away as detected in our supposedly inauthentic relation to place and modern landscape. Instead, we purportedly find ourselves having "no sense of place," which implies "no awareness of the deep and symbolic significances of places and no appreciation of their identities."[272] In this respect, Relph detects the same leveling indifference and numbness that was disclosed in the analysis of technology, but Relph also forebodes Marc Augé's postmodern notion of the non-place. In "Modernity and the Reclamation of Place," Relph argues that place is not to be dismissed as a romantic anachronism. In fact, it is an integral part of social well-being. For Relph, an awareness of the dynamics - and politics - of sense of place thus takes on a central role in a thinking of human geography and well-being. For Harries, the same attention to the built environment in a contemporary context leads to a similar emphasis on sense of place and dwelling, albeit through the lens of art and architecture. The main concern addressed in "Thoughts on a Non-Arbitrary Architecture" is what Harries sees as the inhuman indifference of modern architecture, echoing the motif of disenchantment and leveling raised here in chapter 1.

Some of these observations on modernity and urban planning grow old fast and reservations should be made against falling into the caricature of dystopia. Nevertheless, there remains a universal sameness to how we choose to live as constant commuters, balancing work-life priorities, online personas, and time management efficiency in the swirl and comfort of the everyday. We live in a technologically permeated lifeworld eerily replicated by the person living next door

[272] *Place and Placelessness*, p. 82.

– as well as by the person thrown into the same technological circumstances living on the other side of the globe.[273]

From a Heideggerian viewpoint, the domestication of modern life can be said to reflect the universal grip of positionality [*Gestell*], i.e., Heidegger's term for the way being is revealed in our age of technology as "challenging revealing." It is the instrumentalist drive towards optimization characterized by a calculative thinking of resource and replaceability, as reflected in the commodification of the standing reserve [*Bestand*] that fuels modern consumerism. The problem raised in *Sojourns* is that "home" has somehow been erased by modern technology, eroded by "the force and artificiality of the ramifications and positionality." Directly following the quote on modern homelessness, Heidegger gives more thought to this discussion. He is well aware that if it is true that we moderns are authentically everywhere at home, his own objection of homelessness "would have been proven a lie, branding it as the escape of an empty romanticism."[274] But for Heidegger, when the discussion of home and homelessness takes place only within the context of technological modernity, it becomes a pseudo-discussion. The discussion then rests on the false premise of "groundless home-ness." In his rejection of this line of argumentation, Heidegger objects that such "groundless home-ness, secured only be means of technology and industry, abandons every claim to a home." As it is, not even "the desert-like expansion of traveling" will bring any sense of fulfilment to us moderns, he argues. The very "concept of 'content' [*Sichbegnügen*] would have to be cancelled out by the supply of an always-increasingly demand for new things."[275]

There is some truth to all of these observations and, as such, the idea of homelessness informed by a criticism of modernity remains relevant as a longing for and lack of any sense of resonance with the world. But perhaps a better way of understanding the sense of belonging and attachment to place at stake here, which is featured prominently throughout *Sojourns*, is to begin the thinking of place and belonging as still holding power over us today.

[273] Still we remain strangely removed from the hardship taking place all around the globe such as the brutal reality of the refugee crisis unfolding in and around the Mediterranean borders. All this presents a cruel reminder of a very concrete sense of homelessness and lack of dwelling that still exists in a world of inequality. Home and homelessness is also a matter of privilege and politics.
[274] GA75, p. 234; *Sojourns*, p. 37 ff.
[275] GA75, pp. 234-235; *Sojourns*, p. 37.

A Case for Place

In December 2017, the Trump administration announced the reduction of the Bears Ears National Monument in Utah, USA by 85 percent, amounting to the biggest elimination of public lands protection in US history.[276] The rollback immediately sparked political controversy, as it was widely regarded as an opportunistic political maneuver to uproot the existing environmental protection policy in order to benefit big corporate developers and the oil and gas industry. But far beyond the realm of politics, the reduction to Bears Ears raises the philosophical question of dwelling and our attachment to the world. As such, the case of Bears Ears serves to illustrate exactly what is at stake in *Sojourns*, i.e., the importance of place.

Before the Trump administration initiative, The Bears Ears National Monument was a protected area of 1.35 million acres of federally owned land, spanning four separate federal states, and giving home to 15.000 residents.[277] The region had received its protection status because of its unique cultural record and landscape, such as the famous Valley of the Gods, and numerous other ceremonial sites considered "profoundly sacred to many native American tribes, including the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, Navajo Nation, Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah Ouray, Hopi Nation, and Zuni Tribe."[278] The original proclamation establishing the Bears Ears National Monument states that "for thousands of years, humans have occupied and stewarded this land" and that "these tribes and their members come here for ceremonies and to visit sacred sites…closely tied to native stories of creation, danger, protection, and healing. The towering spires in the Valley of the Gods are sacred to the Navajo, representing ancient Navajo warriors frozen in stone."[279]

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[276] The White House Proclamation; "Modifying the Bears Ears National Monument"; Office of the Press Secretary; 4/12/2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-modifying-bears-ears-national-monument (accessed 7/7/2020)

[277] Washington Post; "Trump Reductions to Bears Ears National Monument: What Remains"; 12/4/2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/bears-ears (accessed 20/5/2019).
The Guardian; "Trump slashes size of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase national monuments in Utah"; 5/12/2017. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/04/trump-bears-ears-grand-staircase-escalante-monuments-shrink (accessed 19/12/2019)

[278] The White House Proclamation; "Establishment of the Bears Ears National Monument": Office of the Press Secretary; 28/12/2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/28/proclamation-establishment-bears-ears-national-monument (accessed 7/7/2020), ff.

[279] Ibid.

Valley of the Gods, Bears Ears © Wikimedia Commons

The case of Bears Ears raises the question of how we relate to place. It reflects two separate issues, each pertaining to dwelling. First, it is the case of economic interest versus concern for the environment and cultural heritage, that is, the story of capitalism and corporate interest overruling cultural and environmental considerations. In this case, it is in order to gain new territory for uranium mining companies and the fracking industry to expand. In this respect, the example reflects the underlying tension between human agency and the ecosphere that characterizes the age of the Anthropocene, as discussed in the previous chapter. But perhaps more profoundly, the reduction of the Bears Ears National Monument displays two fundamentally different attitudes or modes of being in the world in relation to place. One the one hand, it documents the leveling drive of industrial technology and a reductionist view upon nature as a resource available and in stock only to be used – and used up – with little or no regard to existing cultures or traditions of value and worship. Opposed to this, it reflects the attachment to place, that is, it reflects a non-neutral, caring attitude of being in the world inscribed in a system of value and tradition. When the native people come to ceremonial places such as the Valley of the Gods, they do so because the place matters to them. The Valley of the Gods is a sacred place in the sense of *weihen* discussed above. In other words, it is significant and of intrinsic value. As a result, the sacred place of the Navajo somehow opposes the leveling thinking of economic interest of an instrumentalist

paradigm. The particular place represents a primordial relation to the world and, as such, cannot be subject to a reductionist account of reality and place as mere resource or site. This is why the controversy of Bears Ears is also important to the study of *Sojourns*. At the heart of the controversy are places of worship that are considered sacred by the native tribes. The story of Bears Ears calls into question the status and meaning of place and by doing so, it serves as an illustration of the fundamental tension that runs through *Sojourns*. Heidegger introduces this schism in terms of dwelling and a "gift of consecration" as opposed to the insensitivity of our modern mindset. At stake here is the tension between a sensitivity towards the holy and towards ancient sacred grounds, as opposed to the leveling indifference of modern Greece in the form of hotels and mass tourism as a motif throughout in Heidegger's account. The question of place goes to the center of *Sojourns* as reflected in this chapter and Heidegger's visit to Olympia and Delos.

As for the case of Bears Ears, the problem lies in how we relate to place. For the Trump administration, Bears Ears and the Valley of the gods represents nothing more than the potential for political and economic gain. But for the native tribes that have inhabited the area for hundreds of generations, the place is sacred – consecrated. The same tension of how to relate to place emerges as a major theme in *Sojourns*, and in the discussion of place and experience in this study, for it raises the following question: *What are the implications of place?* The simplest answer to this question – given the examples of Bears Ears and Heidegger's unsatisfactory start to the Greek journey – is to say that place matters. For all its banality, it is nonetheless a useful, preliminary definition of place. Place has to do with a sense of belonging and rootedness, a sense of meaning that counters the restlessness and indifference on display in the analysis of the conditioning pretext of technology. Moreover, place has to do with something concrete, something particular and experiential. When Heidegger leaves the Acropolis with a sense of frustration and disruption, it is because place matters. Depending on one's identity and history, we may have vastly different approaches to particular places, but as a common denominator, place matters. In one view, Bears Ears is an object of political trade and a means to economic gain. But in another, the very same area holds the meaning and significance of that which is sacred and poetic in the world. It reflects the difference between two mutually opposing ways of experiencing and relating to the world. It is the difference of dwelling or not dwelling.

We are now in a position to more adequately address the sense of place in *Sojourns*. Heidegger's account of place in his other writings establishes the centrality of a conceptual notion of place that remains a lasting theme in his later thought. The previous chapter examined the ontological significance of place in Heidegger's thinking, but also argued that this approach does not offer a full perspective on place. However, this only makes Heidegger's journey to Greece all the more interesting. In *Sojourns*, the question of place is catapulted to the foreground. The question of place becomes evident if we consider Heidegger's accounts of two Greek temples.

The Greek Temple

One of the most iconic "places" discussed in Heidegger's earlier authorship is the site of the ancient Greek temple at Paestum in southern Italy. In "The Origin of the Work of Art" from 1935, the analysis of this temple site is a brilliant exposition of Heidegger's thought on the way artworks work. The ancient temple is an emblematic work of art that sets up the world of the ancient Greeks and manifests what he will later call the epoch of "the Greek sojourn" [*Aufenthalt*]. Heidegger thinks of the temple as exactly that, the manifestation of the world of the Greeks. So much of Heidegger's later thinking is anticipated in this important essay: it discusses the elemental interplay of earth (as *fysis*) and world that takes place in the work of art; the disclosive character of the "happening of truth" implied in the Greek notion of *aletheia* as a "coming out of concealment"; the opening up and "worlding of the world" as the field of referentiality; the withering and withdrawal of that same world over the course of the history of being; the poetic function of art and language as a way of revealing being – to name a few aspects of Heidegger's later writings already present in the essay on art. Anticipated also is the theme of dwelling in a place. Heidegger even ends the essay with a lyrical passage that brings together the primordial proximity [*nahe*] of dwelling [*wohnen*] in place [*Ort*].[280] In addition to this, the interplay of the fourfold is anticipated in the earlier two-fold structure of earth and world. That said, the introduction of the fourfold and the coining of the notion of the thing alongside the writings on technology in the Bremen lecture cycle also marks a new development and emphasis in Heidegger's thinking about dwelling. It is in these later texts that place comes to the fore.

[280] GA5, p. 66. *Poetry, Language, Thought*, p. 76.

While "The Origin of the Work of Art" anticipates Heidegger's philosophical account of "place," his discussion there lacks the dimension of the experience of place. He offers reflections on a Greek temple in Paestum, Italy, which he has never visited. This text reveals how he imagines an ancient Greek temple once worked. In fact, there are no less than three temples in Paestum, and Heidegger's account makes it unclear which temple he is thinking of, if he is indeed thinking of any particular temple at all.[281] The account of the ancient Greek temple in "The Origin of the Work of Art" is of course a theoretical reflection on artworks and the establishment of worlds. It lacks reflection on the experiential place. At the time of the essay, Heidegger has yet to place himself in the Greek landscape and to experience the ancient places of worship. Without this element of experience, the temple becomes a type. Strictly speaking, the "place" of the temple is not a particular place, or at least it is not clearly identified. There is no "there." Despite its reference to Paestum, it is not a particular temple, but an abstraction, an emblem of a Greek temple constructed for the sake of philosophical argument.

This does not undermine Heidegger's essay, however. But the focus of this investigation is a more comprehensive account of place that includes the sensitivity towards the particular place. Therein lies the significance of *Sojourns*. As we continue the investigation of *Sojourns* with the experiential dimension of place in mind, in order to supplement Heidegger's more conceptual thinking, what emerges is the ostensive point of the particularity of place – a prosaic reminder that place is there to be sensed. Why travel to Greece if not to place oneself in the Greek landscape to examine and experience to the fullest extent the actual places of life and worship, if not to get a sense of the depth and character of what is otherwise merely conceived in thought? In other words, why go to Greece, if not for the sake of place? And why embark of reflections on place and experience if not under the premise that place does something to us, i.e., that it matters? To follow through on these questions, let us consider Heidegger's sense of place in *Sojourns*, as he encounters the temple of Poseidon, echoing his past notions in the essay on art.

The Temple of Poseidon

In 1935, when Heidegger first delivered "The Origin of the Work of Art" as a lecture to the Kunstwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft in Freiburg, he is still decades from making his first ever journey to Greece. Almost 30 years after standing in the lecture hall in Freiburg, Heidegger finally

[281] Harries, K. *Art Matters*, 100.

finds himself face to face with the Greek landscape and the temples of worship. One of these is the temple of Poseidon, at Cape Sounion.

Having spent the day in Athens, which included the curious visit to the Acropolis, Heidegger drives by car down the coast to the southern tip of Attica to Cape Sounion. Here, on top of the cliffs that overlook the Aegean Sea,[282] the temple of Poseidon once stood as a site of worship of the Olympian god of the ocean. Heidegger finds the almost perfect depiction of the exemplary "Greek" temple he had lectured on decades earlier. Now, at Cape Sounion, the nexus of earth, sky, mortals and divinities all come together in this place in the Greek landscape – as Heidegger chronicles the visit. While he makes no clear reference to the success or value of this particular visit, it is clear from reading his reflections and the description of the temple, as it emerges out of the Greek landscape at the end of the long drive, that he is not been let down: "The way the bare rock of the cape lifts the Temple towards the sky over the sea, serving as a signal for the ships."[283] Reflections like these echo the two-fold of earth and world in "The Origin of the Work of Art," and the account shares a noticeable resemblance with the earlier descriptions of the "Greek temple." In many ways, the temple of Poseidon from *Sojourns* epitomizes the Greek temple from "The Origin of the Work of Art" and the striking resemblance between the two temples runs through Heidegger's entry on the visit. Heidegger casts the visit as an imaginary déjà vu and a sense of excitement runs through the text. The question remains, of course, to what degree Heidegger's account is made to fit the imagination of the already preconceived notion of what to expect or encounter. Heidegger has his own suspicions of just this sort of thinking. However, such mechanisms of the mind are notoriously difficult to rule out or falsify, which presents a concrete quandary and a general reservation to be raised against the account as genre. That said, the geography and landscape of Cape Sounion and the temple of Poseidon does indeed justify the comparison. It shares remarkable resemblance to the earlier account in support of the description in *Sojourns*. Still, underneath Heidegger's excitement and imagined déjà vu lies also the tension between the temple as type and the temple as token, that is to say, between an ideal of a "Greek" temple, possibly modelled over a particular Hellenistic temple in

[282] The Aegean Sea is named after the myth of King Aegeus who threw himself to his death, in some accounts from the cliffs of Cape Sounion, upon the return of his son, the hero Theseus, because the king mistakenly thought Theseus' quest to kill the Minotaur had failed.
[283] GA75, p. 238. *Sojourns*, p. 43.

Italy but lifted into theory and thought in the essay on art, and on the other hand the actual encounter with the concrete, the particular temple of Poseidon in *Sojourns*. What comes to the fore in *Sojourns* is the question of place.

The attention to place can also be seen in the lines of development that Heidegger's conceptual thinking undergoes from "The Origin of the Work of Art" to *Sojourns*. By the time of the journey to Greece, the two-fold of earth and world is no longer the axis by which Heidegger explains his thinking. What lures in the text is the field of the fourfold and, with that, the orientation towards place. Heidegger explicitly mentions the sky and comments on "the invisible nearness of the divine" in contrast to human work. Evident is the fourfold structure of earth, sky, mortals, and divinities. In this respect, *Sojourns* is indicative of the shift in Heidegger's thinking from the earlier two-fold structure of earth and world in the 1930s to the later fourfold structure spanning Heidegger's later writings from 1949 and onwards.

In terms of this development, what changes is the notion of world. As noted by Mitchell, Heidegger's understanding of "world" changes from a concept defined in opposition to the elemental earth to the intelligible quadrant of the fourfold. One way of understanding Heidegger's notion of world in this later period is to see it as the field of referentiality and meaning that emerges in the existential dimensionality of the fourfold. The fourfold is the world as it is revealed in things and through place. This relation can be illustrated through Heidegger's own descriptions in *Sojourns*. During the visit at the temple of Poseidon at Cape Sounion, for instance, it is exactly this notion of world that occupies Heidegger's thought. As he arrives, the attention is given to the commanding Greek landscape and the staging of the temple as it rises above the Aegean Sea. In Heidegger's account, everything is tied to the notion of the fourfold as he gives thought to the importance of the Greek outlook in what proves to be a comment central to the project of *Sojourns*. Facing the temple of Poseidon, Heidegger presents the following reflection on the exceptionality of the Greeks and the Greek landscape and language:

> "In the land of the Greeks, though, was given the exceptional gift of holding the wealth of the holy, both its grace and its fears, in its spoken language."[284]

[284] GA75, p. 238. *Sojourns*, p. 43.

This is a key observation that Heidegger makes during the journey, namely that what made the Greeks so extraordinary – and so utterly removed from us moderns – was their ability to live with the sacred and worship the gods. The passage continues:

> "Despite their love for navigation, the people of this country knew how to inhabit and demarcate the world against the barbarous in honor of the seat of the gods. Despite their ambition in competition, they knew how to praise what is great [*das Große zu rühmen*] and by acknowledging it, to bring themselves in front of the sublime [*das Hohe*], founding, in this way, a world."[285]

This is precisely what is so exceptional about the Greek sojourn according to Heidegger. The Greeks knew how to "praise what is great" and to bring themselves into a relation to something greater than themselves. This is the founding of their world. Standing before the temple of Poseidon that overlooks the Aegean See, this is what Heidegger seizes on. Here, at this place, the temple is a testimony of ancient Greek spiritual life and practice, and he finds here traces of a sensitivity and openness towards "the wealth of the holy, both its grace and its fears."[286] It is reflected in language and stone. Heidegger calls this the "exceptional gift" [*außergewöhnliche Gabe*][287] of the Greeks: they were able to accept and confront the depth of the divine and to live in accordance with the weight of this outlook – in other words, to make sense of the world in existential terms. The Greeks worshipped their gods in a world imbued with meaning. For Heidegger, this sense-making is described in terms of a "gift." But a gift is also something that one receives, and thus he calls attention to the ability to receive. Implied here is a sensitivity towards the divine that Heidegger finds on display in the Greek landscape at Cape Sounion, and which maps onto the greater drama of *Sojourns*. It has to do with a sensitivity towards the world and an ability of sense to receive "holiness." Understood in this way, the "gift of consecration" also echoes the discussion of homelessness in modernity and what it means to dwell. We shall return to this "gift" and how it could translate into a contemporary context in the following chapters. For now,

[285] Ibid, p. 238. Ibid. pp. 43-44 ff.
[286] Ibid, p. 238; Ibid. p. 43.
[287] Ibid, p. 238; Ibid, p. 43.

it is important to note the weight and insight that he reads into the visit to the temple of Poseidon. The visit echoes the Greek temple analyzed in "The Origin of the Work of Art," but it also weaves into the other themes in *Sojourns*, including the tension between our modern gaze and the outlook of the ancient Greeks.

Although the visit to Cape Sounion makes an impact on Heidegger, he still refrains from speaking of consecration or success. He limits himself to comments on "the exceptional gift" of the Greeks and "the invisible nearness of the divine" that is tied to the Greek landscape in which the temple resides. The reflections allude to the role of the Greek landscape and a strong sense of place drawn from the encounter with the temple.

The Shrine of *Sojourns*

We previously established the notion the region [*Gegend*] in conjunction with place and it arguably offers a heterogeneity and open-endedness to the thinking of place. [288] This relation comes to the fore during Heidegger's visit to Delphi. Throughout the descriptions in *Sojourns,* Heidegger is moved by the landscape of Greece and it serves to amplify the experience place. Heidegger is keenly aware of the significance of Delphi as a mythical reference and a place of worship. Yet as he arrives, it is the surrounding landscape that strikes him the most. Located on the slope underneath the towering Mount Parnassus, the elevated sanctuaries of Delphi offer a view of the valley from where the company had arrived in the bay by boat. Heidegger notices "the greatness of the region itself" and explicitly ties the mountainous landscape to Delphi:

> Under the lofty sky, in the clear air of which the eagle, Zeus's bird, was flying in circles, the region [*Gegend*] revealed itself as *the* temple of this place. The place itself before anything else unveiled for the mortals the hidden mystery of this location where it was allowed to erect their dedications [*Weihewerke*]—and first among them, as fits its rank and dignity, the Doric temple of Apollo.[289]

Heidegger's formulations here, when read in context with the reflections on the consecrated and the holy, suggests a thinking of the holy as something primordial that mortals come into relation

[288] Malpas defines the region as "referring to an interconnected set of places" (*Place and Experience*, p. 219).
[289] GA75, p. 242. *Sojourns*, p. 51.

with through place. When understood in this way, the place reflects the "hidden mystery" of the holy that underpins and presupposes the practice of worship even before the sanctuaries of Delphi were built. As we shall see, this is precisely also the realization made in Delos as Heidegger marvels at the ancient ruins and the temple grounds. The place *invites* for the temple to be built and for the practice of worship to take place. It is this sense of place that Heidegger detects and what moves him in the Greek landscape. In this respect, he, too, reacts to the place as a gift of consecration when tracing what was once there for the Greeks to wonder and worship. Yet all this presupposes a study of Heidegger's visit to Delos where his thoughts on place and experience in the encounter with Greece comes to a head.

A Sojourn Takes Place

Having spent days at various sites and places recounting the Greek past, Heidegger is still left ungratified. He later refers to the "trial" [*Prüfung*] of *Sojourns* as "the question of *Aletheia*," but up until this point, the journey has left him emptyhanded, unable to confirm his own inclination: that the land of Greece would indeed allow for something like a revelation of the spirit of ancient Greece. The visit to the Acropolis was only halfway successful as it had been interrupted by the impeding presence of the other tourists in a sudden reminder of our epochal removal from the world of the Greeks. But as Heidegger makes his way to Delos, the melancholic tone in *Sojourns* is about to change for the better. The island of Delos is situated in the Aegean Sea near the center of the Cyclades archipelago. The company arrives by boat and as soon as Heidegger catches sight of the "seemingly small island" he is taken by surprise:

> In comparison to everything else we have seen up to now in our journey, the island looked on first sight deserted and abandoned, in such a way, though, that it couldn't have been the result of mere decline. At once it laid a claim totally unique that we had nowhere felt before up to that point.[290]

[290] GA75, p. 231. *Sojourns*, p. 30.

Heidegger is captivated by what he sees – and not just by the idea of the place, but by the bodily sense of being there. Anyone who has been at Delos will know that it is a somewhat remote island and that the gale howls in the open plane. The bare rocks and the Northern wind makes for a harsh encounter.[291] Once a center of worship and pilgrimage, the island is the mythical birthplace of Apollo and Artemis. A number of religious landmarks are spread around the remains of the ancient city near the harbor. Rising above the ruins is Mount Kynthos, the single peak of the island. It is a steep, rocky climb. As Heidegger makes his way to the top, he is being tested by the hike, but his excitement grows:

> With every step that led us over ancient rocks and ruins, with the wind that blew stronger and stronger, towards the cleft peak of the Mt. Kynthos that rises steep in the middle of the island, the meaning of the island's name became more expository and its significance grounded in its being [*seinder*].[292]

The howling wind of the Mediterranean is a constant at Delos, and Heidegger, too, feels its force. As the elements of nature come together in a crescendo of sorts, Heidegger reflects on the mythical name of Delos:

> Δήλος is the name of the island: the manifest [*die Offenbare*], the visible [*die Scheinende*], the one that gathers every thing in its open, every thing to which she offers shelter through her appearing she gathers into *one* present.[293]

In this emphasis on the role of language, Heidegger recites the etymology of Delos in what becomes something like a linguistic awakening. Delos, the manifest [*die Offenbare*], is the quintessential phenomenological name. The praise continues: "Δήλος, the sacred island, the center of

[291] During his return to the Greek islands, rendered in the incomplete *Zu den Inzeln der Ägäis* (GA75), Heidegger makes particular reference to the seasonal winds of the Aegean Sea. It is the phenomenon of the strong, dry winds characteristic of the region and the time of year. Heidegger makes both his trips during the spring, during the time of Easter in 1962 and around Pentecost in 1967, respective, thus precisely clashing with the peak season of the Northern winds.

[292] GA75, p. 231; *Sojourns*, pp. 30-31.

[293] Ibid, 231; *Sojourns*, p. 30. The transliteration of Δήλος is Delos.

the Greek land and its coasts and seas, reveals insofar as it conceals." For Heidegger, the island becomes the place of truth and presencing. But it is an observation echoing the insight from "Building Dwelling Thinking" that brings it all together for Heidegger. Encountering the remains of the temples on the island, Heidegger has the following thought:

> In the sojourn granted by ἀλήθεια [truth] and ἔργον [work] appears as well: everything that is made and built by human work. In this granted sojourn, the mortals themselves appear and precisely as those who respond to the unconcealed for they bring to their proper appearances that which becomes present in this or that manner.[294]

What dawns on Heidegger is not a divine epiphany or revelation, but the simple fact that the ruins before him are built by human hands, and, critically, as a *response* to the place itself. It is the mortals that respond to the unconcealed [*Unverborgenheit*]. Delos is the unconcealed place. It is the primordial place, *the* place, and the very reason the buildings were built. The place came to be as a reaction to the sacred place, the birthplace of Apollo and Artemis. Heidegger's observation brings to mind the example of bridge in "Building Dwelling Thinking," a bridge placed in the landscape, not arbitrarily, but because of the landscape and the place itself. In the essay, the bridge constitutes the place, just as the thing invokes the fourfold. In Delos, Heidegger shares the same insight. And yet it overwhelms him as he stands there, in the landscape of Delos facing the ruins. The place moves him. What moves him is the resonating trace of sensitivity. It is the revered sense of outlook and worship that he so admires in the ancient Greeks exactly because it presents a relationality and responsivity that is no longer available to "us moderns." It is the same sensitivity that he refers to in the commentary on Hölderlin as a basic mood [*Grundstimmung*] of awe and wonder [*staunen*/*erstaunen*]. Here, in Sojourns, it is described as "the exceptional gift" of acknowledging "the wealth of the holy." It represents a point already noted, that for Heidegger, the Greeks "knew how to praise what is great and by acknowledging it, to bring themselves in front of the sublime, founding, in this way a world"[295]

[294] Ibid, p. 233. *Sojourns*, p. 34.
[295] Ibid, p. 238. *Sojourns*, p. 44.

For Heidegger, the visit to Delos delivers the long-desired sojourn as the journey to Greece comes to a culmination and he can finally declare his prize:

> The meditations that for a long time occupied me with regards to Ἀλήθεια, and the relationship between unconcealment and concealment have found, thanks to the sojourns of Delos, the desired confirmation. What appeared to have been only an imaginary conceptualization was fulfilled, it became full of presence, the presence of that clear [*gelichtet*] that had once granted to Greeks their coming-to-presence. [296]

Several lines intersect in this climactic passage. The linking of place and language in the manifestation of Delos and Heidegger's theory of *aletheia* is articulated as the light metaphor is brought on full display in the shifting of unconcealment and concealment and the clearing and presencing of *aletheia*. And yet Heidegger insists that this is more than mere "imaginary conceptualization," for what takes place is fulfilled only by the experience itself. It is exactly the embodied experience of something takes place and is revealed in a presencing. Implied here is the main argument underpinning the reflections of *Sojourns*: that only by placing oneself in the Greek landscape, in the sense and atmosphere of the particular place, is one able to go beyond the wishful thinking of "imaginary conceptualization" and find confirmation. This is the *Prüfung* of *Sojourns* that Heidegger puts to the test.[297]

Beyond Delos

We arrive then at a comprehensive notion of place informed by Heidegger's conceptualization of place as gathering and opening, but also, critically, as encompassing the experiential element of place rooted in the lifeworld. It is the sense of place that comes together in a sensitivity and – as we are about to see – receptivity towards the particular. It is the sense and receptivity of receiving the world through the particularity of place in the openness of being that occurs in the staying

[296] GA75, p. 233. *Sojourns*, p. 34.
[297] GA75, p. 249. *Zu den Inseln der Ägäis*.

amidst things [*aufhalten*]. The point here is the same, whether we phrase this in terms of releasement [*Gelassenheit*] or a staying [*Aufenthalt*] and abiding [*weilen*] amidst things as in the composite term of dwelling. In the encounter with the world in all its heterogeneity and the multitude of particularities, we arrive in place. It is in and through the particularity of place that we receive the world and that the world touches us – in the materiality and spatiality of the atmosphere of place. It is the drama of longing and belonging. We sense the world through place, and we attune to the world and are being attuned through place. This is the sensitivity and affectivity of place. Our attunement to the world and how we are in the world arise in and through place as the site where we encounter the world. Dwelling and place are coextensive and our basic attunement comes through place as does the mood and affectivity in which we feel and sense the world.

All these lines come together in an expanded notion of dwelling and place as the experiential side of a thinking of place reflects the body and the embodied nature of being human. Just as place can be seen as "the disclosive happening of belonging"[298] in which we receive the world in its particularity on existential terms, so does the body serve as the irreplaceable lens in and through which we receive and address the world. In this sense, the overlapping concepts of dwelling and place come together. They reflect the way we are touched by and attuned to the world – in a tension of disclosure and exposure – in the sensitivity of the particularity of place in the midst of things.

What becomes clear over the course of this study is that Heidegger's own notion of place in important ways also comes up short of fulfilling these lines of development. For all his thinking on place – as a disclosing event in and through which we encounter the world – the aspects drawn out here do not adequately account for a comprehensive notion of place in a contemporary view. In other words, Heidegger's understanding of place *underestimates the complexity of place.* This is further articulated in the discussion on sculpture and contemporary modern art and literature in the following chapter.

We started this chapter by noting Heidegger's call for "the gift of consecration" only to end with Heidegger's own sense of completion and fulfillment achieved during the visit to Delos. It marks the natural climax of *Sojourns*, the place where everything comes together for

[298] *Heidegger's Topology*, p. 242.

Heidegger. As a narrative plot and a philosophical coda, the island of Delos offers all the confirmation that Heidegger set out to find. Yet something else awakens during the journey to Greece. Something that has to do with dwelling and the presencing that takes place. For this same reason, we may speak of another "peak" of significance in the outline of *Sojourns*, namely Heidegger's visit to Olympia and the temple of Zeus. It has to do with the question of consecration and, consequently, the role of sculpture.

CHAPTER FIVE: A THINKING OF SCULPTURE

> But the matter of religion is so arranged and so rare, that a person who expresses something about it must necessarily have had it, for he has not heard about it anywhere. Of all that I praise and feel as its work there stands precious little in holy books, and to whom would it not seem scandal or folly who did not experience it himself.
>
> Ludwig Feuerbach, *On Religion*

> God was gone; it was the silence of his departure.
>
> Jack Kerouac, *On the Road*

> We never knew his head and all the light that ripened in his fabled eyes. But his torso still glows like a gas lamp dimmed in which his gaze, lit long ago, holds fast and shines.
>
> Rainer Maria Rilke, *Archaic Torso of Apollo*

The Visit to Olympia

Heidegger's visit to Olympia is significant for several reasons. In his entry following the visit, Heidegger is himself ambiguous about what to make of the encounter, and yet precisely this visit to the temple of Zeus in Olympia becomes a point of reference for Heidegger in the years to come. And it is a revealing visit. It marks Heidegger's first in situ encounter with Greek sculpture and architecture during the tour, and the visit plays an important part in the dramatic structure of *Sojourns*. But more that than, the visit to Olympia involves an unexpected insight that is to inform Heidegger's thoughts on sculpture in the following years. It is safe to say it becomes a lasting point of reference. Over the course of the following years, Heidegger develops elaborate philosophical interest in sculpture, leading to a lecture on Greek sculpture, and culminating in the artistic corporation and exhibition with the Basque sculptor Eduardo Chillida and the essay on "Art and Space," Heidegger's last publication before his death. Heidegger has always had an in-

terest in Greek thinking and architecture, but one could also claim with some right that the interest in sculpture as a living artform starts exactly here, with the visit to Olympia. As Heidegger, a few years later, in 1965, is asked to return to Athens as a member of the German Academy to give a lecture in front of the Greek Academy, his talk centers precisely on his findings during the visit to Olympia and the analysis of the Atlas metope of the temple of Zeus. For our purposes, the visit in *Sojourns* also functions as a way into Heidegger's thinking from a contemporary viewpoint, as Heidegger's reflections on sculpture and the sense of place are put in dialogue with contemporary modern art. What is revealed through this move are not just the pros and cons of Heidegger's thinking on sculpture, but also, interestingly, a thinking of experience and a sense of place. Heidegger's later thinking is often recapitulated as his preoccupation mainly with language and poetry, but, here, we find a different path into a thinking of dwelling, one that sets off years of interest in a thinking of sculpture inspired and informed by this particular visit to Olympia.

Focusing on Heidegger's visit to Olympia and a thinking of sculpture, the chapter adds to the previous examination of place by further exploring the relation between space and place. As we shall see, Olympia involves the meeting of space and place, techne and poesis, craftmanship and poetic thinking as it informs Heidegger's later reflections on sculpture. In this way, the visit to Olympia also indirectly calls attention to a key notion for a thinking of dwelling, namely, the aspect of *receptivity* that comes to the fore in the discussion on sculpture. As such, the visit to Olympia opens up Heidegger's thinking on sculpture and receptivity. It marks an area in Heidegger's later thinking that still has something to say about dwelling and poetic thinking when brought into conversation with modern contemporary art.

Heidegger arrives to Olympia in the early morning hours. During the dusty bus transfer from the coast and inland towards Olympia, expectations rise as Heidegger recalls Olympias great past, as if saying this has to be the place:

> Now it had to come—that place [*Ort*] where once all Greece gathered itself during the hottest days of the summer for the peaceful celebration of the Games and to worship its highest gods.[299]

[299] GA75, 221. *Sojourns*, p. 12.

Olympia, home of the first Olympic games and, before that, an ancient place of worship for Zeus, ruler of the Olympian gods, certainly has a thrilling effect on Heidegger, offering a promising prospect. But what first meets the eye upon arrival is a disappointing sight. The run-down, "shabby-looking" nearby village is deemed "just a plain village disfigured even more by the unfinished new buildings [to become] hotels for the American tourists" and Heidegger is "disappointed with the nearby view of the Cronus hill." But as the group makes its way to the temple grounds, the atmosphere changes. Heidegger notices a "mystifying silence" as he enters the Altis[300] – the walled sacred ground of the sanctuaries. The solemn sentiment is underscored by the fact that the group find itself alone on the grounds. Standing in the Altis facing the temple of Zeus and Hera, Heidegger makes the following observation:

> The groundwork of the surprisingly great temple consecrated to Hera and Zeus, the colossal shafts of the columns, reaped by a superhuman power, although fallen down still preserving their upright, supportive thrust—all these kept at bay the impression of simply a massive edifice.
>
> Was that a hint [*ein Wink*], perhaps, about the appropriate way of seeking that which had to be tested in the following days? Was that a signal for the clear insight that the archaeological research, although it remains necessary and useful, nevertheless, has no access to that which prevailed and took place amidst that which was erected—which means: consecrated [*Geweihten*]?[301]

The quote ends with another reference to the consecrated. This is the language in which Heidegger casts the journey to Greece. In this regard, the account of the visit to Olympia is themed around the elusive quest for "the gift of consecration." But more than a reflection on the status of religion and religious worship draped in narrative suspense, Heidegger's reference to "consecration" also hints at a decisive feature in his thinking of place. The reference to the gift of consecration is obviously a reminder of what is at stake in the project of *Sojourn* – that the idea

[300] The Altis is a sacred place, a large walled area housing the temple of Zeus and Hera as well as principal alters and host of small treasuries built by Greek city states as seen in Delphi and other sanctuaries. The sacred area of the Altis was enclosed by walls and outside were the stadium and the hippodrome as well as baths and other accommodations for visitors.

[301] GA75, p. 222. *Sojourns*, pp. 13-14.

of undertaking the journey to Greece at first caused Heidegger to hesitate, because it indirectly implies the confirmation or lack thereof of his own long-established philosophical interest in the Greek origin. Still, the theme of consecration also opens the door for understanding the sense of place at work in Heidegger's account. As established in the previous chapter, the German word *weihen*, to consecrate, refers to the demarcation of a holy place, ritual or time and here, in *Sojourns*, the consecration takes on a spatial sense inscribed in place as holy ground, the place of the sacred. Heidegger's use of the term thus carries a double meaning in the sense of both confirmation and consecration. On the line here, up for confirmation, is Heidegger's own project in *Sojourns*. But, it appears, this has to do with the demarcation of and confrontation with that which is the consecrated.

The consecrated refers to the sacred place. It sets up the boundary of place, the inside and the outside. The notion of place itself can sometimes seem amorph or somewhat blurry – after all, place can take on endless shapes and forms depending on the topology and our own implacement and reference point. But this is not the case for sacred place. We will return to Heidegger's understanding of the boundary as an expansive, creative notion in keeping with the Greek *peras* shortly in his thinking on sculpture, but, here, in the reference to the religious place, no such dynamics seem to apply. This can perhaps be explained by sheer convention, in that the religious would simply have to be clearly defined place. The same could be said for the apsis of the Greek temple, which marks the dark place behind the alter – symbolically referencing the other world. But here, in Heidegger's description of consecration in reference to place, it sets up a clear sense of inside and outside, echoing the thinking of Mircea Eliade. Building on Rudolf Otto's notion of the holy, *Das Heilige*, Eliade understands the religious experience in terms of *hierophanies*, that is, literally, as manifestations of the sacred, implying the distinction between the sacred and the profane.[302] The same basic semiotic division between inside and outside is at work in the notion of place, as reflected in Relph's discussion of "the insideness and outsideness of place" or in the works of Trigg and Belden.

The visit to Olympia is influential for Heidegger's later thinking of sculpture for several reasons. First, it is the site of the Temple of Zeus that is to become a concrete reference point for

[302] The terminology of "the sacred" and "the holy" are used interchangeably here. In his book, Eliade translates Das Heilige as "The Sacred," hence the terminology of the sacred and the profane (*The Sacred and the Profane*, p. 8.)

Heidegger's later work on sculpture. The visit to Olympia has direct bearing on Heidegger's later thinking in the years to come. In 1965, Heidegger returns to Greece to a visit to Athens by invitation of the Greek Academy of Art. As a member for the German Academy of Arts, Heidegger alongside fellow members is invited to give a lecture at the Greek Academy of Arts. The lecture is called "The Provenance of Art and the Determination of Thinking"[303] and is wrapped around Heidegger's thinking of sculpture. It is an important document on Heidegger's thinking on sculpture and the lecture offers insights into a rare topic for Heidegger, namely the role of the body. The lecture is significant for another reason. The subject of the lecture is a direct reference to the visit to Olympia in *Sojourns*. In his lecture, Heidegger zooms in on a particular piece of sculpture, making it the centerpiece of this lecture, namely, the Atlas Metope from the Temple of Zeus in Olympia (Marple, 160 cm, 468-456 BC). Heidegger knows the particular metope from his visit to Olympia. When seen in this context, Heidegger's experience in Olympia holds a clear influence on how he thinks on sculpture. Perhaps the strongest impact on Heidegger in the visit to Olympia as documented in *Sojourns* is his encounter with the Temple of Zeus, giving way to reflections on the relation between the Greeks, their gods, and the holy. This is the other reason why the visit to Olympia in *Sojourns* is significant, marking the site of a central observation for Heidegger's reflections on sculpture and the depiction in Sojourn. Experiencing the elevated friezes, he realizes the true nature of their worship, that is, for whom they were made.

As already noted, Heidegger seizes on a "hint" during the visit to Olympia. What is hinted at is the existential drama inscribed into religious practice and worship. The idea is that what is at stake here is something larger than life, namely the weight and meaningfulness of religion itself in the Greek worldview. This is a crucial point in Heidegger's reflections during the Greek sojourn. What he detects in Olympia as a "hint," but also in the notion of consecrated space as a feature inscribed in place, and, finally, in a very concrete observation, is the crucial notion of a Greek sensitivity "toward that which is great" and thus "founding a world." I will refer to this "world-founding" in terms of sensitivity, for it marks the sensitivity of the ancient Greeks that Heidegger so longs for – and that connects to his own readings of Hölderlin and the Greek sense of awe and wonder [*staunen, erstaunen*]. It reflects a central idea in Heidegger's thinking on Greece, which comes forth in the visit to Olympia. In *The Sacred and the Profane*,

[303] GA80, The original German title of the lecture is "*Die Herkunft der Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens*."

Eliade is equally sensitive to the act of world-founding that he identifies as a religious modality of existence – not unlike Heidegger's idea of a basic mode or *Grundstimmung*.

Standing beneath the Eastern frieze of the temple of Zeus, which depicts the epic chariot race between Pelops and Oenomaus, Heidegger makes the following observation:

> Never, though, were the two pediments objects of observation at the same height as the observer, but they were visible to the eye only upwards to a much greater height. Were they created for the human observer after all? Was not the flowing stillness of their appearance dedicated to the gaze of the invisible god as a gift of consecration?

What strikes Heidegger is the difference in height. Standing beneath the artwork, he is able to observe the vantage point and the way in which the pediments are on display. They are precisely not meant for the human eye, and Heidegger remarks that the other pediments on display in the museum at the height of the museum visitors are "out of place." The pediments of Pelos and Oenomaus are there for the gods to see – not for us. In this very concrete way, their placement tells the story of Greek sensitivity for the divine as an act of worship and wonder.

Heidegger's observation on the intentionality of sculpture opens a parallel to Rilke. Having worked for two years as the assistant of August Rodin at his country estate outside Paris, Rainer Maria Rilke publishes a collection of poems starting with the sonnet, "Archaic Torso of Apollo." Describing the headless god, the poem echoes Rodin's modern thinking of nuancing the idealized body of Apollo in a move of removal and imperfection. Yet the poem also carries a deeper message: that something shines on and confronts us through the brute materiality of the sculpture. This culminates in the enigmatic closing lines of the poem: "For there is no place that does not see you. You must change your life." In a way, the thought-provoking statement still rings out. Left unanswered, Rilke raises a voice of authority. The command from the stone is primordial in tone yet it remains radically relevant in that it tells us to change the ways of our lives. For Heidegger, something similar is at stake in Olympia. Standing in the Altis in front of the frieze, Heidegger, too, senses something by way of the stones. But it is a subtle realization for all its indirectness. For it does not require the content of words in the form of Rilke's imperative.

Yet what is "hinted" [*Wink*], is still a gesture of recognition and a relation of authority. For what Heidegger experiences, observing the pediments, is the phenomenon of worship itself. It is the fact *that* a voice was once heard. This is for Heidegger the striking recognition that occurs when standing before the temple. Any attempt to draw Heidegger's thinking into "onto-theological" substance would be a mistake. He merely calls attention to the fact that the sculpture "works" in that it serves a function of an intrinsically meaningful field of religious reference. As such, the temple ruins of Olympia continue to perform the story of worship identified by Heidegger as a Greek sensitivity, and it is this sensitivity that so captivates him as a way of imbuing meaning and "founding a world." Dwelling as world-building is taking place. Heidegger seizes on this phenomenon because it illustrates the underlying sensitivity of the ancient Greeks. It implies a thinking of presencing, as emerges in "The Origin of the Work of Art" in the emphasis on the happening of the event. In this respect, *Sojourns* and the visit to Olympia follow the same line of thinking, not in the abstract format of a philosophical essay, but in the context of experience and sense of place.

As to the question of how to place Olympia in *Sojourns*, Heidegger is characteristically torn. While the revelation of the Greek sculpture evidently comes to have a lasting impression on Heidegger, he brushes off the question. Still, he does not find consecration or affirmation in the sense of an experience. Olympia is still too far removed from us:

> Did Olympia offer the insight that we have sought into what is proper to the Greek world? Yes and no. "Yes" insofar as its gentle emergence of its clearing distance spoke in an immediate way through the sculptures. But those were in the museum. Thus "no"—especially since the region of Olympia did not yet set free the Greek element of the land, of its sea and its sky."[304]

Even though Olympia turns out to be a difficult place for Heidegger to gain insight into the true character of the artifacts examined there, for my purposes, this is an excellent example of how Heidegger's thinking on sculpture relate to his broader reflections on thinking and dwelling. The happening of encounter indicates that sculpture deserves special attention. It shows that sculpture

[304] GA75, 224. *Sojourns*, pp. 18-19.

artifacts are uniquely available for analysis in the sense that they make explicit his thinking of dwelling. As we will now see, sculpture reveals much about spatiality and the way we are drawn into the materiality of the experience.

A Thinking of Sculpture

Like no other art form, sculpture reveals spatiality. Because of its three-dimensional character, sculpture occupies the space around it and presents a relation between body and space. This is why we are drawn to sculpture. It calls attention to the spatiality of the work of art and to the manifestation of materiality itself. Heidegger's thinking on sculpture involves the idea that sculpture has the potential to reveal "a special character of space" which can be said to bring with it a new understanding of our own relationship with the world. As we shall see, sculpture opens up a way of experiencing the world by exposing the elemental relation between material and space that allows us to relate to the world in a new way. What I argue here is that the notion of clearing-away [*Räumen*] of sculpture presupposes and points to an open, receptive attitude to space. As will become clear, this element is what we need to establish for a thinking of dwelling to take place. To make this argument, I distinguish between two separate attitudes or modes of being in the world that were also reflected in the chapter on technology. One pertains to a scientific or technological sense of space. The other is a receptive attitude related to a sense of space that calls attention to place and *the ecstatic character of being*. The inherent difficulty involved in the possibility of such a shift in attitude is the fact that from the vantage point of being in the world in a technological age as explored in chapter 2, any other approach seems to require an exit from being itself.

According to Heidegger, however, art—and specifically sculpture—carries within it a call to overcome this illusion. What I want to call attention to is the way that, in Heidegger's later thinking, sculpture opens up a receptive mode for dwelling with space as an alternative way of conceiving of being in the world, which carries implications for the way we experience the world. This reflection about experience will include an examination of the works of artists Eduardo Chillida and Janet Echelman as a way to explore and assess the arguments about sculpture

presented here. That is, the inclusion of concrete works of art will serve to illuminate an alternative thinking about experience and to reveal the potential of sculpture to deepen a sense of our relation to the world.

In the discussion of Heidegger vis-à-vis Echelman's contemporary modern art, I make the suggestion that Heidegger's thinking about sculpture and place can be fruitfully supplemented with an aesthetics of atmosphere as previously introduced in chapter 3. The concept of atmosphere also captures the atmospheric quality that is a central element in Echelman's works but that is not fully apprehended in Heidegger's sense of place. However, these questions presuppose Heidegger's reflections on sculpture.

The importance of *Räumen*

Heidegger was increasingly drawn to the study of sculpture over the course of his authorship. He found in sculpture an artform that enabled him to reexamine the role of art in our lives through a rethinking of the relationship between bodies and space. Some aspects of this thinking are anticipated in his earlier work, but he only gradually comes to realize the importance later ascribed to sculpture. Heidegger's last published text, "Art and Space," is a short essay on sculpture accompanying the works of Basque sculptor Eduardo Chillida at an exhibition at the Erker Gallery in St. Gallen in 1968. Heidegger there examines the interplay of art and space. The essay starts with a discussion of different notions of space and asserts that "art and scientific technology regard and work upon space toward diverse ends and in diverse ways."[305] Heidegger sets up a distinction between what he sees as scientific space as opposed to "genuine space" and the idea that space may have some "special character." According to Heidegger, our conventional, modern notion of space founded in Galilean and Newtonian physics amounts to "one objective cosmic space" of which all other renderings of space are mere aspects. It is a notion of space characterized by quantifiable sameness and indifference, and by what Heidegger labels "homogeneous expanse." While this holds true for Newtonian physics and the Cartesian plane of *spatio* and *extensio*, Heidegger seems to regard this feature as an overarching symptom of the desire to control

[305] Heidegger, Martin. "Art and Space." in *Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory*. Edited by Neil Leach. Routledge, 1997, p. 121.

and dominate. It is the same thinking that we explored in chapter 2, and that sets up the overarching tension running through *Sojourns*. For Heidegger, it marks a condition epitomized by the privileging of technology and calculative thinking, a hegemony of theoretical thinking in an age of technology that Heidegger criticizes in his later thinking. As we discovered, in this understanding, technology is a leveling drive towards replaceability and a commodification of things into resources, and it poses the threat of reducing things into sheer stock or standing reserve, as poignantly pointed out in the essay on technology. It is up against these demands of technology that Heidegger forms his reflections on sculpture and space. Accordingly, the distinction between two opposing modes of being in the world and notions of space is informed by attention towards the singular and unique as a basis for exploring a thinking of experience. This is a key element that reflects the overall attention to the particular in Heidegger's thinking and that I take to inform the sensitivity of a contemporary notion of dwelling as pointed out in chapter 6.

Contrary to the scientific notion of space, Heidegger ascertains a notion of "genuine space, namely what uncovers [Being's] authentic character."[306] As it turns, the question of space [*Raum*] has not been addressed in the right way. The character of space is historically specific and any attempt to list its historical varieties amounts to nothing more than mere derivatives of the aforementioned, thus missing the question of the special character of space. Heidegger wants to think space differently and he does so by bringing the question of space to sculpture:

> Still, how can we find the special character of space? There is an emergency path which, to be sure, is a narrow and precarious one. Let us try to listen to language. Whereof does it speak in the word 'space'? Clearing-away [*Räumen*] is uttered therein. This means: to clear out [*roden*], to free from wilderness. Clearing-away brings forth the free, the openness for man's settlings and dwellings. When thought in its own special character, clearing-away is the release of places toward which the fate of dwelling man turns in the preservation of home, in the brokenness of homelessness or in the complete indifference to the two. Clearing-away is release of the places [*Orten*] at which a god appears, the places from which the gods have disappeared, the places at which the appearance of the godly tarries long. In each case, clearing-away brings forth locality preparing for dwelling. Secular spaces are always the privation of often very remote sacred spaces. Clearing-away is release of places.[307]

[306] *Art and Space*, p. 122.
[307] *Art and Space*, p. 122.

Heidegger here presents the key notion *Räumen*, i.e., clearing-away. It is central to his understanding of sculpture and spatiality, as it paves the way for receptivity and thus authentic dwelling. What Heidegger alludes to here, I would argue, is the way in which sculpture creates a space as we encounter it. This is why we are drawn to sculpture. The surrounding space becomes part of the work of art. It does so in the sense that the sculpture and the space surrounding it spill over into each other, as the space becomes a relational part of the sculpture itself. This relational aspect is tied to Heidegger's interpretation of the boundary discussed earlier, to which I shall return. It is this relation between the sculpture and the interconnected space surrounding it that creates a new sense of space, an aspect sometimes referred to in Heidegger's later thinking by the Greek term *poiesis*. One could also argue that "the special character of space" presented here points to the status of "the between." Spatiality itself comes to the fore in the relation of space and materiality in sculpture. In this way, sculpture is the manifestation of spatiality. The relational character of material and space points to ecstatic being in that sculpture "brings forth the free, the openness for man's settling and dwelling" and reveals "the release of places toward which the fate of dwelling man turns." Sculpture stands out in its relation to the world.

According to Heidegger, *Räumen* is also a making-room for something to appear or settle. It is a form of receptivity and opening up in order for dwelling to take place. Heidegger thus links the existential dimension of dwelling to the special character of space detected in sculpture. It is worth noting how the notion of clearing-away is introduced in the essay. It brings context to Heidegger's thinking on the poetic character of space exposed in sculpture. Heidegger refers to language. It is with the vocabulary of the forest that Heidegger speaks of the "clearing" taking place in sculpture. Clearing-away is a translation of the German *Räumen*, which alludes to the forest metaphors most clearly presented in *Holzwege*. The German word *Räumen* has a topological connotation that is lost in the English "clearing-away." *Räumen* is related to *Raum*, space, as in the original title of the essay, *Die Kunst und der Raum* (art and space). The metaphoric language of forest and wilderness echoes Heidegger's related neology of the *Lichtung*,[308] translated into English as the clearing. By creating this vocabulary of wood-paths and wilderness,

[308] Heidegger develops the notion of the clearing in "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking." The clearing refers to a forest opening which in German is *Lichtung*.

Heidegger indirectly points to the notion of truth[309] as a backdrop to the reflections on sculpture and the special character of space.

All this brings us to a central element of dwelling. Heidegger goes on to connect the clearing-away of *Räumen* with *Einräumen* as a making-room for something. This is a key feature for sculpture, and for a thinking of dwelling, as it paves the way for an alternative way of experiencing the world. Bringing together the two, Heidegger rhetorically asks:

> How does clearing-away (*Räumen*) happen? Is it not making-room (*Einräumen*), and this again in a twofold manner as granting and arranging? First, making-room admits something. It lets openness hold sway which, among other things, grants the appearance of things present to which human dwelling sees itself consigned. On the other hand, making-room prepares for things the possibility to belong to their relevant whither and, out of this, to each other.[310]

The making-room is an open attitude, creating the possibility for the openness necessary for dwelling to take place. It is the exact hermeneutic move required for dwelling to take place. This reads well with Heidegger's understanding of the overarching distinction between the notion of space employed by science and in technology as opposed to a different way of being-in-the-world presented with this new understanding of space. Heidegger counters what he regards as the hegemony of modern science and technology with a being-in-the-world characterized by dwelling and conditioned by a requisite gesture of receptivity. Only by making-room for the opposite, i.e., that which is new and that which opposes the universality of modern science and technology, may one be receptive to a sense of dwelling and belonging "in the midst of things."[311] Heidegger warns of the dominance and pervasiveness of the former and one senses the alarm and claustrophobia on the rise in his terminology of the emergency path [*Notsteg*]. But while Heidegger's use of language in this passage seems overly dramatic, his reflections on *Einräumen* as a gesture of making-room or admitting is central to the potential of sculpture. It marks an im-

[309] Heidegger understands truth as unconcealment in line with the Greek sense of truth as *aletheia*. To this end, the German *Lichtung* (clearing) reflects the same phenomenological thinking of concealment/unconcealment.
[310] *Art and Space*, pp. 122-123.
[311] Ibid, p. 123.

portant theme in Heidegger's later thinking, namely the idea of *receptivity* as a preliminary hermeneutical condition for understanding and, ultimately, for the possibility for genuine experience.

The Listening of *Sojourns*

In *Sojourns*, we identified the two contrasting lines running through the text: on the one side is Heidegger's longing for experiencing something like a genuine Greek spirituality. The hope that by placing ourselves in the Greek landscape and visiting the places, something like the traces of what once was could emerge out of the Greek place. On the other side is the conditioning veil of modernity. That is, the fact that we are irreparably removed from the world of the Greeks and that we are so ingulfed in technology that we have forgotten how to sense and be sensitive towards the world. Heidegger casts this overarching tension of dwelling and not dwelling that runs through *Sojourns* in terms of calling and hearing. He identifies a double movement of hearing and calling. By hearing, Heidegger means receiving, or rather, the ability to open up, to listen, to make room for receiving something. The hearing-calling dialectic is also an active-passive duality. While calling is an activity, an act of transgressing and thereby also of imposing on someone or something, hearing, on the contrary, can be characterized as a passivity. An invitation perhaps, but a merely reflexive gesture, in the sense that hearing does not imply a demand on anything or anyone else than the one who is trying to hear.

But who is it that *should* be hearing then? According to Heidegger, the question of hearing is a demand directed at us. Yet according to Heidegger, in our everyday existence we do not in fact hear or understand this call. As discussed in the previous chapters, we are not receptive in the same way that the Greeks were open to hearing a call. Furthermore, this call is a *Mitrufen*, a calling-with, which seem to imply a collective, or a community, in the communication; i.e., the shared nature of demand and responsibility. Part of what is lost on "us moderns" is the sense of community and meaning. What is lost, according to Heidegger, is the tie between hearing and calling. Yet, Heidegger insists on the possibility of hearing. The question remains an open question, pointing to the need for genuine *listening*. Only if we listen, may we be able to hear the calling. For Heidegger, a hermeneutical move is necessary in order to open up ourselves to this call and to actively receiving. What he is alluding is the ability to hear, i.e., to make room for hearing. This "making room or way for" is precisely what Heidegger explores in his thinking of

sculpture through the language of *Räumen*. As it turns out, this making-room is a necessary condition for something to present itself, for something to reveal itself and speak to us. It seems that the task of hearing the call goes through an anticipatory act of listening. Only so may the question of receptivity remain an open question. In order to "hear," we need to "listen," and only when qualifying our hearing by applying the genuinely open, attentive attitude of listening, can we truly hear the calling. Receptivity refers to a preliminary openness, a gesture of making-room in order to be able to receive. It is a precondition for any genuine, authentic experience.

It is now clear that the double movement of clearing-away and making-room revealed in sculpture offers exactly what is needed: an alternative to the hegemony and control of the technological attitude. As opposed to the occupying appropriation of space as resource or an empty container, sculpture points towards an alternative attitude. It is not, however, an exit. Instead, what is offered is an alternative mode of being-in-the-world, a different sense of experience. As pointed out, this new sense of experience does not come easily and the elusive "character of clearing-away is all too easily overlooked."[312] Nonetheless, this receptivity speaks to the potential of sculpture inasmuch as it resists the indifference and "homogenous expanse" of calculative thinking in the age of technology.

The Comb of the Wind

Heidegger's essay on sculpture, "Art and Space," marks the collaboration with the Basque sculptor Eduardo Chillida to whom he dedicated the essay. The two shared a mutual understanding, and many ideas from Heidegger's thinking of sculpture came together in the work of Chillida. To further examine this relationship, I turn to one of Chillida most prominent works of art, *Peine del Viento XV*.

The iconic artwork, *Peine del Viento XV*, is a sculptural group of three structures of concrete steel carved into the natural rocks rising on the coastal line near the Basque city of San Sebastian. Situated on the northern coast of Spain, the sculpture faces the winds of the Cantabrian Ocean, referenced in the title of the work, *The Comb of the Wind*.

[312] *Art and Space*, p. 122.

Peine del Viento XV © Chillida Family, Zabalaga-Leku, San Sebastián, 2019

In Chillida's *Peine del Viento XV*, we are reminded of the elemental character of sculpture. The man-made steel structure is embedded in the rocks facing the sea. The structure opens up and reaches out as it rises from the ground of the solid rock into the air, suspended in mid-air and hovering above the water. The reaching arms of steel combs through the air in the howling winds of the Atlantic Ocean. At the same time, the structure creates a space as it encircles what surrounds it, including the wind passing through it. In this way, Chillida's artwork articulates the thinking of Heidegger. We are drawn to sculpture because it occupies the space surrounding it. The sculpture articulates the special character of space by opening up and making room.

Reaching out into the winds of the Atlantic Ocean, *Peine del Viento XV* is embedded in its surroundings as the man-made sculpture explores the relation of human and landscape in the fierce coastal setting. The created space calls attention to this relation as we are reminded of "the fate of dwelling man." In this relation, a sense of dwelling takes place that cannot be accounted for by a notion of space as an empty container or plane of indifference. Rather, what is at stake here is a rich sense of space as poetic space insofar as the *Räumen* and *Einräumen* clears out and makes room in a receptive, open attitude towards being via the sculpture. In this sense, the special character of space in sculpture reveals the character of place. *Peine del Viento XV* is rooted

in a place which makes it untransferable as a mere site or position.[313] What Chillida's artwork is so good at establishing is exactly this rooted sense of dwelling as being in place. Somewhere between the material character of steel and rock on the one side, and the immaterial, or rather, invisible element of air and wind, a space is created in the clearing-away and making-room of the sculpture. Sculpture makes room for the space surrounding it, and is, conversely, in place, embedded in the surroundings of the coast and landscape. What the sculpture reveals is not the mere shape or contours of a structure; rather, it calls attention to spatiality itself and to the elemental character of belonging to the place. It is this sense of rootedness and being in place that Chillida's sculptures articulate as they open up for a sense of dwelling.

The Plurality of Place

Central to Heidegger's reflections on sculpture is the notion of space. As it turns out, the special character of space is in fact related to a notion of place. The sense of clearing-away in sculpture as a making-room in order for receptive dwelling to take place is made possible by the release of places, *Orten*, in plural. Places are themselves interrelated as regions and drawn to each other as "the gathering of things in their belonging together."[314] Following Malpas' reading of Heidegger, it makes sense to understand this interconnectedness of places as the unity of space. The interrelatedness of places comes together in the notions of locality [*Ortschaft*] and region [*Gegend*]. The notion of space in sculpture must therefore be seen in conjunction with the notion of place. According to Malpas, "space that contains places within it can be understood as having something of the being of a place itself."[315]

In "Art and Space," Heidegger sets up a distinction between the perspective of space as place in opposition to a scientific notion of space. He does this by determining the intrinsic qualities ascribed to place as *Ort*: "place is not located in a pre-given space, after the manner of physical-technological space."[316] On the contrary, the special character of space found in sculpture is a place-like character and, as such, it presents a potential:

[313] This may be viewed in relation to the analysis of *Gestell* and the preferred translation of "positionality" over "enframing" to catch the sense of the centerless and unmoored that Heidegger (and Chillida) opposes.
[314] *Art and Space*, p. 123.
[315] Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology*, p. 262.
[316] *Art and Space*, p. 123.

> Sculpture would be the embodiment of places. Places, in preserving and opening a region, hold something free gathered around them which grants the tarrying of things under consideration and a dwelling for man in the midst of things.[317]

Sculpture creates a place for dwelling in the revealing of places. Places "grant the tarrying of things" and condition the very possibility of dwelling. Heidegger connects the notions of place and dwelling to sculpture in that "clearing-away brings forth locality preparing for dwelling."[318] This is the potential of sculpture. It sets up our relation to the world by opening a place to dwell.

The Boundary and the Void

In the later added "Addendum" to "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger gives an account of the notion of the boundary (*Grenze*) that becomes central to his thinking of sculpture. According to Heidegger, the German word for boundary, *Grenze*, is connected to the Greek term *peras*. Consequently, the notion of the boundary is to be understood in its Greek sense:

> The boundary in the Greek sense does not block off; rather, being itself brought forth, it first brings to its radiance what is present. Boundary sets free into the unconcealed; by the contours in the Greek light the mountain stands in its towering and repose.[319]

What is presented here is an understanding of the boundary not as a demarcation or delimitation, but as something that "sets free into the unconcealed." Instead of blocking off, the boundary "brings to its radiance what is present." The boundary is dynamic. It sets free into unconcealment and is characterized by its radiance (*Scheinen*). As such, the boundary indicates an overflowing or richness in the radiance of the phenomenon. The boundary is not concerned with containing or inclosing. Instead, it marks a beginning rather than an end. It is not the point at which something terminates, but rather it is where something is set free into the open.

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[317] Ibid, p. 123.
[318] Ibid, p. 122.
[319] Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, p. 83.

It is this alternative understanding of boundary in the Greek sense that is developed in Heidegger's thinking of sculpture. In the opening paragraphs of "Art and Space" – where he sets up the distinction between the special character of space in sculpture versus the scientific notion of space as neutral, empty indifference – Heidegger denounces a conventional understanding of boundary as "demarcation as setting up an inclosing and excluding border" [*Abgrenzen als Ein- und Ausgrenzen*]. Leaving behind this notion of border in favor of the Greek sense of boundary, Heidegger's thinking of sculpture, I argue, can be understood through the Greek sense of boundary, with its emphasis on radiance and disclosure.

This reading of the boundary in the Greek sense has consequences for an understanding of space. For Heidegger, the overflowing nature of the boundary in sculpture means that the idea of empty space or void must be abandoned precisely because of the permeating radiance of boundary. This marks a shift in Heidegger's own reflections on sculpture in which he previously saw the relation to space in terms of tension and conflict rather than relational and permeating.[320]

In Mitchell's reading of Heidegger, the overflowing nature of the boundary (in the Greek sense) leads to a thinking of relationality and collaboration, which reveals the space of the sculpture as a place of encounter. Arguing against a separation of the lived body from an empty space surrounding the sculpture, Mitchell follows through on the rethinking on the limit to expose "a material space of radiance." It is in this way, he suggests, that we may understand the special character of space in sculpture. Subsequently, space itself is revealed as a "middle ground and medium" and so the space of sculpture becomes a "between" where dwelling can take place as "relational and tied to surrounding people, places and things."[321] Heidegger's reflections on the boundary as relational, permeating and setting free may indeed be said to constitute a "middle ground." In my view, this is precisely what goes on in the encounter with sculpture and the atmosphere of place and why the concept of the atmosphere is so well equipped for reflecting this radiant encounter. The material space of radiance reflects the way in which sculpture occupies the space surrounding it and the way it affects us. This relational thinking of the boundary in the

[320] In his 1964 speech to German Sculptor Bernhard Heiliger, Heidegger gives an account of the relation between sculpture and space as agonistic and conflicting. The description of the "strife" between Earth and World in *The Origin of the Work of Art* – not including the account of the boundary in the later added *Zusatz* – may also be seen in this light of confrontation. Interestingly, Mitchell calls attention to Heidegger's remarks on the role of the body in relation to sculpture where he describes the body in terms of a lived body.

[321] Mitchell, Andrew J. *Heidegger Among the Sculptors*, Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 92.

Greek sense points to an opening up—a setting free—a new way of thinking experience as we are drawn to sculpture and its special sense of space. The idea of a space as a middle ground or a "material space of radiance," as suggested by Mitchell, reads well with the notion of the atmosphere introduced here in chapter 3. Like air, atmospheres connect and convey. The atmosphere is exactly a hybrid phenomenon and as a spatial carrier of affectivity it mediates the ecstatic character of being that we encounter in the materiality of place. This becomes clear when we discuss Heidegger's thinking of sculpture in conversation with contemporary modern art and literature.

The Weightlessness of Sculpture

In what follows, I will discuss two works of American sculptor Janet Echelman. Pushing the boundaries of sculpture, Echelman's work brings the potential of sculpture into a contemporary setting, which also means questioning our understanding of place. Echelman's work challenges us by expanding the sense of place from something grounded or rooted to something entirely different. The installation of *1.8 Renwick* in the Bettie Rubenstein Grand Salon for the opening of the Renwick Gallery at the Smithsonian American Art Museum serves to illustrate the complexity of this altered sense of place and experience.

1.8 Renwick, Washington DC, 2015. Photo by Bruce Petschek © Janet Echelman

1.8 Renwick consists of a hand-knotted net structure hanging under the ceiling of the gallery. It is accompanied by projected light and a carpet displaying a topological map of the ocean beneath the sculpture. The inclusion of the carpet is an exception to Echelman's artworks that are almost always installed outside, with no additional artifacts besides the sculpture itself. In this case, however, the carpet serves to enhance the presented narrative. *1.8 Renwick* references the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan that hit the entire region. The rotation of earth was speeded up by 1.8 microseconds per day because of these events, and the title of her work is a reference to the length of time the day was shortened as a result. In this way, the artwork opens up perspectives on globality and the shared character of the world.

What we meet here is an expansive notion of place. Just as the day itself has changed, so has also the sense of place as it appears in *1.8 Renwick*. Echelman's sculpture is designed for a multisensory experience that challenges conventional thinking of place as moored and stable. The immersive character of the work invites for an embodied experience. This is why we are drawn to sculpture in general and the special character of space it presents. *1.8 Renwick* appeals to a multisensory form of experience through an expansive notion of place. It offers a concrete, heterogeneous rendering of space while calling attention to the ambiguity of the boundary as a lived, bodily experience. It is the lived body that engages with the work of Echelman and it is this notion of embodiment that enables us to take in the sense of place that is articulated. The indeterminacy of the boundary is on full spatial display in *1.8 Renwick*, but the multisensory spatiality and the immersive character of the work are themselves established through a clearing-away and making-room that enable the receptive, open attitude of the special character of space in sculpture. Echelman's work explores the unmoored, the ephemeral, the blurred. As we noted, Heidegger does in fact refer to the sensuous body on one occasion in relation to sculpture, but Echelman's work challenges Heidegger's account of sculpture and place because—unlike Chillida's work— it does not articulate a sense of being rooted in place. In Echelman's works, the rooted place is overthrown and in transition due to the floating, indeterminate sculptures and the expansive, multisensory character of her artwork. This is perhaps the most significant difference between the place-based works of Chillida and the free-floating, aerial artworks of Echelman. *1.8 Renwick* calls for a rich and expanded sense of place beyond the elemental sculptures of Chillida. During the opening of *1.8 Renwick*, museum guests encountering the sculpture

laid down on the ground or sat on the floor, seemingly absorbed while trying to take in the artwork. The work makes a powerful impact with an expansive notion of place, exposing the clearing-away of *Räumen*. In this way, the work reveals its character as *Gegend*, region, incorporating the interconnected surroundings in the gathering and belonging of things which "grants the tarrying of things" and thus conditions dwelling.

Unlike *1.8 Renwick*, Echelman's other sculptures are most often designed as site-specific, outdoor installations, some permanent, some temporary. Still, they display the same rootlessness as unbounded, unmoored, and, essentially, open place. They are netted structures, knotted together with a woven texture to explore volumetric form without solid mass. They often elude the conventional notion of sculpture by defying the norms and constraints of gravity, form, and space. Seemingly floating in mid-air, suspended between building blocks or hovering public squares, the ephemeral sculptures call into question the notion of spatiality and the experience of space as rooted. Because of the way they are constructed, the sculptures move softly in the wind and, like *1.8 Renwick,* are illuminated by projected colored light at night to explore the terms of solidity and form. In this sense, Echelman's work also articulates the elemental character of the wind while drawing attention to the indeterminacy of the boundary between space and sculpture. Her 2016 installation, *1.26*, represents all of these features typical of her work.

1.26, Santiago, 2016. Photo by Mark Davis © Janet Echelman

At Santiago's Museo Nacional de Belles Artes in Chile, *1.26* presents the indeterminacy of the boundary—a clearing-away and a making-room—calling attention to the special character of space in the work. At the same time, the tension and wonder of the seemingly solid, yet netted sculpture suspended in mid-air come together in a heterogeneous unity in the work of art. As was the case with *1.8 Renwick*, Echelman's *1.26* also represents a physical event: the 2010 earthquake and tsunami that hit Chile and, again, the title is a reference to the shortened length of the day. In this way, Echelman's sculptures give form to that which is no longer there. In Heidegger's thinking, the boundary as something positive that sets free and opens up leads to the rejection of the idea of the void and of space as an empty container. For Echelman, the boundary also gives rise to something positive in the concrete spatial rendering of artistic expression. As we immerse ourselves in the expansive notion of place, the sculptures open up a shared experience and a reminder of the interdependency and interconnectedness of our lives—from the lived, embodied perspective to the global scale of the cataclysmic physical event. All of this, I would add, points to a deepened sense of place and relationality as the artwork illuminates our own being in place through the special character of space in sculpture.

The Atmosphere of Sculpture

Leaving the earthbound structures of Chillida behind, Echelman invites us to float, exploring the atmospheric qualities of sculpture. Returning to the concept of atmosphere introduced in chapter 3, we now explore the hybrid qualities in sculpture beyond Heidegger's reflections.

As we have seen, Böhme's new aesthetics adopts and develops the concept of atmosphere in order to render the affective, spatial qualities that go beyond the domains of subjectivity and objectivity. It is a hybrid notion, articulating the phenomenon of spatial or environmental attuning. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger had already introduced a similar idea, *Stimmung*, translated in English as "moods," and it is fair to say that Böhme's concept of atmosphere owes a great deal to Heidegger's thinking. Both concepts imply a shared sense of environment and both are tied to human states. We already mentioned this when introducing the concepts in chapter 3. However, if one is to differentiate between the two, Heidegger's concept of mood is first developed in the context of fundamental ontology and, as such, weaved into a *Dasein*-centered think-

ing of space,[322] tied to existential attunement (*Befindtlichkeit*).[323] In contrast, the concept of atmosphere specifically presents the materiality of spatiality. Both concepts carry the tonality of affectivity, but what atmosphere more adequately reflects is the connected nature of our spheric existence. In the atmosphere of place, we encounter the world, and, as a hybrid notion, the atmosphere can be said to reflect the middle ground of "the material space of ecstatic being" related to our being in the world. Unlike moods, atmospheres reflect the touching of the world.

For all these reasons, and because of the weather-like qualities of the atmosphere, explored in more detail in chapter 6, the concept of atmosphere is especially well suited when discussing place in a contemporary context. All the more so, since the role of the atmosphere is also open to the perspective of design as an integral element of the works of art, as reflected in Echelman's work in reference to the perception of space and place.[324] The concept of atmosphere is a complex hybrid of materiality, spatiality, affect, affordance, and place. As such, the atmosphere offers an appropriately broad concept for circling the forces at play in Echelman's sculptures in relation to Heidegger's thinking of sculpture.

As examined in chapter 3, the concept of atmosphere reflects the affectivity and open character of place. It also offers a vocabulary for reflections on the works of art and, as we shall see, perspectives of the way we are in the world. Compared to the works of Echelman, Chillida's art explores a more conventional notion of space and dwelling through elemental, earthbound works embedded in the landscape. Yet, this does not mean the concept of atmosphere does not also apply to Chilida's work. On the contrary, the pre-reflective quality of the atmosphere of place seem a strong influence when encountering Chillida's *Peine del Viento XV*, as the arms of steel combs through the air in the howling winds of the Atlantic Ocean. Echelman's works are transformative by design—changing, floating, moving. And while Chillida insisted on working

[322] *Heidegger among the Sculptors*, p. 6-9.
[323] *Being and Time*, p. 134.
[324] For Echelman the atmosphere is a reflection of our human condition. In contrast, Böhme and Griffero makes the case that atmospheres can also be produced, albeit in a different playing field reflect a separate agenda of cultural criticism: for Böhme and Griffero this opens up a discussion of manipulation particular to our current context of late capitalism. Given the nature of the experience economy and the aestheticization and commodification of culture and the lifeworld, we must be especially mindful of this element of production and manipulation. Still, this is but an aspect of the staging that originates from the arts. As artistic expressions, Echelman's sculptures reflect our basic human condition rather than the instrumentalist paradigm of economic rationality and calculative thinking.

in solid, hard materials, Echelman finds a new expression for sculpture in a soft, ephemeral guise. Chillida's elemental sculptures are in part inspired by the collaboration and dialogue with Heidegger, and communicate a strong sense of place and rootedness in the landscape. When brought into conversation with the contemporary modern artworks of Echelman, this orientation changes with the enhanced notion of place as unmoored, immersive, and ephemeral. Yet, despite the contrast, the works of Echelman and Chillida also share many of the same essential characteristics qua sculptures. Above all, emerging as a common feature is the notion of *Räumen* that opens up and clears away to make room for a receptive dwelling and an open attitude towards being in the world.

As we have examined in the previous chapters on dwelling and place, the sensuous is very much part of our experience of place. It is part of the immersive character of place as we sense and experience place through the materiality and atmosphere of place. This is exactly what is going on in the artworks of Echelman, and, in fact, it is also what is at play in Chillida's sculptures. But whereas Chillida stops short of claiming the bodily presence (of the beholder) in the monumental structures that grow out of the grounds and into the landscape as part of an elemental notion of place and rootedness conveyed, Echelman's ephemeral structures impose themselves on us by way of their *shared character*. They point to this feature of communality on several levels. There is the communal aspect of planetary ecology and the intersubjective character of nature and natural disasters. And there is the communal sense of exposure and fate nested in the at times forgotten insight that *we are in it together*. We are in it together when disaster strikes and nature hits back. And we are in it together in terms of the earth we share and the everyday lives we live. We are in it together as mortals, exposed and vulnerable, living under the same shared sky. Exactly this existential insight that we find in Echelman's aerial artworks also rings throughout the poetry of Juliana Spahr.

In the Air

A reoccurring theme running though *Sojourns* is the Greek wind that aminates the landscape and sacred places that Heidegger visits:

> Over the steep foot of the mountain stood the gleaming-while ruins of the temple in a strong sea breeze. For the wind these few standing columns were the strings of an invisible lyre, the song of which the far-seeing Delian god let resonate over the Cycladic world of islands.[325]

This is how Heidegger first encounters Cape Sounion and the temple of Poseidon. "The strings of the invisible lyre" resonates in the air through the Greek wind. In Nemea, Heidegger makes the same observation and refers to remains of the temple devoted to Zeus as "three strings of an invisible lyre." As it happens, Heidegger's journey in *Sojourns* is mantled by the Northern wind of the Aegean Sea. The springtime visit coincides with the seasonal crescendo of the Northern winds and the gale greets him with resounding force during the visit to the island of Delos and the climb of Mount Kynthos. It is the same air that blows through Chillida's sculptures. Rising out of the coastal rocks of the Atlantic Ocean, the iron sculpture of *The Comb of the Wind* cuts through the howling winds like the comb that it is – much like Heidegger's Apollonian lyre. It is also the same air that flows through Echelman's netted sculptures, hanging in mid-air. And it is the air that makes up the atmosphere and all the qualities of the weather. Yet all these musings on air find another meaning in the work of Spahr.

I introduce the poetry of Spahr to illustrate the special character of space encircled by Heidegger in his thinking on sculpture and to expand on the notion of boundary as *peras* in a reflection of space and place. At the heart of her poetry is air and atmosphere as she explores the vulnerability and exposure of being human reflected in the interwoven and shared character of the world we inhabit. Spahr lives in Brooklyn, New York, and writes in the near aftermath of 9-11. Her poetry is trying to come to terms with the traumatic event of the attack on the World Trade Center in September 2001, as she meditates on the spatiality and bodily constitution as human beings. As the suffocating dust of the Twin Towers settles, Spahr's poetry asks what it means to be human? What is the most basic feature of being human and how do we make sense of it? For Spahr, the answer lies in the air. In our breathing of air and in the fundamentally shared character of the world. In her collection of poems, *thisconnectionofeveryonewithlungs*,[326] Spahr

[325] GA75, pp. 237-238. *Sojourns*, p. 43.
[326] Spahr, Juliana. *This Connection of Everyone with Lungs*. University of California Press, 2005, p. 3 ff.

centers on the aftermath of the attack. Her collection opens with the piece, “Poem Written after September 11, 2001” and it starts with the following lines:

> There are these things:
> cells, the movement of cells and the division of cells,
> and then the general beating of circulation
> and hands, and body, and feet
> and skin that surrounds hands, body, feet.
> This is a shape,
> A shape of blood beating and cells dividing.

Having established the constitution of the body – as a shape – what follows is a meditation on the relation of this shape.

> But outside this shape, there is space:
> There is space between the hands.
> There is space between the hands and space around the hands.
> There is space around the hands and space in the room.
> There is space in the room that surrounds the shapes of everyone’s hands and body and feet and cells and the beating contained within.
> There is space, an uneven space, made by this pattern of bodies.
> This space goes in and out of everyone’s bodies.
> Everyone with lungs breathes the space in and out as everyone
> with lungs breathes the space between the hands in and out as everyone with lungs breathes the space between the hands and the space around the hands in and out

Building on this structure, the poem performs the exhale-inhale movement of breathing. The poem grows by the size of each stanza in a continuous crescendo only to shift direction as it culminates, like the activity of breathing. In this way, the structure of the poem itself mimics our bodily constitution. Spahr wants us to remember our own bodily constitution and the simple fact that we breathe. The poem performs its own structure in the duality of inside and outside. From the cellular inside of the body to the space outside that surrounds the hands and the feet and the body. And yet, one thing transcends this divide: the air we breathe. But to Spahr, this air is space.

It is so as “everyone with lungs breathes the space in and out.” The air is space because, for Spahr, it is space that connects us and separates us.

The repetition of “in and out” adds rhythm and structure. Rhythm and repetition are both primordial features of the constitution of the body. The poem performs a thinking of building. It is a “built” body of elements and parts that come together into a shape. In this respect the human body is to be understood as a gestalt and the elements and limbs come together in the wholeness of the body as “a shape” in that the shape of the poem is the body. Spahr examines our breathing, mimicking its rhythm and repetition line by line in the pulse of “in and out.” During the course of the poem, the space that we breathe grows to global proportions, connecting “the space of the regions and the space of the nations and the space of the continents and islands and the space of the oceans….” As the poem exhales, Spahr places it back in New York with the final lines:

> How connected we are with everyone.
>
> The space of everyone that has just been inside of everyone mixing inside of everyone with nitrogen and oxygen and water vapor and argon and carbon dioxide and suspended dust spores and bacteria mixing inside of everyone with sulfur and sulfuric acid and titanium and nickel and minute silicon particles from pulverized glass and concrete.
>
> How lovely and how doomed this connection of everyone with lungs.

Spahr’s poem ends with a grim reminder of the events of 9-11. It turns out the air we breathe is both a blessing and a curse, for it is the same shared air that also holds the insides of the Twin Towers. It is the dust and dirty air that came to cover the streets of Manhattan for weeks in the mixing space of air and dust. Despite the generality of the theme and the omnipresence of space that flows in and out, Spahr’s poem is also a meditation of place. For it is also a placed poem that reflects a particular place. A place that has been dispersed and evaporated in the air. But also a place that has been absorbed into us all, as if always part of the air like the global event. In this way, Spahr’s poem draws us in and leaves us behind with the double character of ground zero as a place.

9/11, New York © Steffen Nielsen

The poetry of “thisconnectionofeverythingwithlungs” is gripping in that it reminds us that we are, all of us, embodied beings and our that lives intersect organically. We are all part of the same world and part of the same air that we breathe. Part of the thrownness and facticity of being in the world is that we are at the same time both immersed and exposed. Air is the bringer of tidings and giver of life. But it is also a bearer of death and loss. What Spahr reminds us is that air is but a medium. Air is the middle ground or the in between of the atmospheres. Understood in this way, the material radiance of space that we found in the reflections on sculpture, is air. According to Spahr, it is the space that binds us and connects us. The poetry of Spahr presents the compelling message of interconnectedness and vulnerability. The world is shared. And we humans, are mortals indeed, all immersed and exposed as we share and breathe the same encompassing air. A bringer of tidings and giver of life, but also a bearer of death and loss in light of the current pandemic, air is first and foremost the medium in which we live and connect – for better or worse.

But in between the lines of Spahr's poetry I find the transcending character of humanity. Already Aristotle alludes to this transpiring feature of air by calling attention to breathing and speaking. The activity of breathing is the activity of spirit and thus opens the door for a thinking of humanity. Spahr wants to reminds us that we are indeed connected. That we are humans and that we share the world and the air we breathe. For better and worse. We depend on each other in the same way that we need each other. Our shared co-existence is also our shared fate, and in this respect, we are all in it together, as human beings. Spahr's poetry thus addresses the question of dwelling as an illustration of worldhood. Echelman wants portray the same message. It is a message of co-existence and interconnectedness. This connection of everyone with lungs is also the connection of everyone who shares the same biosphere. In this way, both artists offer perspectives that start in the particular but that go beyond the concrete to the general of humanity.

A Forgetting of Air

Sharing the topic of air with the poetry of Spahr, Luce Irigaray also has things to say about Heidegger and *The Forgetting of Air*. She finds that Heidegger's thinking is preoccupied with the element of earth and that the earth-bound grounded characterization of being – as possibly illustrated in the elemental works of Chillida – leads to a claustrophobic sense of containment, as in the house of being, and a forgetting of air. Irigaray acknowledges that in contrast to his other writings on the ontology of being and the rootedness of language and home, there is a new openness emerging in Heidegger's later thinking on sculpture and in the embrace of the boundary understood as *peras* in "Art and Space." She phrases her criticism in a rhetorical question:

> Does this boundary bring Heidegger to a standstill in the march of thought? Should the fluctuations, the occillations, the waverings, and the hesitations that occur repeatedly in "Art and Space" be understood as withholding? Is the philosopher changing position in that piece? Or is he making the "things" move about before him, giving the illusion of a change in position, while he keeps the framing of his point of view fixed?[327]

[327] The Forgetting of Air, p. 20.

Irigaray questions the scope and intentions of Heidegger's findings in his thinking of sculpture. She argues that Heidegger's ontology is irretrievably caught up in a "space-time that is already determined by and for the Being of Man."[328] When viewed in this way, Heidegger's later thinking is a forgetting of air. We may understand air in its widest sense as a well-placed metaphor in a feminist criticism of negligence and bias, but it is also air in a very concrete and sensuous sense. According to Irigaray, "our first home is not in language, but within the ambient air."[329]

On the note of air, we are now in a position to fully explore the lines of development drawn up in this study. The chapter set out to explore Heidegger's visit to Olympia and the potential of sculpture as an alternative mode of being in the world through a reading of Heidegger's reflections on sculpture. In doing so, I encircled the special character of space as a material space of radiance sculpture and identified the key features of clearing-away and making-room as essential to a thinking of dwelling. As noted, the clearing-away of sculpture presupposes an open, receptive attitude that is necessary for authentic dwelling to take place. The open, receptive attitude establishes an alternative, new way of conceiving being in the world that carries with it implications for the way we experience the world.

The inclusion of the artworks of Eduardo Chillida and Janet Echelman offered concrete examples of how sculpture can suggest different notions of place. While Chillida's sculptures present a sense of place rooted and embedded in the landscape, Echelman's artworks explore an expansive notion of place through a multisensory sense of immersion. Heidegger's thinking of the boundary in the essay on sculpture was further explored in the deeply relational aspects of sculpture exemplified in the works of Echelman and in the discussion of the poetry of Spahr. Despite their differences, it turns out these works of art and literature also share a common feature in that they were of greatest significance in illustrating the breadth of experiential space that they shared: an openness that invites one to dwell there and a receptivity toward being in the world. In this way, art illuminates our being in place. The special character of space in sculpture prompts our relation to the world and opens up a place to dwell. As it turns out, our relation to the world and each other is one of interconnectedness. It is precisely this aspect of entanglement that underpins the artworks of Echelman and the writings of Spahr. Like the air we breathe, our lives

[328] Ibid, p. 25.
[329] *Elemental Philosophy*, p. 316.

too intermingle. Whether in the context of globally defining events or in our daily lives, our spheres remain interwoven as we share the same earth and air.

CHAPTER SIX: THE ART OF DWELLING

Toward a Sensitivity of Dwelling

> Well I sing at night, wander by day
> I'm on the road, and it looks like I'm here to stay
>
> The Band, *Endless Highway*

> The waves of the aether roar on always, but for most of the time we have turned off our receivers.
>
> Martin Buber

Tuning into the World

I opened this study quoting Patti Smith on "the indecipherable mayday" from "lost things." According to Smith, "the dead speak," but "we have forgotten how to listen." If we are to agree with Smith – echoing Heidegger – that we have forgotten how to listen, we are left with the choice of one of two options: apathy or empathy. One option is to let go. To simply resign and refrain from further involvement as we accept the state of disconnect in apathy. The more interesting option, as argued here, is to commit ourselves to the question of listening, and to give serious thought to the idea that the act of listening implies a conscious, authentic mode of being in the world that constitutes dwelling. Following this line of thought, dwelling tells us something about what it means to be human. It is a trajectory that leads not to the idleness and indifference of apathy, but rather to an imbuing of meaning and significance that prompts commitment and engagement in our world today. In other words, the task at hand implies a sensitivity in the sense of hearing as listening presupposed in dwelling. Borrowing the concept of resonance from Rosa,

one aspect that has become evident during the course of this study is that there is a deep resonance with the world in the concept of dwelling in terms of the rootedness and sense of belonging. In a critique of Norberg-Schulz, Malpas has deemed the notion of dwelling "an essentially *backward-looking* orientation," but we see now that this critique is raised in the context of a conventional reading of dwelling as *wohnen* exclusively. What is argued here is a critically different understanding of dwelling that adds a much-needed contemporary relevance to the concept and a forward pointing gesture in the form of an openness to a necessarily contemporary orientation of change. What resonates with the past, must necessarily also ring out and reverberate with the present in order for it to make sense and matter to us today. But not only that. For dwelling to make sense today, it must be more than a nostalgic move in the form of a one-way ticket of passive resignation going backwards in time towards that which is lost. Relevance is a two-way street. In order for something to make sense to day – for us to connect to something and for something to hold meaning – it will also need to be culturally relevant. It is this sense-making that can allow us to orientate ourselves in an instrumentalist paradigm that tries to make the world controllable but which has grown numb to a sensitivity of "that which is greater than us." We know now from our investigation of *Sojourns* and sculpture that in order to dwell, we must recalibrate our capacity to listen – to tune in and be attuned in order to dwell. Listening takes effort. Presupposed in the metaphor invoked in *Sojourns* of listening as the dialectic of calling and hearing is the potential of knowing "how to listen." Therein lies the question of receptivity and the open trajectory of potential change. The "how to listen" and "what to listen for" are implied in the act of listening. It points to the receptivity and the performativity involved in the act or mode of listening. And it points to the responsivity of moving when moved. All these aspects of listening resonate throughout the previous chapters of this study and inform what I refer to as *the art of dwelling*.

In this final chapter, I outline a contemporary thinking of dwelling as *the art of dwelling*. I do this as in continuation along the paths laid out in the foregoing chapters on the notions of the *Aufenthalt* and the atmosphere of place. As already anticipated, this means moving beyond Heidegger's own understanding of dwelling understood exclusively as *wohnen*. The message from Heidegger's later writings, including *Sojourns*, is one of anticipation but also of fatalism. According to Heidegger, all we can do is listen and wait. But this also means that Heidegger's thinking remains trapped in the fatalism implied in the history of being. If Heidegger is right that

"only a god can save us,"[330] then all we can do is join Heidegger in the wait for a second coming. In this thinking, only a new, authentic, historic sojourn like the one of the Greeks can redeem us and dethrone the perils of technological modernity. But instead of following Heidegger down this road, what is suggested here is a more optimistic line of thinking; one less prone to the apathy of waiting. I take from Heidegger the motif of receptivity in the sense of an active listening. This is the theme developed in the chapter on sculpture as well as in our analysis of *Sojourns*. There, receptivity was shown to be a condition for listening as the hearing of the calling. But I will argue here that there is indeed an alternative way of being in the world that breaks with the fatalism implied in the history of being by insisting that our present situation holds the potential for authentic being. In this sense we leave the fatalistic Heidegger behind. In what follows I tie together some of the trajectories suggested earlier in this study by again focusing on dwelling as *aufhalten, weilen* and *wohnen*. It is this multi-dimensional concept of dwelling that informs the basis for *the art of dwelling*. At its core, I understand dwelling to be *a form of poetic sensitivity, receptivity, and responsivity*. This is not conceived as a final definition, but rather an exploration of a path that opens up the possibility for dwelling in a modern, contemporary context.

The Art of Dwelling

The art of dwelling can be described as *poetic sensitivity*. By this I mean an open, receptive attitude, a sensitivity characterized by being attuned toward the particular in its particularity. Taken at its core, dwelling reflects a particular way of being in the world that presents an open, receptive attitude of sensitivity. In the dialectic of hearing and calling, it is the act of listening. Dwelling involves "being attuned" and it calls attention to our poetic receptive capacities without which we would be unable to listen. And without which we would not be human. From the thematic reading of Heidegger's late thought stands a recalibrated Heideggerian notion of dwelling. It has something to say about the way we experience the world today and how we are in fact primed for a reorientation toward that which is all too often marginalized and overlooked. In the previous pages, I have often referred to "the particular in its particularity" and have argued for a

[330] Spiegel, Der. "Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel's Interview with Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, vol. 20, no. 4, 1976.

sensitivity to the uniqueness of the singular as a way of being in the world. This is contrasted with an insensitive attitude of a modern mindset of optimization.

The Activity of the *Aufenthalt*

What has emerged in this study – a thematic reading of the concept of dwelling explored through reflections on place and sculpture and informed by Heidegger's journey to Greece – is not a standard exposition of Heidegger's concept of dwelling. Rather, what is presented here is a broader Heideggerian idea of dwelling not to be limited to the metaphor of *wohnen* alone. Having established that dwelling is a composite term of *wohnen*, *weilen* and, *aufhalten*, the investigation has opened the door to a Heideggerian idea of dwelling liberated from the fatalistic tone. The journey to Greece offered a prism into Heidegger's later thinking in which the aforementioned considerations on the nature of dwelling came about, but it also highlighted the centrality for the notion of dwelling as *Aufenthalt* for any contemporary thinking of dwelling. As hinted in the conceptual exposition of dwelling, the term *Aufenthalt* – a stop along the way, a sojourn – is key to understanding what goes on when we dwell in a contemporary sense of the word. The concept of *Aufenthalt* reflects the broader connotation of dwelling inasmuch as it implies existential, temporal, and experiential aspects. The notion of *Aufenthalt* can be said to lift the concept of dwelling beyond the context of *wohnen* and open up the phenomenal sphere of experience. The term can be read in the context of the history of being as an indication of an epoch, say, the Greeks or "us moderns." But critically, the term *Aufenhalt*, as the substantiation of *aufhalten*, also refers to an *activity*, i.e., the act of tarrying with or staying with something. Understood in this way, the emblematic character of the *Aufenthalt* goes beyond the conventional reading of dwelling as *Wohnen*. Some of these insights are already there, hiding in Heidegger's text, yet remain obscured and convoluted. The conceptual exposition in chapter 1 established an overlap between *wohnen* and *aufhalten* in Heidegger's own uses of the terms. This is further emphasized by the grammatical and existential reflexivity implied in *sich aufhalten* that carries the individuating quality of the pronoun. As it turns out, the language of *aufhalten* and *Aufenthalt* reveals the constitutive common denominator for dwelling running through the different aspects of *wohnen* and *weilen*: the activity of the *Aufenthalt* involves the temporal and spatial aspects of dwelling as the staying [*aufhalten*] or tarrying with things for a while [*Weile*], circumscribed in the staying of the

Aufenthalt. All these aspects of dwelling come together in the activity of the sojourn – the *Aufenthalt*. Put another way, on display in the activity of the *Aufenthalt* is the situatedness and the experiential dimension of dwelling as tarrying with or staying with things that turns out to be critical for our sense of engaging with and receiving the world in any meaningful way. It thereby presents an attentive, reflective attitude or way of being in and experiencing the world as opposed to a looming mode of insensitivity or inauthenticity. In this important way, the activity of the *Aufenthalt* is the articulation of the art of dwelling.

The activity of the *Aufenthalt* is obviously central to Heidegger's travel book, *Aufenthalte*. The disruptive experience of placing oneself in the Greek landscape to visit the concrete places of worship calls attention to the experiential dimension of place. As discussed in chapter 2, the visit to the Acropolis is an example of just that. It is the staying with things, the tarrying and lingering of being in a place with all the bodily sensations and atmospheric qualities of the place in the opening of dwelling to which Heidegger responds.

For Heidegger, the world arrives with the ecstasy of the thing, the fourfold, and in the staying with things. This calls for an existential understanding of our own placed character. However, the same is true for the role of the body and our experience of place. This study accentuates the role of the felt body, phenomenally, and the affective, atmospheric qualities of our sense of place. The special character of space as place and the immersive character of embodiment and bodily sensation is on full display in the discussion of sculpture. The dialogue with modern contemporary art and poetry calls attention to the fundamental shared character of our being in the world – in the air we breathe, in places we live, and in our experience of shared atmospheres. The breathing in and out in Spahr's poetry is a phenomenal reminder of the nature of our bodily being in the world and, ultimately, of the facticity of our thrownness.

Spahr's poetry also points to our attunement to the world, the mood [*Stimmung*], in which we sense and receive the world. This attunement is also part of the *Aufenthalt* just as it reflects the abiding character of *weilen*. The immersive character of *weilen* can also be said to carry the mood or *Stimmung* of the moment, thereby mapping onto the thinking of affectivity and atmosphere. As part of one's being in a place one *sinks* into the place, as Casey points out. It is this abiding and tarrying that characterize the *Aufenthalt*. When we stay with things, we open up to the place by sinking into it. This reads well with Heidegger's idea of releasement as a freeing, or

letting be in the "releasement toward things,"[331] It has the same characteristics of immersing oneself in the suspended period of time in the *Aufenthalt*. This is where – and when – the presencing takes place: in the sojourn of the *Aufenthalt*, that is, in *the staying with things for a while* [*Weile*][332].

For all these reasons, the *Aufenthalt* is exemplary of the art of dwelling. As an activity, it opens up and allows for a genuine experience that is made possible by the staying with things in place.

The atmosphere of dwelling

We are now better positioned to fully examine the notion of atmosphere as a force of affectivity through which we become attuned to the world as we come into relation with it. In this way, the notion of atmosphere is an aspect of the activity of the *Aufenthalt*.

I begin with an example of atmosphere from Tomas Espedal's *Bergeners*. Echoing the title of the book, the following passages is part of a smaller entry letter "Bergeners." Espedal writes about his hometown of Bergen in the intertextual framework of Joyce's Dublin. In this respect, place is the real protagonist of the text. Espedal writes:

> First a sniff of wind, and then the wind comes, damp and cold, it's a fresh, good wind. The wind comes like a good, much-needed breath from another place. The wind comes from the sea. The wind comes from the sun, from the clouds, from the mountains, from west or north, the wind comes like a harbinger. Here comes the wind. It touches the hair and face. It pulls at jackets and trousers and pushes us along the city streets. The wind comes like a harbinger of rain.
>
> It'll be raining soon, it's raining now, rain falls. That hard, gentle rain. Tentatively at first, filmy. Small flowers of water. In the air. With the wind, water flowers in the air, with the wind. The way the water droplets unfurl and burst open in the air. The way the water droplets form themselves into a more powerful stream, a harder fall, a heavier rain. It beats. The rain beats against the head and throat. The rain whips and beats, against the throat and mouth, against the windows and doors, against the roofs and walls, against the eyes and face. Hard water. Heavy water, it's no longer rain but water that falls. A grey, malevolent water that falls.

[331] GA16, p. 527. *Discourse on Thinking*, p. 54.
[332] *Art and Space*, p.v123.

> All the water, it feels like home. Like living in a grey, wet darkness, it doesn't vanish. A strip of light. A clearing in the air. A shimmer, which cuts and divides the horizon, sky and sea. And above the sea that rises and the water that falls, a gathering of clouds. White, grey, black clouds being woven into one another, masses and threads, they weave a web in the sky, a heavenly and lovely web of clouds that changes and changes with the wind. Now the water is falling. Now we're home.

As a place, the city brings together the elemental landscape in which it is embedded. Located between the North Sea and the Norwegian landscape, the geography of Bergen brings together elements of contrast. Like Heidegger's bridge, the city of Bergen is a place of gathering and opening. It gathers the elemental, atmospheric sensations of wind, water, air, clouds, and it opens up the painful yet familiar sense and sentiments of home. As a harbinger, the wind invokes the intertwining sense of destiny and destination. The wind opens up the landscape just as the rain opens up memories and feelings of past. As it rains in the city, the rain grows harder and meaner. Espedal plays on the fact that Bergen is known for its rainy weather, but underneath the mundane fact lies the affectivity of place. With place comes pain. Home and pain come together as a Homeric theme in the original sense of nostalgia: *nostos* (homecoming) and *algos* (pain). Like the harboring wind, Espedal's text opens up a sense of place and belonging.

Implied here is the materiality of the elements. The breath of cold, fresh air. The wind against the skin, bringing tears to the eyes. The water droplets growing into a greater stream. The rain beating against the skin. The atmospheric qualities of these elements gather in the multisensory encounter in the phenomenal sphere of place and body. In the atmosphere of place, the wholeness of the gestalt lures in synesthetic perception. But what comes first, place or atmosphere? In the text, the shift in weather and the bodily sensations of the elements of nature give rise to a sense of home. And yet the text is already placed. Home, to Espedal, is Bergen. It is the place from where he writes and it is the place that emerges in the atmosphere of the place. It is a reinforcement of the home town of Bergen as a point of departure and fixation. In keeping with the merging of body and place, what is established here is the *simultaneity* of atmosphere and place in the phenomenal sphere. As a result, it constitutes the sense of place as lived experience through the atmosphere of place and the affectivity of the felt body.

There is a sense of purgation in Espedal's text – a development running through the three stages from the "good wind" over the "beating rain" to the "clearing" sense of home. The text moves us through the atmospheric tonality of the weather. The rain whips as the harshness of nature brings about memories of Bergen. But there is light in the darkness in the sense of a Heideggerian clearing. Espedal speaks of a "clearing in the air" well aware of its philosophical connotations and the dynamics of concealing-revealing implied in Heidegger's thinking. In Espedal's text, the atmosphere establishes a sense of home and with it a sense of comfort and closure. Yet given the range of atmospheric qualities by which the sense of place is established, I want to call attention to the complexity and full range of temperaments involved in the sense of home, the emblematic place, as many-faceted and ambiguous. Espedal's Bergen may emerge in a clearing coda, but it calls for the full-scale tonality of the weather to establish the sense of home. The atmospheric elements that give rise to this sense of place are by no means benign and pleasant. They are ominous and dark. The hardness, the whipping, the beating, the darkness, the heaviness, the malevolence. All of these are features of the weather, atmospheric qualities constituting a sense of place and home. This offers insight about place that is often overlooked, but nonetheless crucial, namely that place is by no means intrinsically good. Rather, it is as complex and conflicting as everything else in the world, so to speak. It is the heterogeneity of place and the affective quality of the atmosphere of place. Conflicting feelings and trajectories may come together in the sense of place, which is why place in and of itself is no guarantee for a harmonious tone or positive mood. Nor is place neutral indifference – in reference to Heidegger's critique of technology. Rather, place and atmosphere are tied together, and as such, the sense of place always opens up an avenue of affectivity.

The connection between place, affectivity, and atmosphere becomes clear if we reflect for a moment on the idea of atmosphere. Hidden beneath the notion of atmosphere is the phenomenon of weather. This means that affectivity is intertwined with the context of meteorology from the very beginning[333]. The vaporous element of *atmos* reads like the air we breathe and feel. And at the heart of the dynamics of weather is the phenomenon of pressure. It is pressure that deter-

[333] Böhme argues that the concept of atmosphere originates from the study of meteorology and that it shares an affinity with the phenomenon of the weather, as discussed by Frølund: Frølund, Sune. "Gernot's Böhme's Sketch for a Weather Phenomenology," *Danish Yearbook of Philosophy*, Vol. 18, 2018, pp. 142-161.

mines how the weather is. Pressure affects the temperature just like the "highs and lows" of atmospheric pressure indicates the nature of weather front ranging from calm or stormy. Similarly, wind is the movement of air. The wind can be hard or gentle. It can be brutal or calm. Established here is the relation between the forces of nature and the effects – and affects – of the atmosphere.

It is precisely the obtrusive character of the weather that produces affectivity in Espedal's text. From the first "sniff of wind" to the beating rain against the skin. Implied in the purgation brought about by the weather in also the heterogeneity of place: the layers of affectivity and memory implied in nostalgia. This complexity challenges the less complex understanding of place and dwelling argued by Norberg-Schulz in his appraisal of the *genius loci*. It seems our sense of place and home may well be more conflicted and complex than is reflected in Dylan's found memories of trains. Smith's dejávù reflects the ambiguity of joy and loss, whereas Spahr's work, in particular, articulate the complex relation to place as both personal and shared, absent and present. Along the same lines, Echelman's sculptures involve an embodied sense of immersion but also invoke the shared domain of co-existence. All of which point to the multilayered character of place. That said, there is a logic to the narrative of homecoming in Espedal's text. After all, the passage does end in a clearing. In this sense, the elements of nature that tears through the text leave behind a coda of catharsis and sanctuary.

As mentioned in the Introduction, I suggest that the concepts of dwelling and place are conceptually related: they overlap and depend on each other. This point now becomes more evident if we consider Espedal's text not just as a reading of place, but also of dwelling. In teasing apart the concept of dwelling, the same move has been applied to the notion of place as a comprehensive term. What now becomes clear is that dwelling and place overlap. In this respect, Espedal's description of the atmosphere of place could just as well be read in relation to the analysis of dwelling. For a person familiar with the geography of Bergen, Espedal's text does indeed reflect and incorporate the surrounding landscape of the city such as the wind from the nearby mountains and the water and rain characteristic to the particular region. But the text also reads well as a Heideggerian exposition of dwelling. The fourfold looms large in the description of the elements and the outstanding components that come together in the atmosphere of place. Not unlike the canonical examples of the bridge and the river, the gathering of the falling rain opens up

the perspective of dwelling. As such, the text goes to prove the intertwining of dwelling and place its description of the atmosphere. In this way, Espedal provides something that Heidegger does not. If all we only had Heidegger's examples of the bridge and the river, it might never occur to us that a focus on atmosphere allows us to see something more. This is because Heidegger's examples are so stylized that atmosphere is not distinguishable, as a discrete element, from the categories of the fourfold. This is true of most or all of Heidegger's philosophical texts. Heidegger's examples are stylized and sparse because he has an agenda and he has constructed these examples with an eye to a particular point. Espedal's description is especially helpful because even though there is a similar authorial aim, there is a very different descriptive range. Espedal includes elements that are not emphasized in Heidegger's texts. Espedal offers an explicit articulation of the role of atmospheres as affective forces. His text thereby adds to the understanding of the experience of place in ways Heidegger's descriptions of the bridge and the river do not. The gathering of the fallen rain opens up the perspective of dwelling precisely because of the atmospheric qualities that come together as Espedal dwells in place.

Echoing a central theme in Heidegger's later thinking, Böhme's theory of atmosphere also emphasizes the ecstatic character of things. Böhme's work fits alongside Heidegger's writings on the thing and the fourfold and complements the expanded notion of place that I have suggested in this study. This hybrid notion of atmosphere presents a common ground in which the thing radiates and affects. In this way we may think of the atmosphere as "the material space of radiance"[334] as explored in the reflections on sculpture. This maps on to the reading of the phenomenal sphere and the perspective of embodied experience discussed in the previous chapters. Emphasizing the experiential dimension of place, this study points to the role of the body and the phenomenal sphere reflecting the atmosphere of place. Taken in its most general sense, place gathers and opens. Whether we refer to the atmospheric qualities of place in terms of atmosphere or ambience, depending on tradition, the concepts overlap and the point is the same: both point to the spatial character and "the pathic feature of experience [that] embodies the effective tonality of situations and involves the modes of attunement of everyday life," Thibaud points out in a reflection on "the fundamental affectivity of being-in-the-world."[335] In his writings on atmosphere as ambience, Thibaud calls attention to the "atmospheric sensitivity of the world." A sociologist

[334] *Heidegger Among The Sculptors*, p. 2.
[335] Thibaud, Jean-Paul. "Afterword: A World of Attunements," in *Worhip Sound Spaces*, Routledge, 2019, p. 214.

of training, Thibaud brings Böhme's theory of atmospheres into conversation with a more ethnographical approach through his notion of ambience calling for "a socio-aesthetics of dwelling." For the same reason, Thibaud reiterates Bernard Waldenfeld's point in *Topographie de l'étranger* that "phenomenology maintains close ties with ethnology because both test and deal with the pathic dimension of experience."[336]

To reiterate, from the perspective of the present study, the important thing to stress is that place and atmosphere intertwine. This does not mean that atmospheres always entail a particular place[337], but that a particular place always come with a particular atmosphere. The spatial character of atmospheres are reflected in the atmospheric affordance of the places we experience. In reference to the thinking of Norbert-Schulz, Pallasmaa indirectly draws out this relation between place and atmosphere:

> Atmosphere is certainly closely related with the spirit of place, its genius loci, as well as our empathic and affective capacities. In the same way that music can charge a spatial or social situation with a particular mood, the ambience of a landscape, townscape or interior space can project similar integrating and encompassing feelings.[338]

As Malpas points out, Norberg-Schulz' concept of the *genius loci* is, however, problematic in that it presents a one-dimensional and intrinsically benign account of place. In contrast, the thinking of atmosphere presented in this study, examined through a reading of Espedal, promotes a broader, more dynamic sense of place in that the concept of atmosphere can also encompass the darker and more ominous sides to the experience of place that must also be reflected in a contemporary thinking of dwelling.

One of the most telling features in the passage from Espedal is the emergent character of the atmosphere of place. From the first sniff of air, the atmosphere builds up and ends in hammering rain. It is a becoming. When we speak of "the atmosphere of place," it is often assumed

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[336] ---. "Urban Ambiences as Common Ground?" in *Lebenswelt*, 4.1, 2014, p. 284.

[337] For the same reason, Böhme distinguishes between "atmosphere" and "the atmospheric." For Böhme, the former applies to the affective encounter that takes place between us and the material environment whereas the latter refers to atmospheres independent of us, such as "the night" or "the morning dawn." Böhme's distinction is not without problems, but a similar categorical distinction is needed to order to fend off subjectivism.

[338] "The Sixth Sense: The Meaning of Atmosphere and Mood." *Architectural Design*, vol. 86, 6, 2016, pp. 126-133 .

to be something static and constant, like the materiality of the earth or the sand of the desert. This line of thinking puts us in dialogue with the *genius loci* concept of Norberg-Schulz, but as it turns out, atmospheres are precisely non-static. Like the weather, atmospheres undergo change. I follow Anderson's analysis in that atmospheres are emergent and non-static. In this understanding, atmospheres are dynamic and becoming. There are a multitude of atmospheres, and while some are bound to the materiality of a particular place, others emerge and overwhelm us. Espedal's text illustrates this arrival. It corresponds with Böhme's argument that the concept of atmospheres originates from the study of meteorology and that it shares an affinity with the phenomenon of the weather.

The concept of atmosphere also has implications for how we think of place in terms of insideness and outsideness. Relph addressed this in his analysis of place. In the same way, Heidegger's reflections on consecration [*weihen*] and the holiness of sacred space presuppose the same delineation as that established in Eliade's distinction of the sacred and the profane. Yet the interchanging character of atmospheres as emergent, non-static forces of affectivity calls attention to the blurriness implicit in place.

Nonetheless, there does seem to be a boundedness to place that resists the changing nature of the weather. We are always in place as we experience the world; our multisensory, embodied experience is always bounded by this orientation. Like the metaphor of the horizon used in hermeneutics, the situatedness of our horizontal orientation of place does not mean that we fail to adapt ourselves in our situatedness. Like horizons, atmospheres meet and merge. In this way, the intrinsic character of place can be said to prevail as a sense of insidedness that is exposed to the world. Place is where we meet the world in the embodied, multisensory experience of the atmospheres of place. We previously identified the meeting of body and place as a phenomenal sphere. Like a sphere, the boundary of place is both steady and exposed. In this sense, place is both static and dynamic.

Given the thinking of atmosphere presented here, we are now able to connect the atmospheric sense of place to the experiential notion of the experience of the *Aufenthalt*. A place is never without atmosphere. Only in the conceptual thinking of place that brackets the activity of *Aufenthalt* can we talk about place as a vacuum, free of the senses and the qualities of the particular. We are always in place and we are always bodily situated and placed in

the world. This means that it is in the atmosphere of the particular place that we experience in an *Aufenthalt* is a receptive and responsive way of being in the world. Dwelling, which is a staying with things in the midst of things, connotes both as sensitivity to atmosphere and an openness to the *Aufenthalt*. They come together in *the art of dwelling*.

As a result, the *Aufenthalt* emerges as an essential mode of dwelling in the attuned space of the atmosphere, that is, in the affectivity of place. Through these converging lines the contours of a contemporary thinking of dwelling emerges. As hinted in the above, there are multiple facets to dwelling if we allow ourselves to move beyond the thinking of *wohnen*. Dwelling, in its richest sense, is a constellatory web of interrelated ways of being that overlap and entangle.

Dwelling as Writing

Perhaps we have all experienced the suspended, prolonged sense of time during moments of reflection. This experiential aspect of dwelling is especially noticeable in literature. Still, few contemporary authors have so embraced the act of dwelling as much as Patti Smith. In her work, dwelling is front and center. As a way of writing, dwelling becomes the signature style of her work. From her familiar window seat, Smith embraces dwelling as a creative act, a mode of reflection. Consider this passage, which ponders over the concept of "real time":

> I closed my notebook and sat in the café thinking about real time. Is it time uninterrupted? Only the present comprehended? Are our thoughts nothing but passing trains, no stops, devoid of dimension, whizzing by massive posters with repeating images? Catching a fragment from a window seat, yet another fragment from the next identical frame? If I write in the present yet digress, is that still real time? Real time, I reasoned, cannot be divided into sections like numbers on the face of a clock. If I write about the past as I simultaneously dwell in the present, am I still in real time? Perhaps there is no past and future, only the perpetual present that contains this trinity of memory. I looked out into the street and noticed the light changing. Perhaps the sun had slipped behind a cloud. Perhaps time had slipped away.[339]

[339] Patti Smith, *M Train*, p. 85.

Like Bachelard before her, Smith is drawn to moments of intense and vivid experience. Her poetry and travelogues are filled with these moments of daydreaming. As with Heidegger's *aufhalten*, she stays with the things near her, taking in the place in her own way. While we may think of dwelling as a pre-reflective or nonintentional mode of being, dwelling for Smith comes as a deliberate practice of writing. In this sense, dwelling is a conscious choice of an author fully aware of the style she wants to project and capture in her work. It would certainly seem quite out of character, if Patti Smith were not dwelling. If we follow Smith's line of thinking, we find that the art of dwelling is not just staffage, but a way of creating. Smith points not simply to her own style of self-presentation, but also, and critically, to the process of creativity itself. For as she lingers around coffee tables, the flow of thought that accompanies her kind of dwelling can be viewed as a way of *räumen*, that is, as the creative receptive act of making room to tune to the frequency by which reflection and creativity may ring out. No doubt, Smith's dwelling is also a staging, but it is tempting also to see it as an act of receptivity. As such, it reflects a central feature of the art of dwelling evident in the reflections on sculpture: a sensitive receptivity which again allows for a response in the form of artistic output, in this case, it is dwelling as writing.

Dwelling as Daydreaming

Take another example of the *Aufenthalt*. In *The Poetry of Space*, Bachelard gives an illustration of dwelling that involves travelling. He pictures a train ride, and with it, the fleeting experience of houses that fly by the window:

> An excellent exercise for the function of inhabiting the dream house consists in taking a train trip. Such a voyage unreels a film of houses that are dreamed, accepted and refused, without our ever having been tempted to stop, as we are when motoring. We are sunk deep in day-dreaming with all verification healthily forbidden.[340]

[340] *The Poetics of Space*, p. 62.

Bachelard places us in the window seat of a moving train coupé. The passage suggests the mode we enter when dwelling. Entering a flow of passing places, the day-dreaming is also a suspended lingering, a pause for reflection not unlike Heidegger's "releasement," the freeing state of thinking. The lingering stay in the train coupé is a reminder of the way Casey's talks about dwelling as sinking into a place. Yet Bachelard's example also points to how to relate to place as movement. In this respect, Bachelard merges the experience of sinking into a reflective state with the experience of traveling and movement. Unknowingly, he bridges Casey's categorizations of place through the experience of being in place while moving. Yet for Bachelard, the focus is on the continuous flow of the "film of houses" that brings about a state of daydreaming as it brackets all conventional verification and reality checks. The train ride also echoes the temporal suspension in *weilen* as an abiding moment of the staying with the flimmering film of houses. In their thinking on atmospheres and attunement, Perés-Gómez and Pallasmaa both emphasize "thickness" or "thick presence"[341] as a quality of the situated experience. And *there is* a thickness to Bachelard's experiences of daydreaming. The "impressions of immensity" come together in the staying with things in the suspension of time – just as we saw it in the passage from Bergson on the experience of listening to music.

Elsewhere, in *The Poetics of Reverie*, Bachelard distinguishes ways of being as dreaming. First, the ordinary sense of dreaming as the absent-mindedness of unconscious daydreams [révasse]. But he contrasts this to what he calls poetic daydreaming – "poetic reverie." Just like the *Aufenhalt*, Bachelard's notion of poetic daydreaming is both an activity and a form of poetic awareness. He describes it as the following:

> All the senses awaken and fall into harmony in poetic reverie. Poetic reverie listens to this polyphony of the senses, and the poetic consciousness must record it.[342]

Bachelard wants to tell us that the act of unstructured, unplanned daydreaming is essential to creation of any kind – which is exactly what emerged as a methodological observation in the reflections on Smith. What we might add that Bachelard's notion of daydreaming as reverie can be

[341] *Attunement*, p. 216.
[342] *The Poetics of Reverie*, p. 6.

read as the activity of the *Aufenthalt*. There is a form of poetic sensitivity in the *Aufenthalf* and it is this attitude that Bachelard explores. And while Heidegger offers a comprehensive account of the ontology of place in relation to the fourfold, he nonetheless neglects the atmosphere or sense of place that Bachelard is more inclined to pick up on. The train ride, in Bachelard's thinking, is one such particular place.

Bachelard is not alone in pointing to the potential that lies in the suspended lingering of the *Aufenthalt*. In *Art as Experience*, John Dewey expresses a similar interest in artistic creation as daydreaming:

> I do not think it can be denied that an element of reverie, of approach to a state of dream, enters into the creation of a work of art, nor that the experience of the work when it is intense often throws one into a similar state. Indeed, it is safe to say that "creative" conceptions in philosophy and science come only to persons who are relaxed to the point of reverie.[343]

Like Bachelard, Dewey connects elements of daydreaming to creativity. Dewey comes from a somewhat different line of thinking, but for him, reverie is part of the creative process. Put differently, imagination is the source of art. When Bachelard refers to "reverie" as daydreaming, it is the origin of the creative thought and imaginative impulses.

Similar to the transitive German verb, *sich aufhalten* and the substantiation of *Aufenthalt*, the French term for daydreaming [*reverie*] can be understood as both an activity and a place. In this sense, Bachelard's thinking is arguably playing on both meanings as Heidegger's does with the term *Aufenthalt*. This ambiguity between activity and place is a fruitful one. It is exactly this tension that is at play in the activity of the *Aufenthalt*. It is this bridging function, the ability to incorporate both an active and a passive sense of the term, that constitutes the possibility of dwelling. We arrive then at a complementary notion of dwelling as a general term that encompasses both the existential dimension of *wohnen*, the experiential dimension of *weilen* and *aufhalten* in the notion of *Aufenthalt*.

[343] Dewey, John. *Art as Experience*. Perigee, 2005, p. 287.

Dwelling as Wonder

One final aspect of the *Aufenthalt* needs mentioning. It has to do with Heidegger's own experience during the visit to Olympia. For Heidegger, the visit becomes a point of reference for his later thinking of sculpture. But it also allows him to reflect on the exemplary sojourn of the Greeks and their relation to the gods. As Hölderlin tells us, the gods have fled. What fuels Heidegger's nostalgia is the fact that we are irreparably removed from the religious world of the past. We live in a disenchanted age of technology – left only with the traces of what once was. The result is a deep sense of detachment and alienation that Heidegger also senses in the journey to Greece. But the same predicament also opens up the question of the role of the wonder. During the visits in *Sojourns*, Heidegger time and again stumbles over traces of Greek wonder. He tracks the afterglow of that which is now lost: a sensitivity to the holy understood as the ability to live in accordance with the divine and to see the world as meaningful. But to what degree is *Sojourns* conclusive? No doubt, Heidegger finds confirmation for his theory of *aletheia* during his visit to Delos. For readers of Heidegger this should come as no surprise. But in another, more general sense, the overarching theme of sensitivity and confirmation is left unanswered. It is easy for Heidegger to speak of the holiness of "the shrine" when standing in the Greek landscape at the site of the temple in Delphi or when speaking of the sacred island of Delos as he reflects on Greek religion. And it is easy to speak of holiness when we discuss the sacred places of American religion in terms of the contested territory of Bears Ears today. But what happens when this question is applied to technologized and secularized Europeans in the 21st century? This seems to me to be the real challenge for a contemporary thinking of dwelling. What does it mean for "us moderns" to dwell when we take our own situation into account? To what degree is a receptivity to "holiness" necessary to feel "at home" and "to dwell" today? Put differently, it is even possible to dwell today? .

Implied here is of course the question of "holiness." What this means for Heidegger given that it seems to transcend the religious traditions that once supported and cultivated the receptive attitude (e.g. Greek religion or native American religion)? Heidegger's own answer to this question in *Sojourns* seems to be that we are "still waiting for the call." Any hope of attaining another sojourn like that of the Greeks requires a second coming, according to his later writ-

ings. But it is not obvious that this kind of religious receptiveness is a possibility for a secularized mindset. I want to set aside the question of "holiness" in a specific, religious sense, and suggest instead that the potential for contemporary dwelling lies in a receptivity in a more general sense. Any attempt to answer this modern predicament will need to move beyond a Heideggerian focus on the history of being. As we move beyond an epochal thinking of being, a contemporary thinking of dwelling will search for an answer in the particularities of the world. If we consider "holiness" in its broadest sense, it simply refers to significance as something that matters and has an impact on us. This has to do with particularity in the sense of our particular lifeworld. It has to do with "awe and wonder" as the experience of something that moves us. In this respect, the affective tonality of the atmosphere of place is an indication of this situated, affective, sensory experience. By insisting on the experience of the particularity of the world, the art of dwelling has called attention to the activity of the *Aufenthalt* and to the particularity of the world as such. As indicated in the examples above, it is in the concreteness of the experience of particularity that we find dwelling – and wonder. In the dwelling of writing, in the intensity of the musical piece, or in the freewheeling thoughts on a window seat during a train ride – it is the tarrying for a while with things in the midst of the things in our particular lifeworld.

In his reading of Heidegger, Malpas, too, seizes on the element of wonder and sensibly argues against reducing the origin of wonder to merely "puzzlement and curiosity." Mapas says instead: "Wonder is something that overtakes us, in which we are caught up, and in which we are given over to the wondrous,"[344] It is a fine summary of precisely the overwhelming power of wonder. It is also the closest Malpas comes to acknowledging something like an atmosphere or force of affectivity, whether one thinks of the emergent atmosphere that grips and captivates us as described by Anderson, or the atmosphere of the weather that places and moves us as described by Espedal. Malpas reflects on the experience of wonder in the context of the work of art and, with that, in the context of place. I take from this that the ecstatic nature of wonder is that which overwhelms. We can also think of wonder and the wondrous in relation to the returning theme in *Sojourns* that occupies Heidegger's thinking, namely: the Greek sensitivity to that which is greater than us and the ability to receive it and live in accordance with it in a sense of "holiness." All of this comes together in the notion of wonder, and yet what comes to the fore in

[344] *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*, p. 257.

Malpas' description is the element of embodied experience. We are "caught up" and "overtaken." Like in the spheric sensation of an atmosphere, we are engulfed and absorbed.

The point I want to make in relation to the wondrous is that of particularity, i.e., the singularity of the world as it presents itself to us in and through place the uniqueness, and perhaps fragility, of the concrete. If there is indeed a sense of wonder to be felt, it comes by dwelling. This sense of wonder does not, however, refer to the religious – although Heidegger makes the claim that only a god can save us – but it refers rather to the sensitivity of the particular in its particularity. Perhaps one of the lasting lessons to take from Heidegger's thinking is the insistence on the affordance of the particular. This means that only if we bracket the leveling universality of modern life through dwelling are we able to regain an authentic relation to the world. In this way the particular in its particularity comes with a sense of wonder for it offers something unique and wonderous, namely the *singularity* of the world in its particularity. This is precisely what we encounter in the atmosphere of place through the activity of dwelling. As such, we are also called on *to respond*, *to care*. Like a Levinasian appeal, it reflects sensitivity in the form of a caring, nurturing, and cultivating dwelling as *wohnen* and *schonen*, as already explored. Yet these aspects emerge only through the concreteness of the particular. Only in the particularity of the lifeworld and in the particularity of place are we able to dwell. This is where re-enchantment arrives. Dwelling is always tied to the particularity of place. This is where the *Aufenthalt* takes place. It is implacement as the placed character of our living and thinking reflected in a phenomenology of lived experience and an awareness of the near. The presencing takes place in the phenomenal sphere of place and body in the atmosphere of place. In this sense, the particularity is the generality. We always dwell in the concrete, particularity of place. Openness to being, that is, a receptivity of listening and the careful reflection of releasement takes place in the concrete. This is where the particular in its particularity resides – and where wonder resides.

Dwelling as Transformation

We have come then to the conclusion of the journey concerning dwelling. What started out as a narrower concept in Heidegger's thinking of *wohnen*, has unfolded into a comprehensive thinking of dwelling as an art of dwelling. Dwelling involves a double movement of receptivity and responsivity, to be attuned to the world and to respond to it. As the world touches us, we touch

the world, raising the ethical perspective of question of the how. For Heidegger, to have a world is also to be invested and attached to it. We already saw this in the analysis of *wohnen* as *schonen*. i.e., the caring and nurturing of sparing. We also raised the perspective of the Anthropocene and the question of connectedness, reflecting the fundamentally shared character of the world and how we relate and intertwine in a communal breathing of existence. This is a way of being in the world that reflects a relation to the particular through receptivity and responsivity. The material space of radiance in the atmosphere of place is where we meet the world. Put in Heideggerian terms, we dwell in the "*Da*" of *Dasein*, but only in the double movement of receiving and responding. This takes place in the sphere of the felt body, immersed in the staying with things in the midst of things in the atmosphere of place.

Looming in the background of the investigation of technology is the saving power of art: literature, poetry, music, sculpture, photography, and writing. Given Heidegger's references to poetry and art throughout his later thinking, this should come as no surprise. This preoccupation with art as a redeeming force has roots in the thinking of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer and, ultimately, in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle. Obviously, this is also part of a contemporary thinking of dwelling. The ambiguity of "art" in the art of dwelling is a reference to this legacy and it points to the fruitful ambiguity of both activity and awareness. Nevertheless, in terms of a thinking of dwelling, I argue there is more to be gleaned from these reflections, which Heidegger himself hints at. Indeed, at the end of the essay on building, he calls dwelling a directive. We must *learn to dwell*. This must be understood both in the immediate context of the housing shortage at the end of the war, but also in a primordial sense as something essential to being human: dwelling as the *Aufenthalt*.

Dwelling thus implies a learning. Not in the direct sense of instruction, but in terms of reflection and awareness. The activity of dwelling calls for a deeper experience of the world. This is precisely why the temporality of the *Aufenthalt* implies a temporal shift or suspension. Whether we go to the opera, read a book, or stand in the Greek landscape in front of the temple of Zeus in Olympia, part of the experience is losing track of time. It is a freeing in the sense of *weilen* and in the sense of making room for the experience in order to receive and respond. Dwelling therefore implies change. We may think of this as an awareness in a formative sense, such as *Buildung*, for instance, or, more indeterminately, as the preliminary move of making

room that we previously encountered. Regardless of how we formulate this point, the experience of dwelling as formative is real.

Another way of phrasing this is in terms of *the transformative influence of dwelling.* This is what is at stake an art of dwelling. The ability to relate to the world in a meaningful way is an authentic mode of relation; the mode of being in the world is affective and affected, shaped by the atmospheres of place that surrounds us and constitute the phenomenal world in which we live. And yet this mode of authentic being tends to escape our modern mindsets as we grow insensitive of the world in its particularity.

In his thinking of resonance, Rosa distinctly formulates what is at risk for a modern mindset. The art of dwelling implies what Rosa refers to as "resonant experiences" that lead to meaningful relations to the world:

> […] a change in how we relate to the world is constitutive of resonant experience. When we resonate with the world, we are no longer the same afterwards. Experiencing resonance *transforms* us, and it is precisely this transformation that makes us feel alive. If we no longer allow ourselves to be called or transformed, if we find ourselves no longer able to effectively *respond* to the multitude of voices all around us, then we feel dead inside, petrified, in short: incapable of resonance.

The passage sums up several themes implicit in the art of dwelling. Yet Rosa fails to emphasize here the critical role of the atmosphere and particularity of place. For only through dwelling are we able to engage in a meaningful relationship with world. Receptivity and responsivity are called for – an attention to the particular in its particularity. We dwell in a concrete place. Part of our task to dwell *here*, to live *here*, to recognize *where we are*. To stay in things is to cultivate a sensitivity to *one's very particular fourfold*. This is what I refer to as *the transformative power of dwelling*: It is the kind of humbling revelation that each of us can have on our own journeys. Sojourns, stops along the way, are pivotal moments in the course of a life. In many cases, these changes in a life course are only visible from a later chapter in life, but this does not mean that the change is not significant when it happens.

Dwelling is a matter of being attuned. We tune into the world through dwelling. As an activity and a capability, dwelling is what makes us human. It brings about the connectedness and shared character of the world as we tune into its frequencies. The poetic antennae are part of what makes us human, but learning to listen to the frequencies of the world through dwelling takes calibration of those same antennae. Yet once we learn to make room for that which otherwise escapes us through a receptive and responsive attitude toward the particular, a new sensitivity is won. This is the transformative power of dwelling: the ability to listen to and continuously interpret and engage with the world in a meaningful, authentic way. This is the art of dwelling.

EPILOGUE

A RETURN TO ATHENS

Exarchia, Athens, 2019

A smell of dust hangs in the air as I enter the building. The front door to the street is broken, gesturing the entrance to what was once a home. I walk through a small hallway and into a dark, small room lit up only by the hallway and an open window facing the courtyard. Once inside, I turn and pause, trying to make sense of the surroundings. The place is shadowy and it takes time to adjust. The floor is full of clothes and things left behind. A single wire hangs from a socket in the wall, separating the space in two. Next to me are the remains of an armchair tarnished by fire and smoke. Pieces of wood and brick lie scattered on the floor between the chair and an empty closet coming off the wall. On the other side of the wire is the door to the hallway where I entered. A single window opens to the outside and a dim light breaks into the room through the broken blinds. Beyond it, the shattered stairs of the fire staircase point upwards.

I open this postscript with a visit to an abandoned house on Ikonomou 15 in Exarchia, Athens. As a reflection on place and dwelling today, it marks a return to Athens. Half a century has passed since Heidegger walked the streets of the city during the visit to the Acropolis and, again, five years later at the invitation of the Greek Academy.[345] The passing of time and the issues raised in this study prompts a Heideggerian question: *How can dwelling be experienced in Athens today?* The example of the abandoned house in Exarchia reminds us that place is contested. Beyond the sheltering qualities, dwelling and place are also shaped by elements of conflict.

During a trip to Greece in the fall of 2019 tracing Heidegger's *Sojourns*, I was sidetracked to the area of Exarchia in the heart of Athens. Boxed between the National Museum of archeology and the buildings of the University of Athens, Exarchia has a history of resistance and anarchy. For many years, the neighborhood has been the home of students and artists, but radical political fractions and anti-establishment movements also reside in the district. For a decade, police had ignored the dealings of Exarchia. A state of peaceful coexistence had emerged in a mutual understanding between police and the residents of the neighborhood – albeit a fragile peace and not without seasonal clashes between authorities and the activist sections of the area. Nevertheless, Exarchia had long upheld its status as a kind of off-the-record sanctuary for hundreds of migrants and refugees seeking shelter in the many squatted houses in the area with the support of the locals. But this all changed in 2019, as a new rightwing government took office on a promise to cleanse the city of Athens from the burden of refugees and anarchist squatters.

As I was walking around Exarchia Square one afternoon, I came upon a burned-out abandoned building on the street of Ikonomou. The building was sealed off and clearly deserted. In front of the house lay burned-out furniture scattered around the street and the façade was covered with graffiti. Most notably, the motto "*¡No Pasarán!*"[346] was sprayed all over the building facade as a reminder of the recent events that had unfolded and transformed the neighborhood little

[345] In 1967, Heidegger in invited back to Athens as a member of the German Academy of Arts by its Greek counterpart. Heidegger gives a lecture on Greek sculpture entitled "The Origin of Art and the Destination of Thinking" in which he draws on his observations from the visits in *Sojourns*.

[346] The phase *¡No Pasarán!* dates back to the Spanish Civil War where it was used by socialist fighters as a unifying cry in the fight against Franco's Falangists during the defense of Madrid. It is associated with a 1936 speech by Dolores Ibárruri, a leading socialist who later became the leader of the Communist Party in Spain. Franco went on to conquer Madrid and win the war over the socialists, but today, the expression is still used among anarchists and anti-establishment movements across Europe as an international slogan of resistance.

more than a month ago: “They shall not pass.” Like so many other places in Greece, the encounter with Athens is first and foremost an encounter of old and new. Woven into the texture of the city are the remains of the ancient world and modern Athens is full of these layers and traces of old. But here, in the shape of the burned-down house, was another kind of trace. Like an open wound, the torched building told a story of human misery and pain.

Until recently, the abandoned house had been occupied by predominantly Syrian refugees who, like so many others, arrived in great numbers on the shores of Greece during the refugee crisis of 2015. All of them had left behind their homes and lives to make the treacherous journey across the Mediterranean Sea into the European Union, only to find themselves ragged and broken in the streets of European cities. Many of these found their way to Athens and, ultimately, to the area of Exarchia. They were the occupants of the squatted house. Displaced people and refugees that had risked their lives to get here. Now, the new hardline administration had cleansed the streets of Exarchia and swept the district of its squatters. At the time of my visit to the area, some of these houses were, however, still active despite the governments stated intentions and efforts. The addresses of these locations were kept secret out of fear that the refugees would be taken to camps outside Athens, stowed away, out of view of the tourists in downtown Athens. For these people, the story continues and, with it, the search for shelter and safety. In this respect, the abandoned house was but a temporary sanctuary – a sojourn – on the way to somewhere else.

Some of the questions raised here are political in nature and fall outside the scope of this study. As such, they are left unanswered. But this abandoned house suggests that the circumstances needed to dwell are a privilege. This aspect cannot be forgotten as we consider the question of dwelling today. In its most basic form, human life and existence is about seeking shelter, nesting, settling, finding home. If we take away the opportunity for displaced people to settle and shelter, the very issue of humanity comes into question, for, as this study argues, dwelling is the “basic character” of being human. What was left behind by the squatters is the reminder that dwelling cannot be taken for granted.

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